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ABSTRACT

Mexican Petroleum: Catalyst for a New Relationship
Between
the United States and Mexico?

(February, 1982)
Manuel R. Millor, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda

If a factor were to be singled out as a useful means
to understand

U.S. -Mexico relations during the twentieth century, that factor
most

likely would be petroleum.

Ownership, exploitation, and commercial-

ization of the Mexican petroleum industry have been at the fore of some
of the most intense episodes of conflict and cooperation between the
two countries since the beginning of the century.

issues such as Mexico's economic and political

At stake have been

independence, the reach

of American power in its sphere of influence, and the friction between
national and private interests in the United States.

This study analyzes the overall

impact of Mexico's newly flour-

ishing petroleum industry on Mexican development, and on the relations

between the United States and Mexico.

Since the mid-1970's, the

existence of huge reserves of oil and natural gas in southeastern
Mexico has brought about a radical reassessment of these relations,
in terms of:

a

new delineation of the goals and expectations of both

nations vis a vis each other; and a new perception, by both, of the
national capabilities of Mexico.

vi

The operational context is complex.

Petroleum circumscribes an

assortment of issues as yet unresolved between the United States and
Mexico, and it is a watershed in bilateral relations.
States, it means

a

For the United

change in its conduct and patterns of action

towards Mexico and, for the latter,

a

definition of its project

as a nation.

If an association based on mutual

interests and benefits is to

evolve, the U.S. government must understand and accept the changes
that are taking place in Mexico, and the emergence of the Mexican

state as

a

middle power with autonomous goals of its own.

Under

other circumstances, the temptation of economic and political

interventionism may effectively obstruct this unique opportunity.
In this context, petroleum is both a source of confidence, and a

quandary.

It may turn out to be a propelling force, or a quagmire.

It corresponds to decision makers in both nations to seize this

historical challenge and convert it into

cooperation.

vii

a

stepping stone for
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CHAPTER

I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Cultural Heritage and Dependency

The understanding of the Latin American region has often been impaired by ethnocentrism.

Scholars and public officials have tended to

view the area with preconceived values and notions about development derived from the historical experiences of the United States and Western
Europe.

And the result has usually been misconceptions about Latin

American society and politics, and frustration with policy failures.
Perhaps the most relevant example of the ethnocentric North American interpretation of Latin America is the Diffusion Model.

This model

assumes a continuum whose two poles are tradition and modernity.

The

concept of tradition implies backward, archaic, and static structures.

Modernity is viewed in terms of social and political mobility, the complexity of the social structure, the degree of specialization of roles
and institutions in the political and social spheres, "democratic" forms

of government, and indicators such as urbanization.

According to the

Diffusion Model, underdevelopment is a condition which has been experienced by all nations at one time or another.

The concept of "progress,"

usually seen in terms of economic growth and industrialization, involves
the passage from the traditional to the modernity end of the continuum.

Obviously, this process is of a teleological character.

In North Ameri-

can social science, structural-functional ism in the writings of

Gabriel Almond and G. Brigham Powell
1

exemplifies this emphasis on

^

2

development as

a

linear progression from traditionalism to
modernity.

Likewise, Walt W. Rostow

applies the same conceptualization to the

stages of economic development.

sion Model include:

a

Other theoretical levels of the Diffu-

preoccupation with stability and orderly change;

the decline of ideology as modernization and technology
advance; and the

notion of development through the spread of knowledge and benefits
from
the developed to the underdeveloped areas.

According to the Diffusion Model, "...the solutions to the problems
and conditions of underdevelopment must originate from beyond the borders

of Latin America."^
a substantial

This notion triggered during the 1950

's

and 1960 's

amount of literature that praised investments in capital

and technology from the United States to Latin America, as decidedly ben-

eficial to the development of the latter.^

Social and political stabil-

ity in Latin America was, of course, a precondition for a greater par-

ticipation of foreign enterprise.
By the end of the 1960

's

Cuban Revolution proved to be
policymakers.

the Diffusion Model was in crisis.
a

The

profoundly disturbing event for U.S.

The answer by the American government to the challenges

posed by the Cuban Revolution was the Alliance for Progress.

But the

Alliance failed to promote consistent socioeconomic development and political democracy.^

Throughout the 1960's, in response to real and

imaginary constitutional and socioeconomic crisis, and to the fear of

communism, many Latin American governments were successively taken over
by the military, as it happened in Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966,

and in Peru in 1968.^

In less than a decade, scholars switched their

events.
appreciations of Latin America in reaction to these various

As

the forebodings about violent upheavals
to come, publicized in the

"scare" literature of the early 1960's.^ failed
to materialize, the

scholarly pendulum swung to a vision of an
"unrevolutionary society,"^^

where the structural and institutional obstacles
to change were quite
resilient.
As the previous expectations of orderly democratic
progress have

subsided, as well as the immediate fear of revolution,
shrouded by the

ascent of the military, various observers have undertaken
the analysis
of the authoritarian-corporatist regimes as a possible dominant
model
for understanding Latin America.

Among the main contributors to this

approach are Howard Wiarda. James Malloy, Philippe Schmitter, Ronald
Newton, and Frederick Pike.

James Malloy sees corporatism as an authoritarian mode of organizing state and society in Latin America.

Regimes such as those of

Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico would seem to share certain basic

elements of the corporative model, such as:

no competition; interest

representation based on enforced limited pluralism; statism; ex officio
membership; and co-optation.

The recognized groups in the corporate re-

gime are organized in vertical functional categories rather than horizontal class categories, and interact with the state through the desig-

nated leaders of authoritatively sanctioned interest associations.

However, there are variations in the corporatist model.

12

For exam-

ple, Guillermo O'Donnell differentiates between the populist authoritar-

ianism of Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil, the mil-

itary-populism of Peru after 1968, and the bureaucratic-authoritarianism
of Brazil since 1964.^^

Alfred Stepan makes a distinction between

4

"inclusionary" corporatism which would correspond to
the populist regimes, and "exclusionary" corporatism, which would
conform with the char-

acteristics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian period.

Philippe

Schmitter approaches the question by referring to two
types of corporatism, state and societal, that would discern the relative
power of govern-

ments and pressure groups.

The theoretical perspective of corporatism in regards to the role
of the state in Latin America, as well as the relationship between state
and society, is heavily indebted to those who stress the cultural heritage of Latin American countries as the key factor in understanding the

region.

From this perspective, the corporate tradition, since the con-

quest and colonization of the area by Spain and Portugal, has consisted

of a complex amalgam of social, cultural, religious, legal, philosophical, and moral principles which support the notion of a functional social hierarchy.

The explanation for current manifestations of corporatism in Latin

America can be derived from historical and cultural antecedents.

Cul-

tural relativism affords an apparently logical perspective for contempo-

ary authoritarianism.

Howard Wiarda argues that Latin America has taken

shape along distinct lines of societal structure, organization, and
functions.

The Latin American colonies were established during the

1500's, on the basis of feudal and medieval institutions very much in

force in Spain at the time.

This fact gave rise to political, economic,

and social constants that, to a varying degree, are still present in the

area, including:

absolutist, hierarchical, elitist, and bureaucratic-

patrimonial political bases; semifeudal, mercantilist, and monopolistic

economic policies;

a

rigid, stratified, closed social system;
and a re-

ligious tradition of Catholic hegemony and
absolutism.

Glen Dealy maintains that Latin American society
is structured ac-

cording to a monistic tradition, just as the United
States has followed
a liberal, pluralistic tradition.

Expressed in other terms, this would

mean that while North American institutions tend to reflect

a Lockean

prospect, Spanish American institutions share a Thomist outlook.

Two

of the central principles of Thomist political thought are organicism
and patriarchal ism.

First, society is based on hierarchy; casuistry

plays a more important role than law or rational behavior.

Second, there

are inequalities inherent in society, which imply the acquiescence of its

members; thus, conflict is resolved by "public acceptance of the supreme
power.

"^^

Wiarda would seem to agree with John Mander in referring to Latin

America as a historically conservative and nonrevolutionary area, "in
the sense of having been cut off and only marginally affected by the
1

great transformations that molded our modern world."

Q

In the view of

Stein and Stein. Latin America has never been able to escape its colonial

legacy.

20

Louis Hartz has added insight to this stance with his

concepts on the fragmentation of European culture and ideology.

Detached

from the originating center, says Hartz. that part of the European nation "loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides... (and)...
lapses into a kind of immobility."^^

Robert Adie and Guy Poitras de-

velop the notion of the "politics of immobility" by stressing the resistance to change and to effective government by the politically predomi-

nant groups in Latin American society.

22

According to Wiarda, the dis-

.

tinctively Iberic-Latin tradition has proven
to be quite resilient.
Through its corporate-organic mold it blended
"the traditional regard
for order and hierarchy with the newer imperative
of change and modernization."

Thus, positivism was assimilated within the
prevailing tradi-

tion, and liberalism was seldom successful .^^

The historical cultural explanations suffer from the
"fallacy of
the single factor."

Undoubtedly, cultural heritage is an important fac-

tor in understanding Latin America, but not the only one.

Douglas

Chalmers warns against the temptation to conclude too soon that
"author-

itarian-corporatist" regimes are here to stay.

Change may be the endur-

ing quality of contemporary Latin American politics.

In what may be

considered as a supplement to historical-cultural explanations. O'Donnell
sees the bureaucratic-authoritarian state as a response to modernizing

pressures, including the "extended political activation of the popular
sector."

25

Other authors point out that recent military coups have been

the result of group conflict.

26

Schmitter delineates state corporatism

or "corporatism from above," as that type most appropriately associated

with modernizing societies, and with the phenomenon of delayed dependent
development.

27

The ideas of these authors constitute a link between the cultural
heritage approach and the imperative of the developmental process.

Malloy sees the emergence of authoritari an- corpora tist regimes as "responses to a general crisis of public authority brought about by the multiple effects of delayed dependent development."

28

An attempt to under-

stand the nature and shortcomings of this process of development is the

dependency model

Most "dependentistas" seem to agree on four
basic themes:
1-

Underdevelopment is the result of

a

certain type of relations between

expanding industrial capitalist nations and
peripheral countries.
2- Development and underdevelopment are two
components of the same sys-

tem, two simultaneous and intimately related
faces of the same global

process.
3-

Underdevelopment is not

a

temporary, evolutionary stage, but a persis-

tent, natural condition.
4- There are external and internal

factors that determine dependency.

The interaction between internal domination and external dependency,

deeply embedded in the structures, institutions, and processes of

is

each Latin American national system.

There are differences between the "dependentistas" in regards to the
analytical approach and the solutions perceived to the problems of under-

development.

The "Conservative" approach

includes scholars such as

Raul Prebisch, Miguel Wionczek. and Anibal Pinto.

sis"

30

The "Prebisch the-

took as its starting point the deteriorating terms of trade for

Latin America, as a result of low income elasticities of demand in its
exports, and high income elasticities in its imports.

From there it

evolved into recommendations to push import-substitution industrialization, encourage economic integration among Latin American countries and

obtain a higher reciprocity in dealing with developed nations.

Prebisch

and Wionczek have no abiding fears of foreign investments, although these

should be more selective and controlled.

Wionczek emphasizes the possi-

bility of solutions to the economic problems born out of Latin America's
own initiatives.^^

Some Marxist "dependentistas" such as Ronald H.

8

Chilcote view this "Conservative approach"
as

a

mere variant of the Dif-

fusion Model, and dismiss the expectations
of attaining economic independence and national development within
the capitalist framework.

The "Moderate" dependency current tends
to place the blame for un-

derdevelopment on internal as well as on external
factors.

They differ

from Prebisch in believing that foreign aid
investments, as well as trade

negotiations, constitute policy weapons used consciously
by the center

against the peripheral economies.
are Helio Jaguaribe, Osvaldo Sunkel

Some of the members of this group
,

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo

Faletto, Celso Furtado, and Theotonio dos Santos.

ment as

a

Sunkel sees develop-

deliberate process which must have as its final consequence the

equalization of social, political, and economic opportunities, internally
as well as in relation to more developed societies.

In a historical

analysis of development in Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto perceive as
the basic problem the fact that political power has never been able to

overcome the contradiction between national society and dependent economy.

35

Jaguaribe analyzes the structural problems of Latin America ac-

cording to three main aspects:

economic, political, social and cultural

stagnation; marginality, internal as well as in relation to the developed
nations; and economic, cultural, and political -military denationaliza3f5

tion.

These three categories define the interaction between internal

domination and external dependency.
between dependency and autonomy.

37

Jaguaribe sees a basic alternative
In general, however, the moderates

are rather vague about policy prescriptions.

The "Radical" dependency approach includes Andre Gunder Frank,

Octavio lanni, James Cockcroft, and James Petras. among others.

This

group sees the interests of Latin America and
those of the center powers,

especially the United States, as intrinsically
contradictory.

According

to Frank, the colonial and neocolonial
relationship to the capitalist me-

tropolis has shaped the economic and class structure,
as well as the culture, of Latin American society.

In this context, there are well defined

class interests for the dominant sector of the
bourgeoisie.

These class

interests of the local capitalists perpetuate the imbalance of
the economy, as well as the repressive central governments.

National capitalism

and the national bourgeoisie do not and cannot offer any way
out of un38
derdevelopment.
Octavio lanni elaborates further on the historical and

structural conditions, internal and external, that generate repression
and bourgeois violence.

It is clear that the Radicals pay much closer

attention to class conflicts than the other dependency currents.

Radi-

cals favor social revolution as the only way out of underdevelopment.

As can be easily seen from above, there is no unified theory of de-

pendency.

However, by necessity a dependency approach to politics must

be historical:

the axis of Latin American dependency has changed, from

Spain and Portugal, to Great Britain, and to the United States.

Like-

wise, the structural and historical arguments central to the dependency

approach imply a theory of conflict.

Dependentistas could be spread

along most points of the political spectrum, in regards to their attitudes towards the role of the state and of social classes in national de-

velopment.

In this context, Chilcote sees a basic difference within the

dependency perspective, between the bourgeois and the Marxist conceptions
of development and underdevelopment in Latin America.

40

The controversy between the cultural relativists and the dependen-

10

tistas is more apparent than real.

tween the two.

To be sure, there are differences be-

Whereas the first emphasize culture and tradition, many

"dependentistas" share the assumption that economic arrangements are
the
primary determinants of political, social, and cultural forms.

On the

other hand, the corporative model seems to share with the moderate and
the conservative conceptions of dependency an appreciation of the role

of the state as the protagonist in Latin America's societal transactions.
In various ways the cultural-corporative and the dependency approaches

are not exclusive, but complementary.

Both cultural and economic factors

must be taken into account to understand Latin America.

However, the de-

pendency approach would seem to have an advantage, that is, the fact that
it affords a more dynamic analysis of both the external influences and

internal changes that, through time, have contributed to shape Latin

Americas society.
From the dependency perspective, direct proximity with the United
States has cost Mexico the loss of more than half of its original territory, various military interventions, repeated interference in its domestic political matters, and economic penetration at all levels.

Mexico's

economy has advanced to higher levels of specialization and complexity,
but not along lines of self-sufficiency and economic autonomy.
nomic dependency has obvious political

And eco-

implications.

But in order to understand Mexico one must also look at the cultur-

al-historical patterns that have conformed it.

The continuance of bu-

reaucratic-patrimonial political arrangements can be traced from colonial
institutions to the present-day one-party system, the institution of the
all
"compadrazgo" and the role of the president as the supreme arbiter of

11

political conflicts.

Octavio Paz refers to the Mexican national charac-

ter as a mask that shields from external pressures but at the
same time

prevents the true identity from surfacing,^^ and stresses that "...the

Mexican is not an essence but

a

history. "^^

And the great Mexican

scholar Alfonso Reyes talks of the "age" of the Mexican people as that
"when all time meets in the present, bringing vapors out of the past and
a breeze from the future."

Research on the questions of dependency and cultural heritage must
be undertaken from an eclectic perspective.

Only an integral approach of

political science, economics, and sociology can begin to elucidate the

complex reality of Latin American countries.

The problem of exclusivity

and narrow specialization permeates the social sciences nowadays.

How-

ever, to give only one example, in the analysis of dependency theory both

comparative politics and international relations play a role.

Dependency

theory itself underlines the fact that there is a somewhat arbitrary dis-

tinction between these two subfields of political science.

Development

The distinctive cultural and developmental patterns of Latin America have given rise to the idea that the region represents a "Fourth

World of Development," that corresponds neither to the earlier capitalist or socialist models, nor to the "new nation" model of Africa and

Asia.^^

In this respect,

the corporative-cultural approach is useful,

indeed, in analyzing these unique characteristics inherent in Latin

America's process of development.
Latin American countries are still in search of models of develop-

12

ment appropriate to their own reality.

Since their inception as indepen-

dent republics they have tried to copy models
such as liberalism and positivism, that are inadequate to deal with the
problems of the area and

result in distortions.

At the same time, most of the prominent develop-

ment theorists, such as Gabriel Almond, Cyril Black,
Karl Deutsch, and
W. W. Rostow, have tended to omit Latin America
from their "universal"

models.

The contemporary definitions of development that are not of much

benefit for the study of Latin America tend to reflect the bias of foreign schemes and solutions.
group.

The Diffusion Model falls within this

Latin American countries are not following the same "progressive"

trajectory or stages that the developed nations went through, because the
conditions are simply different.

By this time it seems clear that the

future of most Latin American political systems will not be the "ideal"
type of Anglo-Saxon democracy.

Likewise, Marxism does not lend itself

easily to the analysis of Latin American society and politics:

"The cat-

egories of Marxian analysis apply to the area at best imperfectly and
through some elaborate stretching that at times leaves them all but un-

recognizable."
all

46

The radical dependency approach which pretends to fit

facets of dependency neatly into Marxist theory usually rely more on

ideology than factual analysis.

On the other hand, the "moderate" depen-

dency and the corporative-cultural approaches, even though not all-inclusive, provide useful insights to understand Latin American reality.
In the history of the Latin American countries, since the middle of

the nineteenth century, there have been three vital objectives that

emerge once and again, as imperatives in the process of consolidation of

13

their respective societies:

national unity; modernization and develop-

ment; and regional integration.
tied.

The two first objectives are intimately

It is indispensable to arrive at a
general definition of what de-

velopment must mean for Latin America, in the context of
these three basic goals.

And it means, basically, the conjunction of economic,
social,

and political advancement.
is basic.

The relationship between these three aspects

A true process of development would tend to spread in
an equi-

table way through all the sectors in society the benefits
obtained by

economic growth, thereby promoting the social welfare of the population.
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that Latin American governments would uphold sovereignty as an essential element of the state, to
be either maintained or achieved by all means.

This assumption, how-

ever, could be effectively challenged to varying degrees in most Latin

American countries, according to the dependency model.
Still pending would be the necessity to conceptualize what is meant
by "advancement."

ments.

And this task is unavoidably qualified by value judge-

Perhaps the best way to proceed would be through the analysis of

some key elements in each of the three broad categories of development:

economic, social, and political.

With respect to economic development, three basic groups of indicators come to mind first:

-Rate of economic growth; per capita and national income.

-Relative weight of primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors.

-Infrastructure (communication, transportation, etc.).
However, these economic indicators should be qualified by two additional considerations:

14

-Penetration of foreign capital, especially
through multinationals.

-Distribution of income.
In regards to economic performance, countries
such as Mexico and

Brazil score high, with impressive growth indexes.

However, the "eco-

nomic miracles" of Mexico and Brazil have been accompanied by
a disturbing

phenomenon:

the increasing control by foreign capital of the most dy-

namic sectors of their economies.

In these as

in most Latin American

countries, national income is distributed very unevenly.
With respect to social development, most of Latin America suffers
the effects of a structural dichotomy:

a

small, modern developed, indus-

trialized, urban sector, and a sizeable backward, archaic, rural, and

static sector.

This division hinders an effective national integration.

However, there is a process of social change all throughout the region,
in varying degrees of intensity.

In this context, development must be

measured in terms of social change:

a

society is developed to the extent

that it guarantees equality and effectiveness of social benefits to all
of its members.

The third great category of development, i.e. political, confronts
us with contradictory views on the nature of political
Si

1

change.

Kalman

vert maintains that asymmetry, clashes and conflicts characterize

Latin America's politics; there is no time for peaceful adjustments of
AO

political relationships.

Martin Needier distinguishes among three

states of stability of the Latin American polity, "stable," "evolving"
(i.e. changes towards increasing harmony among the members of the pol-

ity), and "permanent instability" (i.e. persistent inconsistency among
the elements), and concludes that the patterns of "permanent instability"

15

accurately describe the political life of most of
Latin American countries since independence.^^

Fred W. Riggs suggests that instability may

be a permanent feature of developing countries.

Riggs' conception of the

"prismatic society" revolves around what he denominates as the
"elect,"
a ruling group that reflects the social

£
50
of
compromise.

cleavages and is, thus, incapable

.

Ben Burnett and Kenneth Johnson would seem to concur

with this assessment.

Opposite to the previous view is the idea that development must be
understood in Latin America's own terms.

Howard Wiarda maintains that

"...the question has been not so much one of 'development' or 'modernization' but of reconciling.

.

.the static and vegetative features of the

older, patrimonial-corporate state with the imperatives of a modern, urban, industrial order."

52

It is a matter of "blending the traditional

regard for order and hierarchy with the newer imperative of change and

modernization."

53

Another scholar, Albert Hirschman, points out that

"the very forces that are responsible for stagnation in one period can

make for progressive change in the next."

54

In this context, Charles

Anderson has characterized Latin American politics as

a

"living museum,"

where old as well as new power contenders find accomodation and continue
to exist, operate and interact with each other.
In dealing with political

55

change one must keep in mind the trans-

plantation and adaptation of European political categories to Latin
America.

In his theory of "secondary development," Richard Adams talks

about this phenomenon in terms of assimilation and reorganization, not
of innovation.

But, it should be added, there must always be frictions

in this process, and the end product will

not be the same as any of its

16

components.

The contemporary political crisis in Latin America must be

defined in terms of the necessity to create new models of
development,

which do not ignore those already existent under different historical
settings, but attempt to adapt, readjust, and incorporate some of
their

features with a view towards new results.

This constitutes the sce-

nario for Latin America's political process.

Pressure groups constitute one of the fundamental channels of political action in Latin America.

In the comparative setting of the region,

specific government policies are not extrapolative, but would rather re-

flect the constantly changing conformation of pressure groups in society.

Another avenue of political change is that of political parties.

But at

present, with a few exceptions, mainly Venezuela, the power of other political contenders, especially the military, and the growing importance

of the centralized, authoritarian state, make it more worthwhile to analyze parties in function of their relation to pressure groups, and to the

entire political system.
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A useful approach to pressure groups is Abraham Lowenthal's "bu-

reaucratic politics model."

Lowenthal argues against the "rational pol-

icy model" of decision-making, and suggests that the policies of any

given country are not the result of a single or even a few policymakers,

but the product of a series of interlocking bargaining within the system
among different agencies, groups, and individuals.

The outcome of this

political process would depend on the relation of forces at the time.
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Using a similar approach, Guillermo O'Donnell reaches different con-

clusions.

O'Donnell analyzes the emergence of what he calls the "bureau-

cratic authoritarian" state (BA), in countries such as Brazil, Argentina,

17

and Chile.

The BA is characterized by:

control of higher governmental

positions by persons from complex, bureaucrat!
zed organizations such as
the armed forces, the public bureaucracy,
and large private finns; political and economic exclusion of the
popular sector; and depoliticization.

i.e. reduction of social and political

issues to "technical problems. "^^

"The BA is a system of exclusion of the
popular sector, based on the re-

action of dominant sectors and classes to the
political and economic crisis to which populism and its developmental
ist successors led."^^

Mex-

ico, according to O'Donnell, would be a BA
which established control of

the popular sector before the new expansive trends of
world capitalism

that started in the 1950's.

At the vertex of action by the politically relevant groups in Latin

American countries is the state.

Regardless of the various ideological

orientations, the state is today the protagonist of the process of devel-

opment in most Latin American nations.

Only the state can face the enor-

mous task of gearing development within the framework of sovereignty.

It

must confront the challenges of internal antagonisms, foreign penetration
CO

and clientelism.

The process of socioeconomic development in the Latin American countries is fostering an ever-higher degree of political awareness among all

sectors of the population.

This phenomenon galvanizes political action

towards the expansion of the existing levels of participation.

Legiti-

macy, in the end, rests "on the possibility of identifying the locality
CO

with the center."

Development must lead to equitable economic, social,

and political advancement.

Only in this context can the categories of

political freedom have definite meaning.

However, at present, political

achievement in the Latin American nations seems
to be

a

measure of the

relative portion of the population who enjoy
economic and social prerogatives, and these are, to

a

varying degree, always

Mexico as

a

a

minority.

Case Study

A pertinent means to study the previous
approaches and variables re-

lated to dependency and development, would be
the consideration of spe-

cific Latin American cases.

A framework for analysis is needed that

takes fully into account both domestic development and
foreign relations,

especially with the United States.

At present, Mexico constitutes an

ideal case to illustrate these areas:

the context, cause, and effects

of dependency, vis a vis the process of national development; and the impact of this amalgam on U.S. -Mexican relations.

At present, Mexico's pe-

troleum boom deeply permeates these issues.
If a factor were to be singled out as a useful means to understand

U.S. -Mexico relations during the twentieth century, that factor most

likely would be petroleum.

Ownership, exploitation, and commercializa-

tion of the Mexican petroleum industry have been at the fore of some of
the most intense episodes of conflict and cooperation between the two

countries since the beginning of the century.

At stake have been issues

such as Mexico's economic and political independence, the reach of U.S.

power in its sphere of influence, and the friction between national and

private interests in the United States.
The primary objective of the present study will be to analyze the
overall impact of Mexico's newly flourishing petroleum industry on Mexican development and on the relations between the United States and Mex-
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ico.

Since the mid-1970's, the existence of
huge reserves of oil and

natural gas in Mexico has brought about
a radical reassessment of these

relations, in terms of:

a new

delineation of the goals and expectations

of both countries vis a vis each
other; and a new perception, by both, of
the national capabilities of Mexico.

But the operational context is complex and,
as yet, not determined
by far.

The thesis will be advanced that, far from
representing

cut case of positive development for Mexico, and

a

a

clear-

healthier association

with the United States, petroleum may bring
about, on the one hand, distorted development and increasing dependency in
Mexico, and on the other,
a tortuous and perilous period in U.S. -Mexican
relations.

At present, Mexico's petroleum circumscribes the complex assortment
of issues as yet unresolved between the United States
and Mexico, including:

illegal migrant workers, drug traffic, the terms of technical and

scientific cooperation, the restrictions in the United States market to
Mexico's exports, and Mexico's more assertive foreign policy.

Petroleum

may be the catalyst for better and more amicable relations, or for

crudescence of misunderstanding and conflict.

a re-

The result will be con-

tingent upon the conduct of the respective governments, and of all the
various pressure groups that compete for attention and for the enactment

of specific policies in both countries.
The setting is thus ready for closer friendship or escalating con-

frontation in the relations between the United States and Mexico.

In the

present context, petroleum will be the main propelling factor for these
relations, as the governing political circles in both countries adjust
their decision-making capabilities towards cooperation or conflict.
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CHAPTER

II

EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
A Historical Perspp ctive on United
States-Mexico Relations

The nature and reach of Mexico's development, and
its relations
with the United States, are two closely related
phenomena in Mexican
history, and both have followed unsteady courses.
tion of political impasse at home during

century, Mexico was in

a

a

Because of a situa-

good part of the nineteenth

comparatively defenseless position to safe-

guard its territorial integrity.

The result of the lack of even a mod-

icum of national political consensus was the loss of more than half
of
its territory to the United States in 1848.

Even though U.S. historians have tended to consider "Manifest

Destiny" as

a

non-imperialistic course of demographic expansion, as

compared with the more clearly imperialist era of Theodore Roosevelt,^
it is indeed difficult, from the perspective of Mexico's territorial

dismemberment, not to regard the episode as a part of an imperialistic
design.

The recollection of the Mexican-American War is still deeply

embedded in Mexico's national conscience:

the official name for the

conflict of 1846-1848, "the war of the North American invasion," is

a

reflection of public sensitivities in Mexico.
Geopolitical accommodations between the two countries during the

nineteenth century effectively established, for purposes of future economic exchanges, the predominance of the United States.
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The takeover
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of its territory deprived Mexico of any future
aspirations to great-

power status, which were by that act transferred
to the United States,
and left Mexico prostrated and subjected to the
will of its northern

neighbor.
ful

The war between Mexico and the United States, and
its fate-

climax, were not isolated actions.

They must be considered within

the context of the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in
1824, the Gadsden

Purchase of 1853, and the McLane-Ocampo Treaty of 1859;
the latter,
among various dispositions, gave the United States the right of
transit
through the Istmus of Tehuantepec.^

The Civil War in the United States meant a pause in the expansionist action towards Mexico.

However, those were bitter years for Mex-

ico, too, during which the efforts of Juarez's Reform Movement at na-

tional reconstruction had to be channeled into a desperate struggle

against French imperialism, allied with Mexico's conservative elements.
In short, the period between 1830 and the 1860 's in Mexico, char-

acterized internally by political chaos and economic stagnation, and

externally by the loss of half of the national territory to the United
States and a series of punitive expeditions staged by European powers,

effectively turned Mexico into an appendage of rapidly expanding foreign industrial economies.
The period after the Civil War in the United States, one of rapid
industrial growth, coincided with the era of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico,

during which "peace" and "progress" were the catchwords.

Towards the

end of the nineteenth century, accordingly, U.S. policies with regard
to Mexico shifted to a significant degree from a political to an eco-

nomic motivation.

Throughout 30 years, from 1880 to 1910. Diaz and
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his "positivist" advisers opened the doors of
Mexico to foreign capital

and technology.

American companies invested heavily in Mexican rail-

roads, mining operations, and petroleum
exploitation.

Mexico had amounted to 7 million dollars in 1860.

U.S. trade with

It doubled to 15

million by 1880, doubled again to 36 million by 1890, and
nearly doubled again to 63 million by 1900.

During the early 1890's, Mexico im-

ported 56% and exported 67% of the total of its foreign trade, from
and
to the United States; by 1910 these figures had risen,
respectively, to

63% and 76.4%.

U.S. direct foreign investment rose from 200.2 million

in 1897 to 672 million in 1908.

Of the total investment of the United

States in other countries in 1908. 26.62% was located in Mexico.^
By 1910-1911, foreign capital had controlling interests in 130 of

the 170 biggest corporations in Mexico; this represented 77.7% of the
total capital of the 170 firms.

three countries:

Foreign investment came mainly from

the United States, Great Britain, and France.

U.S.

companies controlled 44% of the total capital investment, that is, they
had by far the preponderant share.

porations were:

Some of the most important U.S. cor-

in mining, the American Smelting and Refining Co.; in

oil, the Mexican Petroleum; in railroads. National Railroads of Mexico
and Kansas City Railroad.

By contrast, Mexican capital had a share of

only 23% of the total capital of the biggest 170 corporations.

4

Representative of some of the views about Mexico prevalent in the
United States during those years is the following statement by William J. Bryan, which dates from 1908:

"Before twenty years. North America will have
swallowed Mexico. The absorption of that country
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by ours is necessary and
inevitable, for economic as well as political reasons.
It will
take place in a natural and
peaceful way, and
will mean the perfection of our
natural accom'5

modation.

. .

Previously, U.S. pressures had
affected Mexican territory; now,
U.S. business and commercial
interests began to affect Mexico's na-

tional resources and communications,
both of which passed increasingly
into foreign concerns, mainly
American.

In this process of penetra-

tion. Diaz's government sponsored the
activities of foreign capital,

while the nascent Mexican bourgeoisie
was clearly subordinated to them.
The peaceful conquest of Mexico, i.e.
dollar diplomacy, economic con-

quest through growing ownership of natural
resources, by means of sales
and concessions of lands and mining interests,
continued unabated during this period.

Internally, the price was excessively high.

The

Dfaz's regime meant the denial of elementary justice
to the majority
of the population.

The accumulation of social discontent, and the in-

creasing political awareness of

a

small middle class, were the main

factors that led to the upheaval of 1910.

The regime of Porfirio Diaz came to an end with the Mexican Revolution of 1910. which also marks the birth of modern Mexico.
can movement of 1910 was an authentic revolution.

The Mexi-

It altered com-

pletely the social structures and destroyed the old aristocracy; it
created the instruments for an economic transformation of the country;
and it eliminated the oligarchy which had monopolized political power.

The Mexican Revolution was a far-reaching effort in a process dating
back to the struggle for independence, to bring into being an entity
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which could be properly called the Mexican
nation.
ple, clearly defined movement;

It was not a sim-

the revolution did not have a mono-

lithic character, not did it evolve in a
single direction.

It was a

tentative, experimental and pragmatic movement
absent, to a great extent, of a prior or even accompanying ideology.

The period between 1910 and 1940 could be characterized
as an intense struggle to achieve structural changes in the
economic, social,
and political spheres.

The actors were, on the one hand, newly mobi-

lized social groups, such as the small middle class, organized labor,
and peasants.

On the opposite side stood conservative groups that had

survived the onslaught of the revolution and wanted to restore the old
status quo. and external forces, represented largely by U.S. business

interests, which persisted in their efforts to preserve and strengthen
their controlling position in Mexico.
To a varying degree, from 1910 until the government of Franklin D.

Roosevelt, U.S. administrations repeatedly intervened in the Mexican

revolutionary process, in defense of American business corporations.
These interventions ranged from subtle campaigns of

outright military invasions.

destabilization to

The following cases illustrate U.S. inter-

ference in Mexico during this period:

-Mexican President Francisco Madero. who for certain was no radical, in 1910 made clear his intentions to pursue certain nationalistic

policies and to deny privileges to foreign capital; for example, he es-

tablished the first tax on petroleum.

As a result, U.S. President

William H. Taft, acting on behalf of American companies, alternatively
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stationed sizable contingents of troops
along the Mexican border and
sent ultimatums to Madero, threatening with
military intervention.^
-U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane
Wilson, incensed by

Madero's refusal to acquiesce in the
activities of foreign capital, by
1912 began to show the symptoms of a phobia against
Madero.

Appar-

ently following orders from President Taft's
State Department, Wilson
plotted to bring about the downfall of Madero's
government, and turned
the American embassy in Mexico City into

spiracy against the Mexican leader.

a

center of intrigues and con-

Finally, through an alliance with

General Victoriano Huerta. known as the "Pact of the Ciudadela,"
Wilson

succeeded:

in February,

1913, Madero was first overthrown and then mur-

dered, together with his vice-president.^

-Under the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, several
grave incidents took place, such as the armed occupation by U.S. marines
of the Mexican ports of Tampico and Veracruz in 1914. and General

Pershing's punitive expedition from mid-1916 until early 1917 in pursuit
of Mexican revolutionist Francisco Villa, who had previously raided the

American border town of Columbus, in New Mexico.
-Warren G. Harding's government extended strong official support
to the claims of U.S. corporations, and pressured the Mexican government
in 1922 to accede to the payment of what the Mexicans thought to be an

exorbitant foreign debt, in return for U.S. recognition.

During the

Bucareli Conferences of 1923, the U.S. government pressured Mexico's

Obregon administration to recognize the unaffectabil ity of the holdings
of the U.S. petroleum corporations in Mexico.

g
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In spite of U.S.

interventions and pressures, the Mexican
Revolu-

tion fulfilled significant goals.

for Mexican nationalism and

a

Above all, it became

symbol of national unity.

a

rallying point
In more con-

crete terms, the highest point of achievement was
reached with the Con-

stitution of 1917, which stands as the most radical
document of its
time.

It embodied the revolutionary doctrine that the
common welfare

takes precedence over the parochial rights of the
individual.

And. per-

tinent to future relations with the United States, the
Constitution of
1917 gave ample flexibility and power to the Mexican State to define,

modify, and extend its authority in a wide variety of functions.

The Travails of the Mexican Petroleum Industry:

1901-1938

The development of the Mexican oil industry, between the years 1901
and 1938, could be divided into four stages.^

The first stage is the

period from 1901 to 1910 when, under Porfirio Diaz, production in-

creased at a modest but steady rate; during these years the industry was
for the first time economically important.

The second stage runs from

1911 to 1921, when the highest level of production was reached:

Mexico

was responsible for up to 25% of the world's supply; only the United
States produced more oil.

production suffered

a

During the third stage, from 1922 to 1933,

dramatic drop.

And the fourth stage, from 1933

to the expropriation in 1938, was a period of relative improvement in

the levels of production.

Traditionally, Mexican oil exploration followed the practices inherited from colonial times:

ownership regulations established that
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property of the subsoil was never separated
from the Crown, which held
it for the "public good;" the owner of
the surface rights never acquired

property rights over the resources in the
subsoil.

This precedent

was

reinforced during the Reform Movement in Mexico in
the 1860's, when the
Juarez's administration made clear in 1863 that
"...coal and petroleum

constitute part of the dominion of the nation.
In a series of laws, Porfirio Diaz altered
the concept of national

ownership over subsoil deposits.

The "Mining Law of 1884" made petro-

leum and other minerals the exclusive property of the owner of
the land.
The "Mining Law of 1892" restricted the surface owner's right to
ex-

ploit fully certain minerals, but permitted free exploitation of combustible minerals, including petroleum, without need for concessions.'^^
The "Petroleum Law of 1901," concerned itself with concessions rather
than titles to the land, and gave the Executive Branch the power to

grant permits to explore certain lands and waters under federal jurisdiction.
oil wells,

This law extended to the companies which discovered successful
the privilege of exclusive rights to surrounding lands.

Finally, the "Mining Law of 1909" reaffirmed the ownership of deposits
of mineral fuels by the owner of the surface.

12

As a result of these laws, by 1910 landowners had all rights to the

subsoil; foreign purchasers of Mexican lands acquired subsoil as well as

surface rights, a practice which was actually the Anglo-American system,
and contrary to the Mexican tradition.

Through these laws foreign oil

companies bought large holdings, in the hope that they would prove to
have a rich subsoil.

In the case of federal

lands, the Executive could
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issue permits for unrestricted exploitation,
which were tantamount to

ownership.

Besides subsoil rights. Dfaz granted
foreign oil companies

other privileges.

Exempt from import taxes was the machinery
brought

into the country for the development
of the oil fields.
oil were not taxed, and neither
was the capital

By-products of

invested in oil.

Dfaz was in power, there was no export
tax on oil.

While

The oil fields them-

selves were taxed, but at the rate of
cheap agricultural lands, with no

consideration given to their subsoil wealth.^^
In this way,

large petroleum properties passed into the hands
of

American and British corporations.

The aforementioned laws would later

be the cause of many problems between foreign oil
companies and the

post-revolutionary governments of Mexico.
Incipient exploration had taken place before 1900, but steady ex-

ploration and exploitation did not come until after the turn of the
century.

Two Americans, Edward L. Doheny and Charles A. Garfield, and two

British. Weetman Pearson and Lord Cowdray. established themselves as the
leaders of the Mexican petroleum industry during this period; together
they controlled 98% of the oil production.

Doheny founded the Mexican

Petroleum Company, which would later be sold to Standard Oil; Pearson
founded the Pearson and Son Ltd., which would be sold to the Royal
Dutch-Shell.

Production during the first decade of the century was

about 13 million barrels of oil a year.^^

Around 1910 huge new reserves were discovered in the Mexican state
of Veracruz, which rapidly raised the level of production.

By 1917.

Mexico occupied the third place in the world as an oil-producing nation,
with 55,292,767 barrels annually; oil became the principal Mexican

export.

By 1921. foreign producers were pumping out
and exporting

193,397.586 barrels per year, about 25% of the entire world
output at
the time, which gave Mexico the second place as an
oil-producing country.

The companies based in Mexico supplied most of the oil
imports by

the United States.

There are several reasons that help explain the fact that,
while
the Revolution brought havoc on the Mexican economy, the oil
industry

was actually enjoying a boom.

The oil industry was located mostly

along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, far from the main battlegrounds,
and did not rely on inland transportation.

Besides, the most important

oil-producing area at the time. Tuxpan and Tampico, enjoyed "revolutionary protection" by the troops of General Pelaez.-^^

On the other

hand, the world demand due to increasing industrialization and to the

First World War promised high profits.
The Constitution of 1917 was a direct challenge to the established

practices and activities related to the petroleum industry in Mexico.
The land reforms which had attracted the foreign oil companies were repealed, and restrictions to their investments were added.

became again the inalienable property of the nation.

In

The subsoil

Article 27 of

the Constitution, all resources lying in a natural state in the na-

tional subsoil, such as petroleum and minerals, were thereby declared
to be the property of the nation and not of the person or corporation

that owned the surface above it.

This was a reversion back to the old

system of land ownership that had existed prior to the regime of

Porfirio Dfaz.

Article 27 enunciated the following:
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"The ownership of lands and waters... is vested
originally in the nation which... has the right
to transmit title thereto to private persons...
(however) the nation shall have at all times
the right to impose upon private property such
restrictions as the public interest may require...
in order to conserve and equitably distribute
the public wealth... In the nation is vested
direct ownershio of all minerals or substances
(in the subsoil) .. .sol id mineral fuels; petroleum and all hydrocarbons, solid, liquid or
gaseous
The ownership of the nation is
inalienable and imprescriptible. ."18
.

The same article specified that concessions to own or exploit natural resources could be granted only to Mexican citizens or companies.

The State could grant similar rights to foreigners, as long as they

agreed to be regarded juridically as Mexicans in their operations, and
to waive all right of appeal to foreign nations for protection.

For-

eigners were forbidden to acquire ownership of lands and waters within
a

one-hundred kilometer zone from the national boundaries, or within
in

fifty kilometers from the seacoast.
The general consensus was that Mexico had the right to nationalize
those petroleum deposits not already in private hands.

However, the

crucial point was whether Article 27 of the Constitution was retro-

active or not.

The reach of the doctrine of property set forth in

Article 27 was limited somehow by

a

provision to the effect that no mea-

sure would be applied retroactively, but there was a qualifying clause

that permitted revisions of past concessions which were deemed to be
harmful to the public interest.

Thus, in reality, it was left up to

the Mexican President to determine the path to follow in reasserting

national ownership of natural resources.
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Mexican President Carranza had at first
privately promised that

Article 27 would not be applied retroactively,
but in 1918, as

facet

a

of his running confrontation with the
United States government, he pro-

ceeded to decree that, after all. it was indeed
retroactive.
remained unresolved for the next two years.

The issue

In 1920, Carranza was over-

thrown by General Obregon, who then became President
of Mexico.

Obregdn

reaffirmed the promise of not applying Article 27
retroactively, but
refused the request of U.S. Secretary of State Hughes to put
it into a
formal treaty.

It was for this reason that Hughes effectively blocked

U.S. recognition of Obregon

's

government.

Obviously, there was

a

degree

of correspondence between the actions of the U.S. government, and
those
of U.S. private companies with interests in the Mexican economy.
In a series of legal

oil

cases dealing with the rights of the foreign

companies, the Mexican Supreme Court, in apparent contradiction with

the Constitution, stated the "positive acts" principle.

This meant that

Article 27 was not retroactive on lands where "positive acts," such as
drilling

a

well, had been performed by owners before 1917; if this was

the case, then full ownership could not be questioned.

However, if no

such act had been performed, then the owner forfeited subsoil rights.

20

This compromise would have been acceptable to the U.S. State De-

partment if its permanency could have been guaranteed.

But Obregon was

fearful that if he yielded too much to the U.S. government, domestic

repercussions might ensue; therefore, he still refused to make
with the United States.

a

treaty

However, Obregon did enter into an "extra-

official" pact, known as the "Bucareli Agreement," which embodied the
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"positive acts" principle.

The agreement led to the official
recogni-

tion of Obregon by the U.S. government
on August 31. 1923.^^

Obregon's successor. Plutarco Elias Calles
(1924-1928). adopted
at first a tough stance in the continuing
negotiations with the U.S.
oil

companies.

In 1925 the Mexican Congress passed a
petroleum law

limiting the ownership of oil rights acquired before
1917 to fifty

years.

Thus, the Bucareli Agreement was considered to be no
longer in

effect.

The foreign oil companies protested accordingly, expressing

their dissatisfaction, and bringing about new negotiations.^^

After

a long

process of bargaining, in December, 1927, the Mexican

Congress adopted a new "Petroleum Code," which embodied the terms of
the Bucareli Agreement.

This new code satisfied the U.S. State Depart-

ment, as American concerns could now rely upon the Mexican courts for

protection.

Based on this code, shortly thereafter, in 1928, the

Morrow-Call es Act went into effect, under which U.S. oil companies
could no longer look forward to expanding their activities in Mexico.
On the other hand, those properties on which they had performed "positive acts" before 1917 were tacitly theirs for intensive development to

perpetuity.

The oil companies had, in exchange, implicitly agreed that

subsoil deposits were nationally, and not privately owned resources.
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If the Mexican petroleum industry gained importance during the

period 1911-1921, its decline between 1925 and 1927 was equally drastic.

As a result of the unstable conditions in Mexico regarding prop-

erty rights in the oil industry, foreign oil companies started turning

their attention to Venezuela, which at the time was far more "cooperative" than Mexico, and appeared to have more petroleum, anyway.

Large

discoveries of oil in Oklahoma and Texas
also made operations in Mexico
less important.

In any case, the length of time
during which Mexico

could continue to supply new reserves
for exploitation seemed to be uncertain.

The decline in production in the Tampico
fields appeared to be

directly related to the controversy over
the Mexican legislation of
1925.

But there were other, more ominous reasons,
for the decline and

for Mexico's future as an oil-producing
nation.

In the rich fields of

Tuxpan, for example, the foreign oil companies
had exploited the wells
irrationally, at full capacity, bringing about the
filtering of salt

water into the oil deposits and their subsequent destruction.^^
The oil companies had been steadily losing importance in
the Mexican economy since 1921.

In that year, when the highest peak in produc-

tion was reached, the industry accounted for 6.92% of Mexico's 6NP;
by
1936 it had slipped to only 1.83% of the total GNP.

During the period

of peak production, the petroleum industry employed between 30,000 and

50.000 workers, or about 0.7-0.8% of the Mexican labor force.

By 1936,

only 14,000 workers were employed, that is, approximately 0.23% of the

work force.
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In 1922, the Mexican treasury had received 88 million

pesos in taxes from the oil companies; this figure dropped to 19 million pesos by 1927.^^

Foreign investments in the petroleum industry fell from a total of
862 million pesos in 1923 to a mere 107 million at the time of the ex-

propriation in 1938.
the Mexican oil
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Towards the end of 1924, capital investment in

industry was estimated to be around 800 million pesos.

Of this sum, American capital represented 57.46%; the British con-

trolled 26.16%; and the Dutch had 11.37%.

Only 3.02% of the invested
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capital was Mexican.

From these investments, foreign companies
had ob-

tained, by 1924. almost 2.000 million
pesos, from the sale of a little

over one billion barrel s.^^
There was a clear drop in operations after
1926.

By 1927, refin-

eries had cut down their activities by
40%. in relation to the year
1924.

In 1927 the Royal

Dutch Shell suspended its drilling and pumping

operations, and cut down to a third its refining
operations .^^

The

companies stated several reasons for their declining
operations, in-

cluding the arguments over the implementation of Article 27
of the Mexican Constitution, the denial of new drilling permits,
less productive

wells, and high taxation.
Even though by 1928 the legal controversy seemed to be solved, the

entrance of Venezuelan exports in the oil market, and the increase in

production in the United States proper, lessened the interest of the
foreign companies in Mexican oil.
a

During the following years there was

relative improvement in production, but never to the levels of the

early 1920's.

The Oil Expropriation of 1938

In 1934, when La'zaro Cardenas took over the Presidency of Mexico,

the Mexican economy was still very much under the control of foreign

corporations, this in spite of the fact that 18 years had elapsed since
the enactment of the Constitution of 1917.

Total foreign investments

reached a value of 3,900 million pesos in 1935.

The importance of this

figure is easily ascertained by the fact that in that same year the GNP
of Mexico was barely 4,500 million pesos.
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In many ways. Cardenas
symbolized the climax of the
Mexican Revo-

lution.

He adopted a policy of profound
structural changes.

From the
beginning of his government. Cardenas
accelerated agrarian reform. By
1936. this policy was affecting properties
that belonged to important

American concerns, such as the Chihauhua
Cattle Co. and the Cunningham
Investment Co.

Additional lands that belonged to U.S.
companies were

also taken over in Baja California
and the Yaqui Valley of northwest

Mexico.

Under the administration of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the U.S.

State Department recognized the right of
Mexico to expropriate those
lands, but asked the Mexican government
to offer

a

just compensation.

By 1938 Mexico had started paying
these indemnities.

This time the U.S.

government was showing patience in something that
affected the interests of its business corporations; there were
no notes with threats or

ultimatums, as had been the case before for much minor
causes.

In

June. 1937. the Cardenas government proceeded to expropriate
the railroads.

The Mexican State assumed the direct obligations of the rail-

roads' debt, and reached an agreement with the International
Committee

of Bankers; the final settlement for the compensation would be reached

under the following administration of Manuel Avila Camacho.^^
But the issue that brought to a head all the past conflicts between the United States and Mexico was the expropriation of the petroleum industry in 1938.

Since 1917 the various Mexican administrations

had tried, unsuccessfully, to apply effectively Article 27 of the Mexi-

can Constitution and to carry out the nationalization of the subsoil.
In the end, foreign corporations, often backed by the U.S. government,

had held their ground; for example, the Mexican government had not

41

been able to make foreign petroleum
companies comply with Mexican tax
33
laws.
By 1938, however, Lazaro Cardenas
had consolidated his political

position firmly enough so that he felt
confident to challenge the

power of the foreign oil companies, natural
targets of the resurgent
revolution.

At the outset of the disputes, it was the question
of labor relations that brought matters to a standstill.

What the issue finally

came down to was whether the foreign oil companies
would conform to the

conditions and restrictions of Article 123 of the Mexican
Constitution,

dealing with the rights of workers, and backed not only by
Mexican labor unions, but by the CaVdenas' government.

Article 123 granted Mexi-

can workers guarantees such as the eight-hour day, equal pay for
equal

work, control of wages, and the abolition of child labor, and established the responsibility of employers in protecting the workers

against occupational accidents and diseases.

On the other hand. Arti-

cle 123 guaranteed the right of the workers to organize and bargain for
the defense of their common interests through unions, and to strike.

Strikes were considered to be licit when their objective was to achieve
the equilibrium among the various factors of production.
In 1934, during his Presidential

campaign, Cardenas had asked the

Mexican workers to organize themselves in order to pressure him to satisfy the needs of the people.

In his annual

Presidential message of

1935, Cardenas criticized the oil legislation of 1925, because it did

not comply with the fundamental principles of Article 27 of the Constitution.

In that same message, Ca'rdenas pointed out that, while oil

taxes in Mexico were just 1.82 pesos per barrel, in the United States

they amounted to 4.1C pesos per barrel.

Shortly afterwards. Cardenas

consolidated the twenty-one Mexican oil unions
into the National Petroleum Workers' Union.

In 1936. the Mexican Confederation of
Workers

(CTM) was organized, which included
the most important Mexican labor

unions; the National Petroleum Workers' Union
merged into the CTM.

The

CTM had in 1938 a total of 600.000 affiliated
workers, of whom 15.000

worked for the foreign oil companies.
Later in 1936. the Petroleum Union struck for the adoption
of

a

new nationwide contract, based on the guarantees stipulated
in Article
123 of the Constitution.

All bargaining failed.

After a six-month

cooling-off period of discussions between union and company leaders,
which ended with no results in sight, the union called for binding arbi
tration, reinforcing its demands with a strike in May, 1937.

On Au-

gust 3, 1937, the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration delivered

a re-

port in which it criticized the foreign oil companies for their respon-

sibility in the decline of production and for reselling oil back to

Mexico at

a

higher price.

The Board found the workers' demands justi-

fiable, and ordered an increase in wages of 27%, as well as social benefits and better working conditions.
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The foreign companies refused to comply, and appealed to the Mexican Supreme Court.

Their appeal was denied on March

still refused to accept the ruling of the Board.

1,

1938. but they

The companies then

tried delaying tactics, which only helped Cardenas in rallying public

opinion against them.

The impasse in the oil industry took the form of

an "economic conflict" which threatened Mexico's very viability; thus

the matter passed into Federal channels.

The companies now faced the
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government, rather than the union.

Bribery failed.

As Cardenas took

steps towards expropriation,
the stunned foreign corporations
finally
agreed to pay the additional
benefits for the workers on March
16. but
by then it was too late.
On March 18. 1938. Cardenas
issued the decree
of expropriation.^^

The conjunction of internal and
external conditions in the late
1930's made possible the expropriation.

achieved

a

Internally, by 1938 Mexico had

considerable degree of national unity, higher
than ever be-

fore in its history.

The central government under Cardenas had
man-

aged, to a significant extent, to neutralize
centrifugal forces deeply

embedded in Mexico's social fabric.

The revolution seemed to have come

to fruition, through government actions
such as the agrarian reform and

the nationalization of the railroads.

Under these circumstances, the

protracted dealings between the foreign oil corporations and.
in succession, the petroleum workers' union and then the Mexican
government,

served to incense and rally public opinion behind the nationalization.

Externally. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" (and its impact in

Mexico through the good offices of U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels),
and his affirmation of the policy of nonintervention, as well as the

forebodings

of the European conflict, made possible a healthy differ-

entiation between the interests of the United States as
those of some of its private companies.

a

nation, and

President Roosevelt acknowl-

edged the principle of international law that underlines the right of

a

sovereign nation to expropriate holdings with the objective of public
utility, as long as an immediate and fair indemnity takes place.
in spite of a strong worldwide campaign by the petroleum companies

Thus,
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against Mexico, finally these had
to settle their differences through
negotiations.
In the end. Mexico paid a sizeable
indemnity.

After long and dif-

ficult diplomatic negotiations, the two
countries signed

pact on No-

a

vember 19, 1941. called the Mexican-American
General Agreement, that
settled in

a

global way all U.S. claims against Mexico,
agrarian as well

as those related to petroleum.

On April

17. 1942, the Commission in

charge of the negotiations ended its mission and
presented

a

report on

the value of the expropriated American holdings;
these were estimated
to be worth 23.995,991 dollars, of which Standard
Oil was assigned

18.300,000 dollars.

Mexico paid

a

third of the debt by July of that

same year, and the rest in five equal yearly payments."^®

The indemnity

to the British oil companies, which owned a greater share of the
indus-

try, was much more substantial.

The oil expropriation was the apex of nationalistic fervor during
the Cardenas' years.

Afterwards, extenuated by the struggle with the

foreign oil corporations, and their international campaign against Mexican exports. Cardenas was not able, or willing, to proceed to nationalize the mining industry.

For his successors, as we will see, it was a

matter of attracting, not fending off, foreign investments.

Fluctuations of the Nationalized Oil Industry:

1938-1976

The nationalization of tie oil Industry did not start

expropriations by the Mexican government.

a

series of

The expropriation of the

railroads had already taken place, and the cases in which the agrarian

reform affected U.S. interests were solved peacefully through the
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Mexican-American 3en?ra.l Agreement.

It could be argued that Cardena
s

did not have a preconceived idea of
nationalizing the oil industry.

According to this point of view, events themselves
would have precipitated the take-over in 1938.

In any case, Cardenas'

administration

pushed ahead with the reorganization of the Industry,
and on June 7,
1938, "Mexican Petroleum" (PEMEX) was created as

a

public institution.

By August. 1940, Pemex had in effect centralized
all

the oil -related

activities in Mexico.

After the nationalization, Mexico's role as an oil exporter declined sharply, mainly as

a

result of the international boycott imposed

by the expropriated oil companies. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Royal

Dutch Shell.

Whereas in February, 1938, Mexico had exported

2

million

barrels of oil, this figure dropped dramatically to only 311,000 barrels
by April of that same year.^^

Thus, after 1938, and until the mid-

1970's, oil production was channeled almost entirely towards the domestic market.
cial

Indeed, the nationalization of the oil

industry was

a

cru-

factor in Mexico's impressive rate of economic growth beginning

with the late 1940's.

It also contributed significantly to stabilize

the country politically, rallying substantial sectors of the population

around a revived nationalistic mystique.
The overall objectives of the expropriation and nationalization of
the oil

industry could be placed in two categories:

to provide suffi-

cient energy for the general progress of Mexico; and to turn the oil in-

dustry into the key element for achieving Mexico's independent economic

development.^^

It could be effectively argued that the first purpose

was adequately accomplished.

The oil industry radically changed its
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structure:

it shifted its orientation from
the exports market to the

satisfaction of Mexico's internal needs.

Petroleum and natural gas be-

came the overwhelming source of
energy for Mexico's development.

However, there are indications that point
to the fact that the second objective of the nationalization of
the oil industry, for Mexico's

state-owned oil company to become the key to
the country's independent
economic development, was never attained.

To present this argument, the

evolution of Mexico's oil industry since 1938
could be divided into
three periods:

the "golden epoch" of Pemex, which lasted until
around

1952; a transition period from 1952 to 1958; and a third
period charac-

terized by the deterioration of the mystique of the
petroleum industry,
as it had been nurtured by the nationalization.^^

The "golden epoch" (1938-1952) was a period of scarce financial
resources and strong international pressures.
cles, the oil

industry underwent

a

radical

In spite of these obsta-

transformation.

Through in-

genuity and a rational distribution of the available resources, the industry kept operations normally after the nationalization; workers and

administrators of Pemex were imbued with
operate the company successfully.
ternal market, parallel

a

sense of determination to

Its structure was geared to the in-

to the gradual

increment in production and the

construction of new refineries and ducts.

All

this was made possible,

in part, because of a prevailing mystique, defined in terms of a spirit

of service to national goals, and in which group and personal interests

were minimal.
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During the administrations of Presidents Avila Camacho

(1940-46) and Alema'n (1946-52), the Mexican government invested con-

siderable sums in Pemex.

Nevertheless, to enhance production and the
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possibilities of financing and acquisition of
capital equipment, from
1949 to 1951 Pemex signed five drilling contracts
with private foreign
oil

companies.

These drilling contracts included guarantees
to the for-

eign companies for expenses and investments,
as well as
the value of the oil production in the
new wells.

a

percentage of

However, Pemex re-

served for itself all rights over any newly
discovered deposits.
During the period from 1952 to 1958, Pemex increased
its refining

capacity by 50%.

However, after the 1954 devaluation of the Mexican

peso, the administration of President Ruiz Cortines
followed a policy of

restraint with respect to public investment, and as
growth of Pemex diminished appreciably.

Oil

a

result the rate of

production increased by

28.7%, barely half the figure of 59.3% obtained during the previous
six-

year period.

By 1958 public investment in Pemex had increased again,

and in that year it represented 26% of the total public investment.

However, another factor, the relative poorness of the new oil fields,
kept increases in output at

a

low level.

Although investments were

geared to modernization of equipment and installation of new ducts, the

increment in processed products could not keep up with demand, and substantial

erately.

imports were necessary; meanwhile, exports increased only modAs a result of the general situation, Pemex's finances were

seriously affected and, since overall government investments were not
sufficient, it had to resort to internal and external credits to defray
expenses
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In November, 1958, a clause was added to Article 27 of the Mexican

Constitution, precluding contracts in the terms that had been agreed to
from 1949 to 1951 by Pemex and several foreign oil companies; with this
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new regulation, by 1965 all foreign
participation in Pemex came to an
end.

In any case, these drilling contracts
had not significantly con-

tributed to increased production or technological
improvement in Pemex.
Pemex paid the corresponding compensation
to the foreign firms.

The new

petroleum regulatory law reaffirmed that all oil-related
resources and
activities belonged to the exclusive realm of action of
the Mexican
State.

After 1958. Pemex seemed to lose momentum.

Paradoxically, or per-

haps correspondingly, once international pressures ceased and
Mexican

control over its petroleum resources was unquestionable, nationalistic

motivations were significantly discarded, and instead of the goal of
service to the nation, mercantil istic criteria prevailed.

From 1959 to

the mid-1970's, the level of administrative corruption seemed to be

rising.

Some of the conditions that characterized this period were:

improper financing, including the maintenance of excessively low prices
for derived products; lack of planning, which relegated the search for
new reserves; a significant increase in the debt of the oil industry,

brought about by credit-financing; interference by the political sphere
in the management of the oil

industry.

All

these factors made impossi-

ble the attainment of the second main objective of the nationalization

of 1938:

industry.

Mexico's independent economic development through its oil
And they also brought about the oil crisis of 1973 in

Mexico.^^
In 1973, oil

reserves in Mexico were at an all-time low.

There

was a radical disequilibrium between reserves, on the one hand, and

production and growth in consumption, on the other.

The apparent lack
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of a sustained and appropriate
oil policy since 1959 meant
that Mexico
had to import increasing amounts
of oil. Thus, even the first
objective of the nationalization,
to provide enough oil and
natural gas for
internal energy needs, was in danger
of retrogression.
If the situati on
had continued much longer, it
would have spelled financial disaster
fo r

Mexico, for towards the end of 1973
international oil prices quadrupled.

The discovery and exploitation of
the new fields in the states of Tabasco and Chiapas ameliorated what could
have been an economic crisis
of major proportions, with its
corresponding political implications.
By the mid 1970's,as stepped-up exploration
and exploitation of the

new oil fields in southeastern Mexico revealed
an enormous potential, old

expectations came to the fore again.

The question, once more, dealt

with a renewed opportunity for Pemex to become effectively
the key to
Mexico's independent economic development.

whether the new oil wealth might be just
repetition of past pitfalls.

a

It remained to be seen

much wider scenario for a
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CHAPTER

III

MODERNIZATION AND DEPENDENCY IN
MEXICO:

1940-1976

Tendencies in Mexico's Development

The nationalization of the oil
industry has been a crucial factor
in Mexico's impressive rate
of economic growth since the 1940
's.

As

the nationalized industry achieved
viability, it became the basis of

increased state intervention in the
economy.

However, this did not

mean a prolonged halt to foreign
investments; it just set the stage for
its new manifestations:

away from the extractive activities, and
fully

and increasingly into manufacturing.

Paradoxically, oil would come to

be the main source of energy for the
expansion of a manufacturing sec-

tor controlled to a great extent by foreign
capital."^
By the late 1940's, Mexico had adhered to
the postwar U.S. policy

of fostering economic growth, mainly through
industrialization, as

a

primary means to achieve political stability and
social progress.

As

it was the case in the United States and other
Western countries, this

model of development led to higher levels of concentration
of wealth.
In Mexico these discrepancies would turn out to be far
more acute,

since the less advanced economic base and fiscal mechanisms cause the

"trickle down" of wealth to be a much slower and less socially satisfying process.

Moreover, some of the main beneficiaries of Mexico's

development policies were to be foreign multinational corporations.
The industrial sector gained the greatest advantages in Mexico's
process of development, and a key role was played by foreign capital.
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Starting in 1940, total foreign investments
rose from the lowest levels
of the twentieth century, 449 million
dollars, to 2,822 million by
1970.^

Foreign investments increasingly centered
in the manufacturing

sector, from 147 million dollars in 1950 to
2,082 million in 1970.

In

this latter year, the figure represented more
than 70% of total foreign

investments.

In addition, more than 80% of the foreign
capital

in-

vested in the manufacturing sector, the predominant
share, was American,
The emphasis on industrialization came to mean, by
the early 1970

's,

a

growing Mexican public and private foreign debt of more than
24 billion
dollars; more than 50% of this impressive debt was contracted
with totally or predominantly U.S. financial institutions."^
It would appear that the oil expropriation of 1938, on a middle

and long-range terms, established the conditions for a displacement,
and not an eradication, of the economic axis of dependency, from agri-

culture and raw materials to the industrial sector.

quantitatively, that dependency vis
have recrudesced.

a vis

At the same time,

the United States seems to

In other words, beginning in 1938 oil was the pro-

pelling force of Mexico's economy, to higher levels of specialization
and complexity, albeit not along lines of self-sufficiency and economic

autonomy.

What were the reasons behind the new wave of foreign investments?
As one of the possible alternatives to develop a country economically,

foreign investments constitute, apparently, a way "to have your cake
and eat it, too."

That is, foreign investments can result in signifi-

cant contributions to economic growth, without precluding present consumption.

Many governments are reluctant, for political as well as
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economic reasons, to deal
with the complex and difficult
issues involved in reforming the
fiscal structure (a measure
that, to be effective, would imply progressive
taxation), as a means of
securing domestic funds for development.
Thus, foreign investments
are sometimes
Viewed as a panacea for the
ills of underdevelopment.
It could be argued that, especially since
the 195C's. Mexico has been
a clear example
Of the previous assessment.
In spite of still ongoing,
though mostly
Ineffective, attempts to shift
the tax burden to the more
prosperous
sectors of the population, and
to increase revenues. Mexico
until the

early 1980's has consistently
relied on foreign investments and
credits
as a practically indispensable
factor in its strategy for development.

The criticisms of this policy are
obvious, such as the often voiced
radical indictments that foreign
investments have been responsible for
the postponement of urgently needed,
deep-seated changes in the social
and political spheres.

On the other hand, an economic
counterargument

would assert that, no matter how substantial
domestic savings might
have been, they would not have been
sufficient by themselves to sustain
the high indices of economic growth of
the postwar era in Mexico.

effect, foreign investments have filled this
gap.

In

Furthermore, and

mainly during the 1950's and 1960's. by concentrating
on "hard" projects, foreign investments have resulted in

plying effect" for the Mexican economy.

a

highly favorable "multi-

Other areas of reference, in

any comparative assessment of the benefits and/or liabilities of foreign investments in Mexico, would be their effects on unemployment,
on

domestic savings, and on income distribution.
The study of foreign investments in Mexico seems to confirm the
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tendency of Latin American
countries to e.bark upon
quick-develop.ent
schemes that are but an
extralogical imitation of the
economic conditions prevalent in developed,
industrialized nations. Since
the recipient society. In this
case Mexico, usually does
not conform to the preordained formulas for development,
the results are not too
attractive,
from a global perspective:
high unemployment; rising
foreign debt; and
control Of the industrial
sector by foreign companies, which
have a com-

parative economic advantage over
domestic concerns.
In any case, during the
late 1940's and early 1950's,
Mexico was

achieving significant economic
goals (for example, sustained progress
in key Industries such as
steel), mainly through national

those of private domestic Investors
and of the government.

efforts, i.e.
However, as

the 1950's wore on. international
conditions ceased to favor Mexican

exports, and the scarce buying power of
the popular sectors of the pop-

ulation weakened the growth of basic
consumer-oriented industries.
a result of these factors, private
domestic Investment declined.

As

There

was a reticence on the part of Investors
to expand the Industrial plant
at an adequate pace.

Some observers detected, during the late 1950's

and early 1960's, a loss of momentum In the Mexican
economy.^

The Im-

passe was related to the everpresent political question in
Mexico of
the roles and domains of the private and public sectors
of the economy.

The possibility of stagnation, then as well as now, might
threaten the

fabric of Mexican society.

Mexico's political leadership seemed to be

faced with a choice of risks.

As Raymond Vernon posed the issues,

"Which risks will they prefer to accept:
the
risks associated with inadequate economic
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performance or the risks associated
with change
in the national decision-making
machinery? "5

Mexico's leaders opted for the latter,
albeit within the existing
institutional framework.

The Mexican government returned to

thodox economic approach, that is.

a

a

more or-

willingness to deal on an equal

basis with Mexico's domestic private
capital.

Nevertheless, to

great

a

extent, the crisis was resolved by the
substantial entrance of foreign
capital:

starting during the mid-1950's. foreign
investments mostly

from multinational corporations made
possible the significant growth of
the industrial sector, on an average of more
than 9% annually between

the mid-1950's and the late 1960's.^
gain:

For Mexico it was

a

Faustian bar-

during this new economic stage the most dynamic
sectors of its

economy fell under the control of foreign entrepreneurs.
However, it would be unfair to single out the multinational
corporations as responsible for the alienation of the industrial
sector of
the Mexican economy.

The entrance and growing power of foreign invest-

ments in Mexico were not just the result of a fortuitous and
favorable

economic juncture.

On the contrary, the Mexican government and, seem-

ingly strange, the prevailing groups in the Mexican private sector,

propitiated and encouraged the entry of large amounts of foreign capital.

The reasons behind this attitude are not hard to discern.

the Mexican government, the economic crisis augured a social

For

impasse;

it could not afford to contract public expenditures, for the price in

terms of political instability might have been too high.

In

other

words, the ruling political circles needed a growing economy, as well
as sources of external

credit.

As for the private sector, their
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sympathy towards foreign investors
derived from their mutual economic,
political, and ideological ties.

Of course, all these circumstances

coincided with a period when U.S.
corporations were looking for promising foreign outlets.^

The decision of Mexico's governing elites
to industrialize the

country no matter what the price was the
key to the massive entrance of
foreign capital.

This conscious encouragement of the
industrialization

process by the Mexican government brought about
painful implications,

among them:

the promotion of capital-intensive industry and
technol-

logy, which have had a detrimental effect on
the unemployment level;

and a tremendous increase in the foreign debt.
A subtle and contrasting parallel could be traced
between the atti-

tude of the Mexican government towards the oil and the
manufacturing

industries.

In the case of the petroleum industry,

the negotiations

were directly held between governments, which allowed the Mexican government to charter the course for the industry, ultimately
istic one.

In contrast,

a

national-

in the case of the manufacturing sector, for-

eign investors dealt directly with Mexican entrepreneurs, the latter

concerned with private gains and profits, and the result was the alieno

ation of that economic sector.
Finally, another very important determining factor of Mexico's

postwar magnet-like qualities in regard to foreign investments, was the
so-called "clima de inversion," i.e. "investment climate."

Since the

late 1940 's, Mexico had offered a combination of economic growth, an

expanding domestic market, and a stable political system, which proved
to be an irresistible target for the expansion of U.S. -based multi-
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national corporations.^

Thus, the stage was set for the
period of "desarrollo estabilizador," i.e. "stabilizing
development." in effect, roughly from
the late
1950's until 1970. According to
Mexican critic Olga Pellicer, there
were three basic objectives in
the strategy of "stabilizing develop-

ment."

The first was to keep price stability,
i.e. an equal level of

investments and expenditures.
through external financing.

This first goal was achieved basically

The second objective, closely related to

the first, was to prevent a rise in
prices of the goods and services

produced by State-related enterprises.

However, since the need for

public investments was greater than the available
funds, once again the

Mexican government had to resort to credit-financing.

Finally, the

third objective was to promote capital accumulation
and reinvestment of

profits, through

a

series of fiscal incentives.

This encouragement of

the role of the private sector represented a weakening
of the financial

capacity of the government which, together with

a

drop in export taxes,

again made inevitable an increase in the public debt.

Thus, the objec-

tives of the model of "stabilizing development" were all contingent upon
the utilization of external credits.

'^^

Within the general framework of the strategy of "stabilizing development," the recourse to external credit financing was

a

means to

avoid other more extreme measures which, if implemented at the time,

might have prevented

a

later reckoning during the 1970's.

These

dreaded remedies were related to the need for a devaluation and a deepseated fiscal reform.

The willingness of the Mexican government to

enter into new foreign debts was coupled at the time with the inordi-
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nate availability of funds in various
international sources of capital.
In any case, Mexico's public foreign
debt, which had stood at 1,327

million dollars during the early 1960's,
reached the figure of 4.200
million in 1970.

During this last year, 22.5% of the income
of the

Public Sector was destined to cover the debt
service, basically interests.

External credit-financing was nothing new, but
now its utiliza-

tion was increasing and deliberate.

istics of these credits were:

a

Some of the additional character-

marked tendency towards "privatiza-

tion;" an increasing reliance of private Mexican
borrowers on the giant

foreign banking enterprises; and

a

growing reliance of the Mexican Pub-

lic Sector on U.S. banks.

The development of the industrial sector was one of the key
priorities in the schemes of Mexico's "stabilizing development."

eign capital retained

facturing activities.

a

But for-

dominant position in much of the expanded manuIn this context,

it could be argued that the pro-

tectionist measures put into effect by the Mexican government have often
served to encourage the activities of foreign corporations,

since these

are already located in the most dynamic sectors of the econorny, whose

further growth the government wants to foster.

The internal dynamism

of the Mexican economy itself then contributes to enhance the role of
the foreign corporations.

At the same time, protectionism and fiscal incentives accounted for
a strengthening of the political

position of native entrepreneurs.

The

renewed assertiveness of Mexico's private sector would play a key role
later on, in the failure and demise of President Echeverria's model of

"shared development."

Finally, to complete the vicious circle, public
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economic policy geared excessive
funds as subsidies for urban
substructure, accentuating tendencies
towards centralization, whose
momentum
brought about larger increases in
public spending.
Meanwhile, the
agricultural sector was neglected.

Mexico followed one policy for industry,
and just the opposite for
the agricultural sector.

Agriculture, which had previously been
the

mainstay of Mexico's process of development,
suffered from decreasing
public outlays:

its share of total

in 1950 to barely 8% by 1960.

sector registered

a

public investment dropped from 20%

In this latter year,

growth of 5%, which meant

a

the agricultural

participation of 15% in

Mexico's total domestic product; by the second
half of the 1960's, these
figures had appreciably declined, to 1.2% and
11%, respectively.

More-

over, a good portion of the growth in agricultural
output took place in

products not destined to the domestic consumption but to
the exports

market.

In general

termis,

during the 1960

's

the situation of the agri-

cultural sector deteriorated sharply, as it was totally subordinated
to
the objective of industrialization.'^^

The neglect of the agricultural

sector, with its detrimental effects on rural employment, and the failure of production to keep up with increasing demand due to population

growth, would have severe consequences for Mexico by the late 1970's
and early 1980's.

Indiscriminate industrialization brought about grave structural
imbalances in Mexico, and it tended to polarize the social sectors along

sharply contrasting levels of income and consumption.

In fact,

it could

be argued that the overall model of "stabilizing development" actually

undermined the capacity of the State as the promoter par excellence of
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Mexico's development, and the
acknowledged arbiter of social
pressures.
As the import of the State in
gearing Mexico's development declined.

dependency vis

a vis

the United States became more clear.

"By the early 1960's, a new
pattern for Mexico's
foreign economic relations was clearly
wmch implied a new form of dependency, established,
sufficiently pronounced, but with distinct
modalities
to those present during the first
years of the
Mexican Revolution. This scheme is similar
to
that which governs the foreign relations
of other
Latin American countries ... (but) in the
case of
Mexico, the proximity of the United States
gives
a special character to its foreign
relations;
because of geographical vicinity there are
between both countries particular ties which
have a very decisive influence in Mexico's
internal life and contribute significantly
to the complexity of its dependence vis
a vis
the United States. "16
In appearance, the decade of the 1960's
was one of uninterrupted

growth for Mexico.

This was reflected in the literature on Mexican de-

velopment during those years.

In retrospect, the administrations of

Presidents Lopez Mateos (1958-1964). and Dfaz Ordaz (1964-1970),
especially the latter, favored relatively conservative economic
policies
that enhanced the role of the private sector and the maintenance of a
high growth index.

However, there were deep problems, such as:

a

high

and rising level of unemployment, due to increases in productivity,

rapid demographic growth, and urbanization; pressures for the distribution of land, related to the stagnation of the rural sector;

a

deterio-

ration in income distribution; labor pressures for wage increases; a

chronic and growing commercial deficit; and an insufficient basis of income for the Public Sector.
In December,

1970, the new administration of President Luis
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Echeverrfa marked the beginning of
an attempt to break with
the priorities of the model of "stabilizing
development," and to address some
of
Its Shortcomings, with
respect to categories such as
employment, income

distribution, and external financial
dependency.
be called "shared development. "^^

The new strategy would

The main objectives of Echevern'a's

economic policies were the following:^^
-

Economic growth with income distribution;

-

Strengthening of public finances;

-

Reorganization of international transactions;

-

Modernization of the agricultural sector;

-

Rationalization of industrial development.

In the socio-political

istration attempted to face

sphere, the policies of Echevern'a's admina

dangerous legitimacy crisis, partly a re-

sult of the social costs implicit in the model of
"stabilizing development" and, more specifically, of the domestic unrest
which had culminated in the bloody confrontation between soldiers and
students in

Tlatelolco in 1968. 21

The process of political reform from 1970 to 1973

was meant to strengthen the institutional and legal opposition
to the

ruling party, "Partido Revolucionario Institucional

"

(PRI), and to allow

new means of expression to the diverse ideological tendencies present
in Mexico.

These reforms were introduced through constitutional amend-

ments and the promulgation of a new electoral law.

Of course, it was

evident that these measures also purported to channel and control social
conflicts through legally recognized political parties.
The objectives of the model of "shared development" made necessary
a

vigorous Public Sector, in order to recover the initiative that had

64

been partly lost to the private
sector, and to give the economy

orientation.

This gave rise to

a

a

new

conflict between the government and

the private sector, which became
a permanent fixture of
Echevern'a's

administration.

President Echeverrfa adopted a policy
that strongly

favored a greater intervention of the
State in Mexico's process of de-

velopment, and changes in the patterns
of distribution of income.

On

the other hand, the private sector
opposed this emphasis on State par-

ticipation; instead, it sought

a

continuation of the policies of the

1960's which, to a great extent, had placed
the political and economic

resources of the State at its service.

President Echevern'a's administration considered
"stabilizing development" responsible for the relegation of the social
aspects of development.

Therefore, public investments would now be channeled towards

the creation of new jobs, an increase in productivity and
efficiency in

basic industries, and the reinvigoration of the agricultural
sector.
And indeed, the Public Sector increased its participation in Mexico's

domestic product, from 11% in 1970 to 17.2% in 1975 and, respectively,
from 38% to 45% of the total gross domestic investments.^^
However, in the end, the model of "shared development" did not

bring about the expected results.

The series of domestic measures un-

dertaken by Echeverria showed the critical interrelationship of social,
political, and economic factors.

Echevern'a's attempts to tilt the

ideological orientation of the government to the left, and to side with
the poorer sectors of the population, brought about a break with the

private sector of the economy.

As huge sums of capital

left the coun-

try and investments collapsed. Echeverrfa resorted to foreign loans to
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finance his government's social
programs.

The growing debt, increased

public spending, and the
diminishing production of basic
articles of
consumption such as foodstuffs,
generated a strong upwards
inflationary
spiral.
In the end, the sectors of
the population worse-hit by
inflation were those that Echeverrfa
had originally meant to help.

And this,
finally, brought about renewed
social unrest, manifest in the
peasant
land invasions of 1976,25 and
the general anxiety over the
presidential

succession that same year.
During Echeverrfa's government, the
attempts at administrative re-

form failed.

The expansion of public spending
stimulated economic

growth indices:

7.3% in 1972; 7.6% in 1973; 5.9% in 1974.

However,

there were no perceptible changes in
the distribution of income.
by 1976. inflation had reached
a level of 16.5% annually.
in imports cancelled out the increments

in exports:

And,

A new surge

the deficit in the

balance of payments increased from 703 million
dollars in 1971 to

3,643.4 million dollars in 1976.

Tourism as a source of revenue was af-

fected by Mexico's vote in the United Nations on
the "Zionist" resolution, which caused a Jewish travel boycott to Mexico.

During the period 1973-1976, Mexico's foreign debt grew by
leaps
and bounds.

By 1976, the total external public debt had reached the

figure of 15.845 billion dollars, which represented 32.8% of Mexico's
GNP.

27

At the same time that private domestic investment contracted,

foreign investment increased its participation in the Mexican economy:
from 2.373 billion dollars in 1972 to close to

5

billion in 1975.

Obviously, foreign investors did not share the lack of confidence prevalent among Mexican private investors at the time.

"Shared develop-
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ment," if for different reasons,
had fallen into the same trap
as "stabilizing development:" an overwhelming
reliance on foreign credits and
investments.

According to Clark W. Reynolds, it
would seem that the

years between 1971 and 1976 "...can
be considered rather

a

period of

'destabilizing development' than of 'shared
development. '"^^
Petroleum, although

a

crucial element in the Mexican
developmental

equation, was only a part of the general
scenario of economic imbalance
that persisted throughout the first half
of the 1970's.

The normaliza-

tion of the petroleum supply lessened
what could have been radical political repercussions, but the economic
crisis came anyhow, climaxing
in 1976.

On August 30 of that year, the Mexican peso
was devalued.

This marked the end of the transition period
of "shared development."

The devaluation seemed to settle the internal
conflict in Mexico in favor of the development schemes of the private sector.
"With the devaluation the last conditions were
given for the reproduction of the accumulation
process on the basis of industrial exports
controlled by dependent capital. "30

Apparently, except that petroleum would take the place of industrial

exports.

By the time Mexico's new President, Jose Lopez Portillo,

took over in December, 1976, the situation of the country was darkened
by dreadful economic indicators, which included:

a

trade deficit of 3.2

billion dollars by February, 1977; inflation running at
high levels of unemployment and subemployment;

a

a

rate of 30%;

high rate of demographic

growth; uncontrolled urbanization; and a decline in tourism.

To gener-

ate the resources necessary to grapple with this multi-faceted crisis,
and to restore confidence, the answer would be found in petroleum.
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Presence and Im pact of U.S. -based Multinatinn;^!

Corporations in Mexico

Multinational corporations could be broadly
defined as "those economic enterprises -manufacturing,
extractive, service and financial-

that are headquarted in one country and
that pursue business activities
in one or more foreign countries ."^^

This basic definition could be

widened or restricted, in relation to the number
of countries where
corporation operates, or to the amount of their
investments.
to better understand the role of multinational

it would be useful

to mention some fundamental

a

In order

corporations in Mexico,

characteristics of their

structure and behavior.
Global corporations are not only multinational, but multifunctional, that is, they are involved in the different stages of
the productive

process through vertical integration.

The distribution of different

productive capabilities throughout various countries gives the corporation headquarters an edge in determining volume and prices.

Multi-

national corporations share a conception of the world as one big inte-

grated economic unit, in which they exert an increasing control through
the technology of production, finance capital, and marketing. '^'^

cosmopolitan vision of the multinationals constitutes, indeed,
lenge to nationalism.

In a way,

The
a

chal-

the upsurge of the global corporations

has been based on the beliefs in "progress" and "growth," i.e. the

"cult of bigness," and in the tendencies towards centralization.

Beginning after World War II, the development of multinational enterprises and their presence in the fields of investment, international
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commerce, and technology, have
been steadily increasing.
nomic weight of multinational
corporations is impressive.

The sheer ecoIn 1970.

it

was estimated that the total
value of all foreign investment was
around
250 billion dollars, with a rate of expansion
of between 10 and 20 per-

cent yearly. 36

By the beginning of the 1970's U.S.
-based multinational

corporations made up 5E.6% of the total;
European firms. 37.5%; Japan.
2.6%; Canada. 3.9%; and Australia. 0.4%.

In 1970.

the annual produc-

tion by foreign enterprises in the world
surpassed the volume of world

exports; from another perspective, the volume
of international production doubled that of exports by Western
countries.

There are opposing views with respect to the
activities of multinational corporations.

Those who favor them point out the increasing

anachronism of the nation-state in an age of expanding and
complex interdependence, when efficiency and rationality are key
objectives to
suit the needs of the world.

Instead of the old-fashioned relative

gains of particular states, multinational corporations would open the

door for absolute gains for all.^^

The adherents of the "sovereignty-

at-bay" theory "...regard the multinational corporation as the embodi-

ment par excellence of the liberal ideal of an interdependent world
i40

economy."

The global corporations consider themselves as vehicles for

peace and better understanding among nations, as
row and confining allegiances of nationalism.

a

step beyond the nar-

In short, centralized and

integrated production is the best way to run the world economy.

The opposing view is equally emphatic.

Some theorists point out

that in economic development there are two basic laws:

increasing firm size, and the law of uneven development.

the law of

Parallel to

69

the concentration of
economic wealth, there is a
process of division of
the world between regions
of development, and
regions of poverty. Thus,
^

underdevelopment and development
are but two elements of the
same phenomenon:
the inability to achieve
balanced growth/^ To the
argument
of efficiency proclaimed
by the promoters of the
international division
of labor, critics reply
that top management continues
to be recruited
from rich countries, while
workers increasingly come from
low-wage
areas.'^^

Furthermore, the activities of
multinationals often result in

clashes between the corporations
themselves and/or their parent-states,
and the host countries.
Finally, all these considerations
implicitly

question the ultimate compatibility of
the profit motif with appeals to
the issues of morality and justice.

Other views on the subject emphasize
that, even though the multinationals have an international or transnational
character, their matrix
and decision centers are located in the
central metropolis, especially
the United States.

Multinationals would appear to be controlled by

self-perpetuating elites that establish

a

symbiotic relationship with

the national state where they originate, in a
process that conditions

and mutually reinforces the two actors.

Even though their pursuits

and behavior may vary, both multinationals and the
states where they are

headquartered share the same basis of sustenance:

economic growth.

As

such, their perception of the world is common more often than
not.

The predominance of U.S. management in the big U.S. -based corporations would seem to substantiate the previous assessment.

Richard J.

Barnet and Ronald E. Muller avoid the use of the term "multinational,"
because "...it suggests

a

degree of internationalization of management.
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to say nothing of stock
ownership, which is not accurate."

In their
analysis of global corporations,
it was found that of
1.851 top managers
of leading U.S. companies
with large foreign sales, only
1.6% were non-

American.

Besides. non-Americans have but
an insignificant amount of

the stock of these corporations.^^

What would have been the causes of
the apparent confluence of interests of U.S. foreign policy and
U.S. -based multinationals?
Some researchers have suggested that after
World War II. U.S. foreign policy
was a reflection of the objectives
of U.S. domestic policy:

growth and productivity, as

a

economic

way of resolving political conflicts.

The

idea behind this emphasis on economic
development was that if scarcity

could be overcome, then political stability
would follow.

In this con-

text, new wealth would make it unnecessary
to radically redistribute

economic benefits and power.

As international

rifts arose during the late 1940

's

tensions and ideological

and 1950 's. the attempt to ensure the

primacy of economics over politics led into higher
levels of concentration of economic power in multinational corporations
as engines of

growth.

In Germany and Japan, as mainstays against communism,
but

mainly in the United States, large corporations eventually managed
to
ascend to the fore of the production process, weakening the concern over

monopolistic power.

However, the economic solution for political dis-

equilibriums would seem to work only under conditions of shared prosperity.

Present-day tensions over U.S. foreign policy and the role of the

multinationals arise from the fact that
"Hegemony remains successful, however, only
when it achieves advances for the whole
international structure within which it is
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exercised. Hegemony imposed in
a zero-sum
cockpit, that is, at the expense of
the
secondary members of the system, must
finally
^
prove less durable. "46
To a considerable degree, the
phenomenon of the growth of the mul-

tinationals since World War
U.S. economy.

II

has been related to the dynamism of
the

Between 1950 and 1968, U.S. private
investments in for-

eign countries increased from 19 billion
dollars to more than 101 billion.'^''

The most important 187 U.S. corporations
increased the number

of their foreign subsidiaries from
250 at the end of World War
than 5,500 subsidiaries under their
control in 1967.^^

I

to more

Even though the

relative importance of U.S. -based corporations
with respect to total

world direct foreign investment tended to
diminish somewhat during the
1970's, with the increasing participation of
countries such as Japan and

West Germany, U.S. capital remained predominant among
the leading multinationals.

By the 1970's it was estimated that close to 75% of world

commerce and industrial production was under the control of 300
multinational corporations, based mainly, although not exclusively,
in the

United States.
The presence and impact of U.S. -based multinationals in Mexico must
be understood in light of these worldwide tendencies.

Because of its

proximity to the United States, its political stability, and its growing domestic market, Mexico has been a much-favored target for the ex-

pansion of the multinational corporations.

The increasing relevance of

the role of U.S. -based multinationals in Mexico coincides with the

worldwide enlargement of these corporations; geographical, economic, and
political reasons explain the degree of the phenomenon in Mexico.
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Mexico is among the top five
recipients of foreign investments.
By 1970, multinational
corporations were responsible for 23%
of the total gross domestic product in
manufacturing, a considerable increase

from the 18% they produced in 1962.

Whereas in 1962 multinational cor-

porations had been responsible for 20% of
all Mexican sales, in 1972
they accounted for 28% of the total. ^0

Foreign investments are concen-

trated in the largest firms and in
certain key industries.
in 1972, 50% of the largest
300 Mexican industrial

For example,

firms, and 61% of the

overall largest firms, were controlled
by foreign interests.

dominance of foreign capital is

a

The pre-

fact in the most technologically ad-

vanced and capital-intensive industries in
Mexico, including:

in non-

electrical machinery, 95%; in transportation,
79%; and in chemicals.
68%.
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Also, foreign investments find

a

favorite field for expansion in

the highly concentrated industries; in these,
multinational corporations

accounted for 71% of all manufacturing sales.
In 1970,

there were in Mexico 1,915 foreign-owned companies.

Of

these, 242 were subsidiaries of 170 U.S. -based multinational
corporations that have an undisputed importance in their home country, in
terms

of their volumes of production and sales, and technological development.

These 242 subsidiaries represented more than
eign investment in Mexico, and more than

a

a

third of the total for-

third of the total sales in-

come; they were predominantly involved in manufacturing activities.^"^

Fully 166 of the 242 subsidiaries (or, 68.6%) were totally owned by some
of the 170 aforesaid multinationals.

multinationals had
sidiaries was there

In 41 subsidiaries

controlling share.

a
a

(17%), the

Only in 14.4% of the 242 sub-

participation of less than 50% by the multi-
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national s.^^
In 1970, out of the
total

value of direct foreign
investments in

Mexico. 80% came from U.S.-based
corporations.

In mining, U.S.

investments represented 91% of the
total, and in commerce, 77% of
the total.
But the clearest case of
predominance of U.S. firms was in
the manufac-

turing activities:

90% of the activities of the U.S.-based
multina-

tional corporations were
concentrated in industry and manufacturing.^^

From the perspective of a
Mexican observer:
"In conclusion, almost all foreign
investment
in Mexico is Northamerican.

and is located,
fundamentally, in the activities that
are
cause and effect of a more dynamic
development:
manufacturing and commerce. "56
In general

terms, foreign-owned firms in Mexico
are highly inte-

grated with their corresponding global
corporations.

Local subsidiar-

ies are owned directly by the parent
corporation, rely on the corpora-

tion for financing, and do most of their
trading with it.^^

In 1976.

foreign-owned corporations brought into Mexico 330
million dollars in
new investments; during that same year,
they took out of the country
781 million dollars in profits.

Thus, the negative balance for Mexico

on this account was -451 million dollars.

The negative balance, i.e.

profits sent out of Mexico in excess of new investments,
reached be-

tween 1971 and 1976

a

total of -1,900 million dollars.

This negative

balance for Mexico, the difference between new investments entering
the
national economy, and profits from their operations that are sent to
the headquarters of the multinationals, would seem to indicate that it
is

Mexico which is financing the development of the United States, and

not the opposite.
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It has been documented
that multinationals tend
to displace native

entrepreneurs, and make use of
native capital, whenever that
course of
action is possible, rather than
to contribute new capital.
In Mexico,
between 1965 and 1971, there was
an increase of 74,542 million
dollars
in the total active capital
of foreign multinationals; of
this sum,
62.6% was financed with national
resources.

By 1967, of the 412 sub-

sidiaries which belonged to the
162 U.S.-based multinational corporations operating in Mexico, only
143 subsidiaries had been established
as new companies;

112 subsidiaries were set up as
acquisitions of al-

ready-existing firms, and 109 as

a

result of branching out of already-

established subsidiaries.^^
In regard to external

credits to finance Mexico's development,

U.S. -banking institutions have also been
predominant.
tal

In 1976, the to-

public and private external debt of Mexico amounted
to 24 billion

dollars.

Of this figure, 15,830.000 million were contracted
with pri-

vate foreign firms, and 11,540,000 million of this
sum (72.9%) were

credits from U.S. private banking institutions.

In 1976, the public

external debt of Mexico, 15,845,000 million dollars, amounted
to 32.8%
of the country's GNP.^^

According to the market orientation of U.S.-based corporations operating in Mexico, a general classification would show two main areas
of investments:

the first, and by far most important, is constituted

by direct investments geared to produce for the Mexican market; the sec-

ond comprises the industrial plants established in Mexico within

a

short

distance of the U.S. border, geared to sales in the U.S. market.
The Mexican government, by the beginning of the 1970 's, offered tax
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concessions to foreign
companies Interested In
setting up Industrial
Plants Within 20 kilometers
of the U.S. border, as
long as all finished
products were exported to
the United States.
By 1972. there were
333
Of these plants
operating along the border
zone, employing 40.000
Mexican workers, and producing
electronic, textile, and other
kinds of products with a value of
500 million dollars annually.^^
By m1d-l974 the number of
companies had increased to more
than
500. which employed more than
70.000 Mexican workers.
In effect, these
were an exception to the
predominantly capital-intensive
activitJes of
U.S. corporations in Mexico.
However, by 1975 the program
began to
slow down, for a couple of
important reasons. On the one hand,
the

Mexican government had doubled
the minimum wage level towards
the end
of 1974. On the other hand,
and most Important, under the
U.S. Act of
Commerce of 1974, all cotton articles
finished in Mexico and exported
to the United States would
now be Included in the American
export quo-

tas for Mexican cotton; fully
25% of the border plants were producing

textiles.

These facts, coupled by the U.S. recession
of 1974-75. had

brought about by mid-1975 a reduction in
the number of plants down to
430 and in the number of Mexican workers, down
to 60, 000.

The picture that emerges out of the presence
and impact of the
U.S. -based multinational corporations in
Mexico is a complex and often

contradicting one.

On the one hand, the beneficial effects of foreign

investments are considerable.
tal

They Include

a

steady Infusion of capi-

and techniques, the promotion of modernization and
industrializa-

tion, a more efficient utilization of resources,
employment creation,
and a rise In productivity.

Perhaps the most visible and tangible
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effect of foreign
investments

is

their contribution to
fiscal revenues,
^

thus helping to cover
the "gaps" between domestic
savings and public
investments; that is, the
taxation of foreign capital
helps to eliminate budgetary deficits.
Foreign corporations are
important tax contributors:
their participation in
the federal budget until
recently
has been around 20% of
the total.
These taxes represent almost
a

fourth of the aggregate value
of their production, and
their fiscal
burden is higher than the
average in Mexico. These facts
are the result of their high rate of
profits and the strict supervision
of their
activities by Mexican fiscal
authorities. Also, their usually
large
Size makes them keep a more
careful accountability than small
and medium-sized Mexican firms. Finally,
some foreign corporations prefer
not
to enjoy the fiscal exemptions
allowed to mixed enterprises, as long
as
they keep absolute control of the
firms.^^
On the other hand, the detrimental
effects for Mexico's develop-

ment of the activities of foreign
corporations are also numerous.

As

it has been stated, an overwhelming
proportion of foreign investments

comes from the United States,

a

Mexico on its northern neighbor.

fact which underlines the dependence of

Furthermore, foreign corporations pre-

fer to have total control of their firms in Mexico,
their rate of profit
is

considerably high, they take advantage primarily of the
Mexican do-

mestic market, and do not constitute
In spite of their fiscal

a

significant source of exports.

contributions, it is assumed that tax evasion

takes place at substantial levels, through "transfer-pricing" and
other

means.

Foreign investments are concentrated in the industrial sector,

and make use mainly of capital-intensive techniques, thus rendering its
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effect on employment
creation to

a

much lower level than
might be
)e ex-

Pected from the value of
their Investments.

The technological depen-

dence Of Mexico on foreign
patents continues to Increase.
Finally, the
activities Of foreign
corporations take place primarily
in or around the
metropolitan area of Mexico City
and a few other major
urban centers.
contributing to regional Imbalances.
In conclusion, the
following could be said to
be some of the main

characteristics of foreign
corporations in Mexico:

-Preponderance of U.S.-based
multinationals and U.S. banking
institutions.
-Substantial control by these
multinationals of some of the most
dynamic sectors of the Mexican
economy.

-Subordination of operations in Mexico
to external decision centers and foreign management.

-Displacement of native entrepreneurs.
-Decapitalization of the Mexican economy.
The previous analysis of foreign
investments in Mexico leads into
the political arena.

The economic and technological benefits
implicit

in direct foreign investments must
be contrasted with the possible loss

or reduction of national economic self-reliance.

From this perspective,

the issue of the positive and negative effects
of foreign investments
goes beyond the economic dimension to a scenario
where economic opera-

tions, albeit important, are subordinated to a
conjunction of political

factors.

These factors are related both to Mexican domestic politics,

and to the maneuvering capacity of the Mexican
government in the inter-

national milieu.
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The political
implications of the
uie effect
errect of iiU.S. economic
influence in Mexico ™st be
viewed within the context
of historical, political, economic,
geopolitical, and strategic
evidence.
In short, the polUlcal impact of foreign
investments in Mexico is
directly related to
the concept of ..national
interest... as a basis for
analysis. But the
'national interest., of
Mexico .ust be weighed
against the notion of the
"national security, of the
United States. The
perception of national
security on the part of
different agencies of the
U.S. government, and
the subsequent actions
to enforce that perception,
have often led to
conflict in the relations
between the United States
and Mexico, ^s a
general rule, the national
security of the United States
has determined
the need for a continuous
reinforcement of U.S. hegemony
in the Caribbean and Central American
area, which comprises the
so-called vital
c:

geographic perimeter for the
defense of the United States,
and of which,
of course. Mexico is an
Indispensable component. That need
has often
clashed with Mexico.
s '.national interest... because of what
the Mexican
government may or may not do. And.
as a matter of fact, all political
outcomes in Mexico, are evaluated
in Washington, primarily in
strategic
terms.
National interest manifests itself
in an acceptable degree of sov-

ereignty.

Sovereignty means internal supremacy and
external indepen-

dence; that is to say, a sovereign
state must have complete legal and

factual authority over all the subjects
(Individuals and groups) which

compose it, and must be legally and factually
Independent from control
by another state.

It is the degree of relativity of Mexico's
sover-

eignty vis a vis the United States that
especially concerns us here.
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The notion of sovereignty
provides
the impact of U.S. business
in Mexico.

a

useful parameter to
assess

Through their massive
invest-

ments, U.S.-based corporations
control to

a

considerable extent some of
the most dynamic areas of
Mexico's economy. I.e.
manufacturing and com-

nierce. as well

nology.

as the most strategic
factor of development,

i.e. tech-

It would follow that U.S.
economic influence potentially
re-

moves a large and vital part
of the Mexican economy from
national political control.
It could be argued that
in many cases, economic decisions have responded to the
needs of U.S. corporations rather
than to
the needs of Mexico.

Therefore, the vulnerability of
the Mexican gov-

ernment to actions taken by U.S.
business corporations or by Washington
is

increased significantly.

The most important result of this
situa-

tion is the limitation to the
scope and reach of political action by
the

Mexican government and, thus, to
Mexico's national sovereignty.^''

Attempt s to Regulate Foreign Investments
The real debate among Mexico's governing
elites since the 1950

's

has not been whether or not to promote the
entrance of new foreign in-

vestments.

In this respect, up to now the issue
is quite well

in favor of foreign investments.

decided

Rather, the critical point has been

how to have both foreign capital and domestic control.

Parallel to the

impressive growth of investments by multinational corporations
in

Mexico since the 1950's, two developments have underlined
the continuous concern of the Mexican government about the activities of
the mul-

tinationals.
-The renewal of the process of nationalization of areas of the
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economy vital for national
viability.

In

1960. the State acquired
the
last two foreign electrical
companies through the State-owned
Federal
Co^ission of Electricity, an action
which gave it the monopoly
of
electric energy. By the mid-1960's.
all foreign mining compani
es were
forced to sell 51% of their
constitutive capital to Mexican i
nves68
tors.

-As the model of "stabilizing
development" gave way to the model

of "shared development" during
the early 1970's, foreign
investments

were seen by the Mexican government
as unresponsive to the needs of
integral development.

Consequently, Echeverria's administration
proceeded

to attempt to control more
effectively the multinational corporations.

The Mexican government decided to face what
it saw as

from the multinational corporations in

a

variety of ways:

a

challenge

increasing

the pressures for "Mexicanization" to new
areas of the manufacturing

sector; forcing the foreign-controlled industries
to increase the use

of domestically-produced parts; tying concessions
of import permits to
the levels of exports by the soliciting corporations; new
coordinated

regulations to control the volume and activities of foreign invest-

ments.^^
There have been laws controlling foreign investments in Mexico
since 1944.

However, because of the absence of

a

general law applica-

ble to all foreign investments, each presidential administration would

take a different approach.

Also, the laws as they stood provided for

exceptions by administrative decree.

By 1973, the need for comprehen-

sive legislation to control foreign investments had become apparent.
In March of that

year the "Law to Promote Mexican Investments and
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Regulate Foreign Investment" was
enacted, and it went into effect
two
months afterwards. Among the
fundamental points of the new
legislation
were:
in no case would foreign
investments be greater than 49% of
th e
total

in any given enterprise; this
same limit would apply to local man-

agement of the companies; the creation
of

a

"National Commission of For-

eign Investment," with the power to
change established percentages, and

tending to greater national participation
when it would deem it necessary.

^0

While this law was being enacted in the
Mexican Congress, an incident occurred which helps to illustrate
the persistence of disagreement
between the official American and Mexican
views in regards to foreign
investments.

The U.S. ambassador in Mexico at the time, Robert
H.

McBride. in a speech given before the U.S.
-Mexican Managerial Committee
in October,

1972, strongly criticized the imminent change by the Mexican

government of the "rules of the game" with respect to foreign
investments, praising their beneficial effects on Mexican
development.

In

response to McBride, and expressing the dissatisfaction of the
Mexican

government with his speech, the Mexican Secretary of Commerce, Jose'
Campillo Sains, declared that, indeed, the rules of the

gam.e

were being

changed, "to adjust them to the needs and aspirations of our day."^^

Significantly, ambassador McBride was recalled and dismissed from his
post within that same year.

Another legal means of control of foreign investments

is

the "Law

on the Registry of Technological Transfers and the Use and Exploitation

of Patents and Brands," which went into effect in January, 1973.

This

law established the "National Registry of Technological Transfers,"
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whose main obierti\/oc
Objectives are +to avcd
the Importation of
technology alb. the

™uinat1onaU

fo. concept of
ro.aUles an. technical
ass,.tance. which should
not exceed 3% of net
sales/^
In the context of
these attempts

to regulate the
activities of the

«lt1nat1onal corporations,
two related facts
should be mentionedMexico

one of the few Latin
American countries that
have refused to
sign With the united
States an agreement of
guarantee to investmentsand Mexico does not
receive direct aid from
the United States.
Another
interesting related action
too. place during the
mid-igyo's. In regards
to the Mexican-sponsored
United Nations .'Chart of
Economic Rights and
Duties Of the States."
To this day. the United
States has not signed
this international
agreement, one of the few
industrial powers still
not to do so. Thus,
while the United States lacks
certain legal and
economic means to pressure
Mexico to be favorably disposed
towards U.S.
policies regarding foreign
Investments, it. too. has avoided
entering
Into agreements that might
hinder a U.S. response to actions
against
foreign investments by other
countries.
is

These Mexican laws that regulate
foreign Investments and technological transfers are by no
means flawless.
It is doubtful whether the
Mexican government has the
administrative capacity to carry on the
reg-

ulatory supervision of foreign
enterprises.

On the other hand, various

devices to circumvent the laws are
still extensively used in Mexico,
such as the subterfuge known as
the "name lenders." which involves
the

registry of shares of ownership under
the name of a Mexican citizen.
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concealing the real owner or
beneficiary.

These facts add up to a sit-

uation where
"The preponderance and
control of foreicn
investments in the Mexican economy
will
continue to grow to the same
extent that
the system does not come to
grips with the
correction of these deficiencies,
and to the
same extent of its failure in
doing so 73
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CHAPTER

IV

MEXICO'S ENERGY POLICY

Measure of the Petrol Pum Bonan
za

Although most of the recent
petroleum finds in Mexico have
centered in the southeastern region
of the country, there are
other areas
of substantial hydrocarbon
accumulations. The main oil and gas
producing areas are the following:

the Northeastern Fields, located
in the

Piedras Negras-Monol ova Province,
which extends through the states of
Coahuila and Nuevo Leon; the
Tampico-Nautla area, which includes the

Chicontepec Basin along the northern
part of the state of Veracruz; the
Reforma Fields in the southeastern
states of Chiapas and Tabasco; and
the Continental Shelf off the state
of Campeche.^

There are also other

areas throughout Mexico that have been
reported as promising sources for
new petroleum provinces.

In regards

to medium-term objectives, explor-

atory work is under way in the states of Baja
California and Chihuahua,
as well

as

in the Continental

off the state of Sinaloa.

Shelf of the Gulf of California and at sea

Longer-term objectives include exploration in

the states of Michoacan, Guerrero. Nayarit, Oaxaca.
and Jalisco.

Addi-

tionally, preliminary exploration work suggests the existence
of hydro-

carbons in various places along the Central Plateau. Sonora, and
the

Chiapas mountain range.

The Northeastern Fields are mainly producers of natural gas, although there are

a

few oil wells near the city of Reynosa.

By 1978,

close to 15% of Mexico's estimated natural gas reserves, which amounted
90
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along the centra, part
of the state of Coahuila
and the northwest
section Of the state of
Nuevo Leon.3 The Sablnas
fields, which extend
over an area of
50.000
appear to be so.e of the
.ost Important In
the Western Hemisphere,
and superior to all the
other natural gas deposits in Mexico put

together/

The Tampico-Nautla area,
site of .uch of Mexico's
oil boo. of the
early 1920's, includes
the old fields near Tuxpan
and Poza Rica.
Present efforts in this area
concentrate on the Chicontepec
Basin, which
covers an area of more than
3,000 km^. These are generally
shallower
deposits, found at an average
depth of only 1,200 meters,
and with a low
yield of between 50 and 100
barrels daily (b/d). By comparison,
the
overall average production
level of Mexican wells at
present, including
of course the rich
Southeastern area, is 500 b/d.^

According to Pemex, the Chicontepec
Basin holds more than 100 billion barrels of oil, of which
close to 18 billion are susceptible
to
exploitation.

However, this would require the drilling
of more than

16.000 wells.

By comparison, from 1938 to March,
1979, the total num-

ber of wells drilled in Mexico came
to 15,895.

Notwithstanding, Pemex

insists on the profitable exploitation
of Chicontepec which, throughout
the first thirteen years of development,
should yield 2,600 million

barrels of oil.

As a start, by March, 1979, there were
433 wells in

production in the area.^

Initially, the news about Chicontepec were

received with awe in the United States. ^
which has subsequently turned

somewhat to skepticism regarding the technical
feasibility of fully developing the area.^
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Mexico's present oil
bonanza centers 1n the
southeastern states of
Tabasco and Chiapas, and
in the Continental
Shelf off the state of
Campeche. An analysis of
production figures for 1979
attests to this
fact.

Pen,ex

divided its oil production
figures for that year In
relation to three geographical
zones, northern, central,
and southern.
Which correspond roughly
to the Northeastern
Fields, the Tanplco-Nautla
area, and the Refor™
and Ca.peche Fields of
the southeast, respectivelyIn 1979. out of a
total production of 590.6
million barrels, that
is. a daily average of
1.618 million barrels, the
northern zone produced 27.812.635 barrels
(5%). the central zone 53.403.515
barrels (9%).
and the southern zone
509,354.216 barrels (SSX)
By 1980. the Reform
area was contributing 48.9%
of the total production, and
the fields In
the Continental Platform off
Campeche accounted for 35.4%. For
1982
the relative importance of
the fields in the Continental
Platform is

expected to increase to 63% of
the total, while the Refo™a
area diminishes its share to 26%.!^

In any case, by mid-1981 it was
possible to

conclude that both oil provinces were
part of the same geological formation.

The Reforma Fields in the states of
Tabasco and Chiapas have undergone

a

place.

By 1975. five oil fields were being
exploited in the area,

rapid development since 1972. when the
first discoveries took

which represented 310,000 b/d. at the time
nearly half of the total
national production.

The average yield per well was over 4,200 b/d.
in

contrast with the then national average of 110 b/d
per well.^^

By

April. 1976. there were 80 wells in the Reforma
area, which produced

442,000 b/d, that is. an average of 5.524 b/d per well.

The combined
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production for both oil and
associated gas was 950.000
b/d. which underlines the fact that
natural gas accounts for
a high proposition
of the
total output in the
Southeast. By 1976. the
fact that wellhead pressures had regained
basically unchanged through
.ore than two years of
sustained production,
confirmed the richness of
the Reforma Fields.
By 1978. the picture
that seemed to emerge from
Pemex's data on the
Reforma oil region, was that
of a huge deposit of
approximately. 7.000
Km .
The geological structures
in Reforma are extremely
rich, and most
drillings in the area have
turned out to be commercially
profitable.
The first discovery of a
"supergiant" petroleum deposit
during the
1970

's

took place in Reforma:

the "Antonio J.

Be^udez"

field, with

6.500 million barrels susceptible to
exploitation, and an average production of 8.000 b/d per well, as
of 1978. Other "gianf fields
in the
area, with more than 1.500 million
barrels susceptible to exploitation.
Include the "Cactus." "Sitio Grande."
and "Iris-Giraldas" fields.

By

mid- 1981 the Reforma area was
producing more than one million b/d.l''
It has been estimated by Pemex
that, when fully developed,

the Reforma

area could produce at least 3.5 million
b/d.The total reserves of

Reforma should amount to over 25 billion
barrels.'^

Closely related to the mainland finds, the most
spectacular and
recent discoveries have taken place in the
Continental Platform off the
state of Campeche.
a

By mid-1978, Pemex had announced the existence
of

"sea" of oil offshore, comparable in size to the
deposits of Tabasco

and Chiapas.

In

order to explore further, and commence the exploita-

tion of the area. Pemex rented several oil rigs
and contracted the

services of U.S. engineers and geologists.

The first drillings
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-suited

1n an encouraging
rate of success.^^

By August. 1979.
Pe.ex
had accelerated
development of the Gulf
of Ca.peche deposits
at the
"ate of one drilling
platform every two weeks.
By March, 1981.
Pemex had explored some
50.000 km^ In the Contlnental Shelf, with
detailed work being done
in 8.000 kml
Actual development Of oil deposits
was taking place within
an area of 700 km^
at a depth of between
1.250 to 3.600 meters.
There was a 6« rate of
successful drillings. With
a production of
1.308.000 barrels per day.
the Gulf Of Campeche is
at present the most
Important oil province in
the world.
The "Akal" field Is the
world's first In capacity of
production, with an output of
42.000 b/d per welL^^

Many other areas in Mexico
are susceptible of holding
deposits of
petroleum and natural gas.
Mexico's territorial extension
is 1.967.183
km
including the Continental Platform,
:
the total increases to approximately 2.5 million kml
According to Pemex officials. 72?
of this
total area. i.e.

1.8 million km^, corresponds to
sedimentary basins, of

which only 10% have been explored
and exploited with relative
Intensity.
The remainder. I.e. 1.6 million
km^, is likely to contain
hydrocarbon
deposi ts.'^^
In order to better understand
the measure of Mexico's petroleum

reserves, the basic scale of reference
should be mentioned here.

There

are three categories used to estimate
the magnitude of reserves:

proven, probable, and potential.

certainty of the deposits.

These terms express the degree of

Proven reserves are those whose location,

size, and susceptibility to exploitation
have been determined beyond

any reasonable doubt.

Probable reserves imply the likelihood of the
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existence of deposits.

Potential reserves pertain
to still preli.i nary

estimates, reached according
to the characteristics
of geological
strata usually associated with
hydrocarbon deposits.
Since the early 1960's until
the mid-1970's. estimates of
Mexico's
proven hydrocarbon reserves
remained stable, at 5 to 6 billion
barrels
of crude oil and natural
gas.
Production steadily increased, albeit
not rapidly enough to compensate
for growing domestic demand, and
by
1972 Mexico's annual petroleum output
of close to 194 million barrels

had reached the previous 1921
all-time high.

By late 1976. the incor-

poration of the fields in southeastern
Mexico had raised the level of

production considerably, as well as the
estim.ates of proven, probable,
and potential reserves.

On February 11, 1977, for the first time
in

its history. Pemex produced more
than a million b/d.

By then, the new

fields in the southeast already represented
60% of the entire output.

During 1977. a year in which Pemex expanded its
exploration to

cover twenty-five states across Mexico, petroleum
deposits were being

discovered at

a

rate of one each twenty days.

By December of that year.

Pemex estimated its reserves, which always include
natural gas as well
as crude oil.

to amount to 16 billion barrels in proven reserves. 31

billion probable, and 120 billion potential.

In his second annual

report. President Lopez Portillo in 1978 officially announced estimates

of 20 billion barrels in proven reserves. 37 billion probable, and 200

billion potential.

22

By August, 1978, stepped-up explorations in the

Bay of Campeche were beginning to raise speculations that Mexico's hy-

drocarbon wealth could place it eventually alongside Saudi Arabia as
a

producer.
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Early 1979 estimates expressed that Mexico conservatively

expected its offshore reserves
and production to equal
that of th.
le entire North Sea by the
n,1d-1980's. and that it had
only begun to exploit
its Gulf of Mexico potential.
On the basis of these
substantial

increments in reserves, the
pro-

duction of hydrocarbons doubled
in just four years.

From 1977 to 1980,
total output increased from
545.6 to 1,032.4 million barrels,
i.e. an

average of 23.7% per year.

In 1976,

the average daily production
was

0.9 million barrels of crude oil and
2,115 million cubic feet of gas;
by early 1980, these figures
had increased to 2.1 million
barrels of

crude oil and 3,672 million cubic
feet of gas.
in production,

the ratio

In spite of the growth

reserves/production improved from 19 years

in 1976 to 57 years in 1979.^^

The program of production drawn up
by Pemex in 1976 had stated the
goal of 2.25 million barrels daily
for 1982.

By July, 1980, two and a

half years ahead of schedule, this
objective had been surpassed, with
2.276 million b/d.

At that time, Mexico became the first producer
of

hydrocarbons in Latin America, ahead of Venezuela,
and the fifth in the
world, behind the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia,
the United States, and
Irak.
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In his fourth annual

report of September, 1980, President

Lopez Portillo announced significant increases in estimates
of reserves:
60.126 billion barrels in proven reserves, 38.042 billion
probable, and
250 billion potential.

Thus, in terms of both reserves and production, the growth of the

Mexican petroleum industry has been spectacular.

On March 18, 1981,

the Director of Pemex was able to announce that available reserves
had

increased almost eleven times since 1976, to 67.830 billion barrels in
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proven reserves, 45 billion
probable, and 250 billion
^8
potential.
the time, the ratio
reserves/production was up to 60
years.

At

There are two reservations
that, to a certain degree,
might qualify
reserves estimates as well as
production goals.
In its figures for reserves, Pemex includes natural
gas as well as petroleum.
Since the
ratio is usually estimated
at 35:65 respectively, petroleum
by itself
would correspond to only two-thirds
of total reserves. Additionally,
partly as a result of the quick
pace of development, in some cases

drilling data have not been forthcoming
parallel to announcements of
increases in reserves.
to reserve claims.

This point could raise some questions
in regards

However, in the light of achievements
in both ex-

ploration and subsequent exploitation
since the mid-1970's, these factors by no means appear to add up
to a straitjacket for the Mexican
pe-

troleum industry.
In his fifth annual

report of September, 1981, President Lopez

Portillo announced that total production of
hydrocarbons through 1981
had reached an average of 2.350 million b/d,
an increase of 17.5% rel-

ative to the same period in the previous year.

Whereas in 1976 Mexico

occupied the fifteenth place in the world with regard to
production, at
present it

is

the fourth largest oil producer in the world, only
after

the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

Likewise, Mexi-

co's reserves are also the fourth largest in the world, on the order
of
72 billion barrels in proven reserves, 58.650 billion probable, and 250

billion potential.

By late 1981 it was a widely acknowledged fact

that Mexico had, indeed, sizable petroleum and natural gas deposits,

whose progressive exploitation was bound to have

a

lasting impact in
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its domestic affairs,
rs. as wpII
;ic
-in
well as
in

Us

.

i
role
in the international
sce-

nario.

Energy Policy

Mnlnistra^

Until recently, the
Mexican government had not
consid-

ered the need for a
comprehensive energy policy.

Since the nationalization of the petroleum
industry, each energy field
had been managed in-

dividually by state enterprises.
classified in two groups:

These state organizations
could be

those involved in the
production process;

and the institutions in
charge of research and
development.

important in the first group
are:
in 1938; the Federal

The most

Mexican Petroleum (Pemex), created

Electricity Commission, set up
also in 1938; and

Mexican Uranium (Uramex). established
in 1979.

The research institu-

tions that operate in accordance
with these organizations are:

the

Mexican Petroleum Institute,
established in 1965; the Electricity
Research Institute, created in
1937; and the National Nuclear
Research
Institute which, together with the
National Atomic Energy Commission,

were established in 1979.^^
Pemex is the most important Mexican
company, second in Latin America, and thirty-eighth in the world,
with sales for 7.290 billion dol-

lars by December. 1980.^2

^^.^ ^.^^^^ ^^^^^

substantially higher

but for the fact that domestic price levels
are far below those prevalent in the international market.

To December. 1979. Pemex employed

103,271 workers in its various areas of activity.

Whereas in 1976 pro-

duction was 14.9 b/d per employee, by 1980 this figure
had risen to
26.1 b/d.

This represented a 75% increase in productivity.

By 1980,
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crude production was three
ti.es that of 1976, while
personnel had only
increased at an average of
5.06% annually.
From another angle, operating expenses, which in
1976 accounted for 54% of
total sales income,
represented only 31% of the total
in 1980.
Of course, it could be
argued that the extraordinary
wealth of the new wells, rather
than specific increases in productivity
per worker, has been the key
to these
improvements.
Indeed, the number of barrels
of proven reserves for each
Pemex worker increased from
72,000 in 1976 to 560,000 by 1980.^3

According to U.S. sources.
"Pemex can easily be compared to
a major
American oil company." Pemex itself
takes care of most of its own work:
exploration, drilling, production,
refining, basic petrochemicals,

transportation and commercialization,
technological development, and
construction.

For operations such as offshore drilling
and coring anal-

ysis, sometimes it contracts the services
of comrr.ercial specialized
firms, just as major American companies
occasionally do.^^

The Mexican Petroleum Institute includes
five divisions:

engineer-

ing, petrochemical and refining, training,
exports, and exploration.

The Institute is Pemex's primary consulting firm
and architect/engineering contractor.

nical
is

It appears to be an internationally competitive
tech-

firm, holding more than 100 international patents.

The Institute

"an active, burgeoning petroleum technology firm"
which, in addition,

provides Pemex with onsite technical supervision at its major
construction projects.

Thus, the Institute not only develops, but also imple-

ments and applies Pemex's technical base.

This role as a fundamental

technological support includes training programs for most of Pemex's
personnel
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Plannini.

The Secretariat of National
Patrimony and Industrial Develop-

ment (Secretaria de Patrimonioy Fomento
Industrial)
fining and implementing national
energy policy.

is

in charge of de-

Its jurisdiction in-

cludes the Energetics Corrmission.
established in 1973 and termed by its

officials as

a

"modest equivalent" to the U.S. Department
of Energy; its

role is rather diminished by the fact
that it does not set any energy
policy.

36

However, the Energetics Commission formulates
guidelines

about the administration and rational use of
energy sources.
words, the Commission is

a

In

other

state instrument for developing strategies

to meet energy demands, according to
available resources and the coun-

try's

socioeconomic needs. "^^
With the creation of the Energetics Commission in
1973, the idea

of a comprehensive approach to energy policy began to
take hold of

Mexican government officials.

At first, the main themes referred to

self-sufficiency, an extension of energy supplies to the population,

a

diversification of energy sources, planning mechanisms, financial stability, and the promotion of research and technology.

There were obvi-

ous internal and external factors that blocked these measures, including:

a lack of coordination among the various organizations

in charge

of the national supply of energy; a discontinuity in the development
plans of the sector, due to the administration changes every sexenio

(six-year presidential terms); after 1976, external pressures regarding
oil

exports; domestic subsidies to the industrial sector; and

reliable data concerning reserves.

a

lack of

However, the fact that national
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development is contingent, to

a

significant degree, on energy
strat-

egies, reaffirmed the vital
need for

double-edged proposition.

a

comprehensive policy.

It was a

Energy policy must be geared
towards produc-

tion, mainly industrial growth,
according to the basic tenets of

Mexico's postwar process of
development; and the industrial
sector
should cover, increasingly, the
needs for capital goods in Pemex
and
the Federal Electricity Comnission.

There were two basic domestic
considerations in the promotion of
a

comprehensive energy policy:

the fact that Mexico's development
and

growing energy demands have relied
predominantly on petroleum and natural gas; and the state policy of
maintaining a low domestic price for

these resources, in order to promote
economic and industrial activities.

Conversely, an energy plan would have to
address the question of diminishing the overwhelming reliance on a single
non-renewable resources,
i.e. oil and natural gas, and of revising
internal price policies.

By 1977, the main guidelines for a comprehensive
energy policy during Lopez Portillo's sexenio (1977-1982) already
seemed clear:

a)

pe-

troleum should not become an end in itself in the process
of development;

b)

petroleum resources must be industrialized;

ical as well

given optimum utilization;
of the energy policy;
g)

for geograph-

as economic reasons, the United States would continue
to

be Mexico's most important oil client;

coal;

c)

f)

e)

d)

petroleum resources must be

hydrocarbons would constitute the axis

the process of development must make use of

nuclear energy should be used once reactors were available,

but it would not be the base of Mexico's development;

h)

solar and

geothermic energy must be incorporated to development, even before
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nuclear energy;

i)

hydraulic energy should also play

a

role.^^

By the late 1970's, it
appeared that the Mexican government
was
following a course of accelerated
extraction of its petroleum resources,
with the objective of achieving
a sizable level of exports.
In the

past. Mexico had maintained a
rather cautious energy policy, geared
to
production for the domestic market,
and conservation of its oil re-

sources.

Now the new and sharply distinct
goals revolved around three

incentives for development:

to achieve self-sufficiency for
Mexico in

refined products and basic petrochemicals;
to increase the participation
of finished products in contrast
with primary products in the exports

market; and to achieve
ducts.

a

liberalization in the prices of petroleum pro-

This amounted to a recognition of the need to
end with superflu-

ous subsidies and excessive protectionism.^^

However, these objectives

would be qualified, increasingly, by crude oil exports,

a

tendency which

in principle at least, would seem to undermine their
intended effective-

ness

.

In recent times, the Mexican government has shown an
affinity with

planning, as a means to bring cohesiveness and
process of development.

a

common purpose to the

According with this trend, on April

15,

1980,

President Lopez Portillo promulgated the "Global Plan for Development,
1980-1982," as

Planning."

a

stage towards the creation of

a

"National System of

The Secretariat of the Budget and Planning (Secretaria de

Programacion y Presupuesto) is in charge of the implementation of the
Global Plan, whose basic objectives are:^^
1-

"To reaffirm and strengthen Mexico's economic, political and

cultural independence as

a

democratic, just and free nation;
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2- To provide the population with
employment and a minimum of wel-

fare, giving priority to the needs
with respect to food, education,

health, and housing;
3- To promote a high, sustained, and
efficient economic growth; and
4- To improve the distribution of income
among the people, factors

of production, and geographical regions."

Energy policy is
ment.

a

crucial element of the Global Plan for Develop-

In his presentation of the Plan, the Secretary
of the Budget and

Planning, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, emphasized
that "oil is inti-

mately tied to the viability of the planning strategy."
is

However, "It

not a matter of implementing an oil growth policy, but
a policy of

development that makes use of oil."

From this perspective, the exploi-

tation and export of oil would seem to be conditioned by the purposes
of the overall development strategy, and by the real absorption
capacity by the Mexican society, of oil resources and income.

Indeed, this

question encompasses the critical dilemma that grows out of Mexido's

petroleum wealth:

will Mexico's government and society be able to fos-

ter, shape, and channel development in a positive way for the nation as
a

whole, or will oil distort development in an uncontrolled, and possi-

bly unsatisfying, fashion.

In other words, oil

income is likely to

further the third basic objective of the Global Plan, i.e. economic
growth; but its impact on the achievement of the other three objectives,
i.e. Mexico's economic and political

distribution of income, still remains

independence, social progress, and
a

dubious proposition.

Energy policy, introduced in Chapter XI of the Global Plan, constitutes a basic support for the objectives of the general strategy of
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development.
this field:

Chapter XI enumerates the specific
goals to be reached in
to uphold the sole ownership
by the nation of all hydro-

carbon resources in Mexico's
territory, as well as in the
200-mile "exclusive economic zone" in the Gulf
of Mexico and the Pacific
Ocean; to
generate sufficient electric energy
for the country's needs; to diversify and take advantage of
alternate energy sources; to promote
the man-

ufacture of capital goods for the
oil industry; to diversify
Mexico's
foreign trade; to protect the environment;
and to propose to the international community the adoption of a
"World Energy Plan," in order to

give an integral approach to the solution
of the energy crisis.
the Global Plan, a maximum level

is

In

set for production of petroleum,

defined as 2.5 million barrels of crude oil daily,
with

a

margin of

flexibility of 10%, to guarantee domestic supply and
exports.

This

means that, according to the Plan, the level of 2.7
million barrels of
crude oil daily would be the maximum expected production
up until
1982.^"^

The Global Plan for Development gave an additional boost to
the

promulgation of an Energy Program.

During September and October, 1980,

the Mexican Congress was busy analyzing the basic points of such a pro44
gram.
Finally, on November 18, 1980, the Secretary of National Pat-

rimony and Industrial Development, Jose Andre's de Oteyza, set in motion
the National Energy Program.

Among other points, he emphasized the fact

that not more than 50% of Mexican oil would be exported to any single

country, the need for appropriate technology, and the urgency of ratio-

nalization in the use of oil.

Specifically with respect to the 50%

limit on exports, Oteyza declared:

"Of the one million and a half oil
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barrels Mexico will export,
the United States will
receive 730.000 or
750,000 barrels of crude daily. "^^

The Energy Program sets
goals to 1990. and projections
to the year
2000.
It places energy in
the overall context of
development, and delineates its role.
In other words, the main
objective of the Energy

Program is to support national
economic development, which implies:
"...in the first place, to expand
the production of
hydrocarbons according to the needs
of a balanced
economic growth. Secondly, to
obtain the resources
derived from o 1 exploitation,
in order to assign
them to activities of the highest
priority. "46

Specifically, the objectives of the
Energy Program are as follows r^^
1-

"To satisfy the national needs
for primary and secondary energy;

2- To rationalize the production and
use of energy;

3- To diversify the sources of primary
energy, paying particular

attention to renewable resources;
4- To integrate the energy sector to
the development of the rest of

the economy;
5- To know with greater precision the energy
resources in the coun-

try; and
6- To strengthen the scientific and technical

infrastructure cap-

able of developing Mexico's potential in this field and
of benefiting

from new techniques."

The Energy Program stresses the fact that so far Mexico has used
its energy resources in an inefficient way.

This is underlined by the

high intensity in energy consumption per unit of GDP, an index comparable, and even superior to those in highly industrialized countries.

In
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other words. Mexico appears
to have an energy-intensive
economy. Thus,
there is a need to modify
consumption patterns and increase
efficiency.
In this context, the
diversification of energy sources
is the only way
to diminish dependency on
hydrocarbons.^^
The Energy Program establishes
three levels of priorities:'^^
1-

Energy and industrialization;

2- Energy and regional
3-

development; and

Energy and the external sector.

In regards

to energy and industrialization,
the Program underlines

the possibilities in refining,
petrochemicals, and energy-intensive in-

dustries.

The links with regional development are
related to the need

for spatial planning of urban and
industrial growth, for a strengthening and extension of infrastructure
and services in the places where the
oil

industry has

ment.

a

greater impact, and for

a

protection of the environ-

The relation between energy and the external
sector basically

deals with the limits of the economy to absorb
income from oil exports,
and the role of these exports in the diversification
of Mexico's foreign
trade.

There would seem to be

a

rather clear contradiction between the

promotion of energy- intensive industries, and the already-established

high-intensity levels in energy consumption in Mexico.

It could be ar-

gued that the solution lies in more efficient operations, but the mode
through which this increased efficiency can be achieved is still undetermined.

On the other hand, even though apparently sufficient consid-

eration is given to the regional impact, the Program goes on to emphasize immediately afterwards that it is mainly at the national level
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where gains fro. the expansion
of the energy sector will
have an effect.
Here, again, the seeming
Inevitability of centralization
would seem to
override the preoccupation
with regional imbalances. Finally,
the capacity of the economy to absorb
income from oil exports is not
clearly
defined.
However, the Energy Program does
set

a

limit to petroleum exports,

at a level of 1.5 million
barrels daily, and of natural
gas, at a level
of 300 million cubic feet daily.
Furthermore, to avoid an excessi'ive

dependency on

a

single product, it is underlined
that hydrocarbons are

expected not to account for more than
50% of current foreign income.
Not more than 50% of Mexican oil
exports should go to

a

single country.

Parallel to this, Mexican oil exports
should not account for more than
20% of the hydrocarbon im.ports of any country,
with the exception of the

Central American and Caribbean countries,
whose needs up to 50% could
be supplied by Mexico.

The Energy Program emphasizes Mexico's unique
international position, due to the magnitude of its petroleum
and gas reserves, and to the

comparatively low costs involved in their exploitation.

Given the ex-

port projections of the Program, and the expected
increases in domestic
demand, it is estimated that the production of crude oil
and gas liquids
will be around 3.5 million b/d by 1985, and around 4.1 million
b/d by
1990.

The production of natural gas will increase, respectively, to

4,300 million and 6,900 million cubic feet daily.

A margin of 10% in

additional production capacity should give the energy sector added flexibility.

The rate of exploitation of actual proven reserves, as estab-

lished by the Program, would guarantee by 1990 a ratio reserves/
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production of at least
23:1 for petroleum, and
of at least 19:1 for
nat
ural gas. which are
deeded to be adequate
margins of security, to
be enhanced as exploration
proceeds." Independently of
the exploitation
policy that is followed,
the Energy Program
concludes that, because of
technical reasons, which
Include safeguards against
premature exhaustion of the fields, the
maxi^m level of production of
oil and gas in
Mexico will not exceed during
any period the equivalent
of between 8 to
10

minion b/d

of crude oil.^^

On February 5, 1981. the
National Energy Program was
published in
Mexico's Official Diary,
approved and signed by President
Ldpez Portillo
and nine Secretaries, and
thus it became a law.
This, in effect, seemed
to reassert the goal of the
Mexican government in regards to
the rationalization of the activities of
the energy sector.

Infrastructure

.

According to the Global Plan for
Development, "the in-

dustrialization of hydrocarbons
structure.

is

the fundamental part of energy infra-

The priority given to infrastructure
works is revealed

by some of Pemex's development
objectives over a six-year period (19771982).

As stated in 1978. these included:

in refining,

to double ca-

pacity to 1.7 million b/d; to accelerate
the construction of gas pro-

cessing plants, and of the gas pipeline
system in Mexico, as well as of
oil and gas distribution and transportation
equipment in general, such
as additional

pipelines and tankers; in petrochemicals, to triple
ca-

pacity to 18.6 million tons by 1982.^^

Mexico's energy policy has given priority to the multiple
uses and
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transformations of crude hydrocarbons
into processed products.
During
the first three years of the
Lopez Portillo government, from 1977
to
1979. there was a significant increase
in infrastructure geared to that
end.

In the area of industrial

plants, there were the following works:

28 refining industrial plants. 18 plants for
hydrocarbon treatment. 24

petrochemical industrial plants, and 50
auxiliary service installations.
During these three years, the area
of transportation, storage, and distribution expanded in the following
way:
128 gas, oil, and petrochemical

ducts. 18 storage tanks. 17 storage and
distribution plants, and 11

port works.

With respect to

offshore structures in the Gulf of

Campeche. again from 1977 to 1979, these
included:

10 drilling plat-

forms, one linkage platform, four platforms
for temporary production,
the setting of a 36" diameter oilduct 165
kilometers long, and 65 kilo-

meters long, and 65 kilometers of recollection
lines.^^

Domestic demand for refined products derived from
petroleum has
pushed Pemex to sustain annual rates of increment of
9.2% on the average.

By December, 1979, refining of crude oil and liquids
had reached

the level of 1.1 million b/d, an increase of 42% from the
December,
1976, level.

For the first time in its history, Pemex surpassed the

level of one million barrels of crude oil refined daily.

The capacity

of crude processing was raised by 31% from December, 1976, to December,
1979; during this same period, processing of gas liquids increased by
78%.
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This was made possible by the incorporation to production of the

new refineries of Cadereyta, with an ultimate capacity of 235,000 b/d,
and Salina Cruz, with an ultimate capacity of 170,000 b/d.

These refin-

eries, together with the expansion in the capacity of older ones, have
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allowed Mexico to become
self-sufficient in processed products.^^
Towards the end of 1980, Mexico
had reached the eleventh place as
a country in the refining
of crude oil and gas liquids,
by increasing
the processing capacity of
its ten refineries to 1,476.000
b/d, i.e. an

average annual growth rate of
13% since 1977.

As a refining company.

Pemex now occupies the fifth place
in the world, surpassed only by
four

multinational corporations.

Expansion is under way in the refineries

at Tula. Hidalgo, Salina Cruz,
and Ciudad Madero, and there are
projects

for new refineries.

The expected expansion of refining
capacity dur-

ing the 1980's will make it
necessary to build five plants equivalent
in size to the refinery at Minatitlan.
the largest in the country.

The increases in refining capacity underline
the fortunate coincidence
for Mexico of huge deposits of petroleum
and gas,

a

rapidly expanding

domestic consumption, and a respectable level of
industrial capacity.
In the primary petrochemical

industry, during 1979 the production

in Pemex's 70 plants reached a volume of
6.34 million metric tons of 37

different products, such as ammonia, ethylene, polythylene,
methanol and
ethanol.

This represented an increment of 60% with respect to
the 1976

level of production.

In spite of this increase, the supply of several

important products still remained under the level of demand.

This

situation was being addressed since mid-1978, with the construction of
76 additional

petrochemical plants, which would help Pemex reach its

goal of tripling production to 18 million metric tons per year.^^

Ac-

cording to the rate of construction, by late 1981 Mexico was expected
to be self-sufficient, and even an incipient exporter,

basic petrochemical products.

in most of the

Ill

In 1980.

the production of basic
petrochemicals was 7.22 million

tons, an increment of
83% over the 1976 level.

The Cosoleacaque petro-

chemical complex is at present
the biggest a^nia-producing
center in
the world, which guarantees
Mexico sufficient nitrogen to
.eet domestic
demand for fertilizer, as well
as a substantial surplus for
exports.^^
On April 29. 1981. the huge
petrochemical complex at La Cangrejera

started operations.
initial
cal

The 20 plants located in this
complex represent an

incorporation of 3.5 million tons per
year to total petrochemi-

production, and will make possible
the fulfillment of the expansion

objectives.
One of the most important additions to
Pemex's infrastructure has
been the Central Duct of the National
Gas System, from Cactus to

Monterrey.
ural

Originally initiated with the main purpose of
selling nat-

gas to the United States, at present it
plays

meeting Mexico's domestic energy needs.

a

crucial role in

The result of the rupture in

the negotiations for the sale of gas to the
United States in 1978 was
a

process of conversion of Mexican industry to gas.

By March,

1978,

the Secretary of National Patrimony and Industrial
Development, Jose

Andre's de Oteyza, stated the intention of supplying all the
industrial
zones in the country with natural gas. and adding an extension to
the

gasduct from Cactus to Reynosa-Monterrey all the way to Chihuahua and
Ciudad Juarez in the northwest.

Gas was to become the key to an ambi-

tious project of industrial decentralization that would help to ratio-

nally distribute economic growth through the establishment of develop-

ment poles.
On March 18, 1979, President Lopez Portillo inaugurated the Central
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Duct.

Its construction time was
17 months, the total

length of the

main line is 1,247 kilometers,
and the cost was over 16,00C
million
pesos. This was the most ambitious
distribution project ever undertaken
by Pemex, and investrr.ents ran
at the rate of almost 1.000 million
pesos
per month.

The line includes 1,102 km of 48"
diameter duct, and 145 km

of 42" diameter duct.^^

Towards the end of 1979, work was under
way in 82 additional ducts,
in order to interconnect the
Central

Duct with various locations in the

country, such as the poliduct
Cadereyta-Monterrey-Torreon-Jime'nez, and

also in other regions such as the poliducts
Rosarito-Mexical
Topolobambo-Culiaca'n in the northwest.

In October.

i

and

1980, the Secre-

tariat of Health and Welfare signed an agreement with
Pemex through

which the latter is to supply natural gas to the central
valley (where

Mexico City is located), by means of
Chiapas.

a

direct gasduct from Cactus,

The main objective of this project would be to reduce the

level of environmental pollution in the capital

cleaner energy sources such as gas.^^

through the use of

By November, 1980, the Director

of Pemex announced that the national duct network for the distribution

of hydrocarbons and gas would ultimately extend 35,100 km, of which
15,800 km were already in service.

At the time,

a

new gasduct was un-

derway between Salamianca and Leon, Guanajuato, alongside which there
will be an industrial corridor through the central part of the country.''^

Early in 1981, construction of

a

line was started in order to

supply gas to the steel works at La'zaro Ca'rdenas-Las Truchas, on the
Pacific Coast.

Likewise, an additional 48-inch gas line was being laid

to double the volumes available in the central

valley.

7?
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During 1980. for the first
ti.e, natural gas consumption
exceeded
that of gasoline, fuel oil
and coal, and its importance
is expected to
be still greater in the coming
years.
In all. in that year
2.940 million cubic feet of natural
gas were processed. 97%
more than in 1976.
In this operation.
Mexico occupies

the fifth place in the world.

The advances in infrastructure
were dramatically underscored by
the
Director of Pemex in his annual
report of March 18. 1981:
"During the period 1977-1980 we
have installed an
average of one high-capacity
compressor every six
days; we have laid 5.200 meters
of pipelines per
day; we have completed and
put into operation one
industrial plant every 14 days; we
have installed
one offshore platform every 19 days;
we have built
a storage tank every three
days. "74
In spite of Pemex's

impressive record of achievements, especially

since 1977. a number of drawbacks still
persist.

By September. 1980.

out of a total production of 3.300
million cubic feet of natural gas per
day. 300 million were being burned in
the atmosphere.''^

flaring has been confined to

However, most

offshore wells in the Bay of Campeche.

With the construction of gas delivery systems
to the shore, specifically
a 336

km gasduct to Ciudad Pemex and a 165 km
gasduct to Merida, it is

expected that Pemex will be able to use up to 97% of
the total production.

By March. 1981. the Director of Pemex acknowledgedthat
in total

550 million cubic feet of gas were still being flared at sea, but
that
the installation of compression platforms as well as the additional

gas pipelines, would soon eliminate the waste.

There are indications that Mexico's industrial sector
ing up with the capital goods needs of Pemex.

is

not keep-

In 1978. a year in which

the petroleum industry grew by 65%. Pemex had to import 50% of the
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capital goods in foreign
.arkets/^

In

October. 1980. the Mexican

Petroleum Institute estimated
that Pemex would spend a
total of 33 billion pesos in foreign
equipment during 1980. This
figure represented
30% of the total imports by Mexico's
Public Sector/^ The previous
facts imply a significant
erosion of Pemex's financial
basis.
Two additional limiting factors to
Pemex's expansion are its
reduced tanker

fleet and the lack of adequate
port facil ities .^^
Pemex is pushing ahead to cope
with these obstacles,
1979. it was announced that

a

In March.

plant for the production of machinery
and

capital equipment would be built
in the northern part of the
country,
with French technology and financial
support, which would eventually

supply the needs of Pemex and the
Federal Electricity Commission.

Addi-

tionally, by mid-1981. Pemex owned 222
drilling rigs, thus becoming one
of the main drilling firms.

But in general terms, the scientific-

technological panorama in Pemex. as well as
in Mexico as

rather somber.

a

whole, is

There is an urgent need to foster basic
research and

research for development, in order to proceed
from the stage of
to that of a producer of appropriate
technologies.^^

a

user

Nonetheless, in

what would appear to be excessively optimistic projections,
by October.
1980. Pemex announced that by the end of 1981 it would be using
in its

operations 90% of national technology, and thus only 10% of imported
technology.

Action is being undertaken which shows
need to develop human resources.

a

preoccupation with the

As part of the National

Program for

Science and Technology. 1978-1982. 2.924 scholarships are being granted
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through the Mexican Petroleum
Institute, for training in the
fields of
petroleum and petrochemicals, as
well as technical training
in nuclear
and solar energy.

The Mexican Petroleum Institute
itself grew in size

from 1966 to 1977. from 316
employees to almost 3.000. 75% of
whom were
Involved in research and development
projects. On the other hand, there
have been increases in the budget
of the Institute in the order of
20% level

a

.^^

With respect to tankers and port
facilities, Pemex
to build up its capacity.

is

also trying

Pemex's tanker fleet is expected to
increase

its deadweight tonnage, from 650.000
tons in 1977. to close to one mil-

lion tons in 1982.
itated.

On the other hand, some shipyards are being
rehabil-

Still, Mexican ports can only service ships
in the order of

25,000-30,000 tons of dead weight, which excludes
supertankers.

This

constitutes an obstacle to Pemex's objective of exports
diversification.
A temporary solution has been found in the Bay of Campeche,
through the
use of a mooring buoy installed at Cayo Areas, with
to it, capable of storing one million barrels.

a

captive tank tied

Crude oil

is

pumped

from the captive boat to the tanker ships that carry the loads
for ex4.

port.
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At present, under the project "Ships. Pipelines and Ports."

a

new

pattern of transportation is taking shape, based on sea and river
routes, as well as the optional use of pipeline systems, instead of the

traditional land roads.

By the end of 1980. 793.000 tons of freight

had been transferred from land to sea and river transportation.

These

measures are aimed at complying with the proposed goal of relieving

congestion in overland routes.

Whereas formerly 78% of Pemex freight
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was transported by railroad
and highway, and only

Zn by water, by 1980
land movements had
decreased to 59% while sea
transportation had increased to 41%.^^
Finances.

A key component of
Mexico's energy policy is the
financial

factor.

The schemes for advancing
rapidly and in unison in the
various
stages of the petroleum
production cycle obey a financial
imperative.
For example, the development
policies for the petrochemical and
refining
phases are expected to eliminate
imports of chemical products,
which in
1976 still amounted to 700 million
dollars, and of fertilizers, which
in that same year totalled
350 million.^''

Several fortunate circumstances
would seem to contribute to a

bright financial outlook for Pemex.

Even though the Reforma Fields are

relatively deep and the decline in the
natural pressure of the wells demands maintenance works, plus the additional
expenses involved in ex-

ploiting the offshore deposits in the Gulf of
Campeche, the total production costs for the average barrel of Mexican
oil are considerably
lower than the costs in other areas such as the
North Sea fields.

Ex-

traction costs for Mexican oil. which vary markedly,
are not expected
to exceed an average of $2.50 per barrel, and might
be as low as $1.60.

However, they are substantially higher than Saudi Arabia's
$0.35 to

$0.50 per barrel.
Pemex

's

development program, introduced in 1977, included

get of 926 billion pesos for the entire period 1977-1982.

were expected to reach a total of 390 billion pesos.

a bud-

Investments

The magnitude of
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these figures is easily perceived
when compared to those of the previ
ous
sexenio. during which budget and
investment totals amounted to 240,300

and 119,800 million, respectively.^^

Since 1977. moreover, expenditure

levels and investments have surpassed
the original estimates by a con-

siderable margin.

Just in 1979, Pemex received financial
resources that

totalled 259,026 million pesos, an
increment of 57% over the 1978 level.
Pemex 's own income from its operations
came to 184,372 million pesos,
71% of the total and 275% higher than in 1976.

sented 74,654 million, or 29% of the total.

Credit financing repre-

Of Pemex's own income in

1979, 72,749 million corresponded to domestic sales,
and 100,766 million
to exports of crude oil, refined products,
and petrochemicals.

Expenses

amounted in 1979 to 258,884 million.
During 1980, Pemex's total income amounted to 362 billion
pesos,
a figure more than seven times higher than
that of 1976.

Current dis-

bursements came to 140,600 million pesos, more than five times those of
Thus, current savings totalled 221 billion pesos, i.e. 12 times

1976.

as much as the 1976 figure.

The destiny of these savings helps explain

Pemex's financial situation, as well as its impact in the Mexican economy.

In 1976, 38% of internal

savings were assigned to the payment of

taxes, i.e. revenues for the Public Sector.

By contrast, in 1980 this

proportion had increased to 73% of internal savings.

In 1980 Pemex

paid 162 billion pesos in taxes, or 20 times more than the 1976 level.

For 1981, taxes are estimated to increase to over 300 billion pesos.
On the other hand, the amount corresponding to investments during 1980

was 121,800 million pesos, or five times more than the figure for
1976.^^

118

As of December 31.
1980, total liabilities of Pemex
amounted to

369 billion pesos, of which 193,400
million corresponded to foreign
debt on a short and long term
basis. That is, the debt
increased five
times from 1976 to 1980.
Pemex officials argue that the
increment in
the debt does not have a
detrimental impact on the financial
stability
of the company, when compared
with the substantial and growing
value of
the vast and ever expanding
petroleum reserves.
In other words, the

growth in reserves has brought about
the possibility of widening Pemex's

credit capacity.

And Pemex has increased its foreign
debt as

a

function

of its investment programs, and
as a result of its supportive role
as
a

major source of revenues for Mexico's
Public Sector.
On the other hand, Pemex is a major
recipient of government expen-

ditures.

Mexico's national budget for 1981 allocated 418
billion pesos

for the sectors given priority in the Global
Plan for development.

Among these, 36%, or 150,480 million pesos, were
destined to Pemex's investments.

As a whole, Pemex received 35.6% of the total
budget for

organizations and companies within the Public Sector, i.e.
376,818 million pesos.

This is 10% higher than the 1980 figure.^^

the precedent of "additional" allocations:

And there is

during his fourth annual re-

port, in September, 1980, President Lopez Portillo announced an increase
in that year's budget by 206 billion pesos, most of which went to Pemex

to "balance costs and operations related to the new oil

level."
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production

Thus, it is likely that, given the industry's momentum, ex-

penses in 1981 will have exceeded estimates once again.
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Alternate ener^^^^ources
termine energy de.and:

.

There are three important
variables that de-

population growth, economic
development, and

modes of utilization of energy
sources.

Energy consumption in Mexico

has also been influenced by
government price policies.

By keeping
prices low, on occasion even
below production costs, the
government has
tried to promote development.
However, this artificial price
structure
has also led to an irrational
pattern of consumption. This is one
of
the reasons that explain the
fact that many Mexican public
companies

operate at

a

loss and. subsequently, increase
the public debt.

In ad-

dition, there is the question of
whether in recent times petroleum resources have been exploited irrationally,
i.e. at an excessively rapid
pace.
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This general situation has hindered
the incorporation of al-

ternate energy sources other than petroleum.
By 1978. the general rate of growth in
energy consumption in Mexico

was 7.5% annually, and 7.7% for petroleum
consumption.
1979, per capita energy consumption expanded at
In the

world context, Mexico has

a

a

Between 1976 and

rate of 5% per year.^^

relatively high level of energy con-

sumption, and one of the highest among developing
nations.

The consump-

tion of primary energy per unit of GDP in 1978, expressed
in thermic

equivalent of crude oil. was of 0.8 in Mexico.

This figure can be com-

pared with 1.1 for the United States. 0.9 for Great Britain. 0.9 for

Venezuela, and 0.6 for West Germany, during that same year.^^
The indices of growth cf energy consumption, and of the GNP, have

traditionally been intimately tied in post World War

II

Mexico.

120

According to official
sources, by 1979 the .ost
important energy users
were the following sectors:
industry. 25%; transportation.
24%; energy.
34%; domestic consumption.
6%; and other uses. 11%.,58

, ,,,,
and somewhat different
chart of energy users would
show the following
percentages:
industry. 26.38%; transportation.
29.84%; residential.

^

8.09%; agriculture. 0.69; other
uses. 1.00%; nonenergy uses.
3.39%;
Pemex's own needs. 14.01%; and
the electricity sector, 16.61%.59

any case, it is clear that the
industrial sector is
user.

a

dynamic energy

The growth in energy use in the
field of transportation is

a

re-

sult, to a considerable degree,
of the rapid increase in the
number of

motor vehicles, of 10.2% annually.

The precarious level of energy use

by agriculture is a reflection
of the travails of this sector in
recent

years.

And the rate of growth in the domestic
sector, well above the

rate of population increase, denotes
an increment in per capita consumption, although not necessarily a more
equitable spread among the various

groups of the population.

Petroleum and natural gas are by far the predominant
sources of
energy in Mexico.

In 1980.

the following sources:

the production of primary energy came from

petroleum, 64.40%; natural gas. 23.15%; coal.

5.25%; hydroelectric works, 6.94%; and

geothermal, 0.26%}^^

Thus, out

of its total energy consumption, Mexico depends in a level of
87.55% on

hydrocarbon energy.

The Global Plan for Development, in its section on

energy, proposes a strategy that would consistently widen the governtrient's

knowledge about Mexico's energy resources, as

sifying actual sources.

It seeks

a

basis for diver-

to promote a greater use of hydraulic,

geothermal, solar, and coal sources, among others.

This strategy
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acknowledges the effect that
domestic price structures
have had on the
exploitation of new sources, and
the need to use energy
more effi.
ciently.
in his annual report of
September. 1981, President
Lopez
Portillo emphasized that the
electricity sector, in which demand
grows
at a rate of 11% annually, will
be forced to double its electric
energy
generating capacity of 17.1 MW every
seven years. Thus, efforts will
have to be undertaken in order
to diversify its energy sources;
specifically,
geothermal. coal, and nuclear power, will
progressively become

substitutes for hydrocarbons, which have
other more productive uses.^^^

Mexico has sizeable sources of energy,
other than petroleum and
natural gas, such as:

Coal.

Reserves, which were 172 million tons in
1976, had increased

to 1,500 million tons by 1980.^^^

Traditionally, coal production in

Mexico has been associated with the steel industry.

However, at present

the Federal Electricity Commission is trying to foster
the development

of other sources for electricity, such as coal.

Some Mexican sources

foresee that by the end of the century coal might supply
12% of the
country's electricity needs.

As a start, the first great thermoelectric

plant based on coal. "Rio Escondido." Coahuila.

is

near completion.

This plant will have a capacity of 1,200 MW.'^^^

Hydraulic energy.

At present, this

is

the source of almost 1% of

the overall energy generated in Mexico, and of close to 28% of electric

energy.
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Even though Mexico is not relatively well-endowed with great

river systems close to its main population centers, the government is

pushing ahead with dam projects in the southern section of the country,
in order to supply an increasing share of the national

demand for
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electricity.

The great works at Chicoacen.
Chiapas, constitute the
most recent example of this
policy.
In November. 1980,
President Lopez
Portillo inaugurated the Chicoacen
Hydroelectric Plant, which required
an investment of 21 billion
pesos, and is expected to
generate 8% of
Mexico's total electricity demand,
i.e. 5,500 MW per hour.^°^

Nuclear energy.

This is another possibility that
is being given

growing attention by the Mexican
government.

During 1983 and 1984, the

nuclear reactors at Laguna Verde are
expected to begin operations, with
a

capacity of 1.308 MW.

Together with another nuclear unit to
be built

during the 1980's. by 1990 Mexico is
expected to have

generating capacity of 2,500 MW.

In this context,

a

nuclear-electric

the objective of the

Energy Program is to build additional
nuclear units throughout the
1990's. in order to have installed 20,000 MW
of nuclear capacity by the

end of the century.

-^^^

A drawback from the perspective of the goal of
energy independence,
is

the fact that Mexico must rely on the United
States for delivery of

enriched uranium for these nuclear plants.

Nevertheless, Uramex has

increased its exploratory activities, in order to guarantee
the production of 250 tons of uranium needed for the Laguna Verde
plant.

By

December, 1980, the prospects appeared to be good, with the discovery

of sizeable uranium deposits in the state of Oaxaca.

With these finds,

the production of refined uranium might reach the level of 70 tons in
a

two-year term.

Apparently. Swedish. French, and Canadian companies

are actively trying to obtain the contracts for the construction of the
new Mexican nuclear plants.

Geothermal energy

.

1

08

Mexico,

a

predominantly volcanic country,

is
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located in a privileged area
for generating geother^al
energy.
There
are estimates for a minimum
geothermal potential of
20,000 MW. The
importance of this figure is
well understood by comparing
it with the
9,000 MW total electric capacity
installed in Mexico at present.^^Q
According to the goals of the
Energy Program, Mexico will
have increased
its goethermal capacity from
150 MW in 1980 to 620 MW
in 1990.^^0

^"^^^ ""^^qy

-

Additionally, the Energy Program
also considers the

"solar option," although only as

long-term resource that will be
the

a

basis for decentralized types of
electricity systems.

The degree of success in promoting
alternate energy sources is

bound to be a decisive factor,
on

a

middle and long range basis, in

determining the flexibility of development
strategies and of foreign
policy options.

Rising domestic demand for energy, if
dependent solely

on hydrocarbons, could eventually
lead to dwindling reserves.

And, to

the extent that domestic needs require
a greater share of total output,

the potential will diminish for petroleum
to be used by Mexico as a

generator of foreign revenues, as well as
policy.

a

leverage for its foreign

Thus, the stabilization of the domestic energy market,
in terms

of a rationalization of consumption patterns
and

a

diversification of

energy sources, would appear to be a must for Mexico's
overall objectives of development.
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CHAPTER

V

THE ENERGY SITUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
The World Energy Crisis:

Frnnnm^r_^nHD^,.,^^

P^^^

crum

It would be pertinent here
to incorporate into the
discussion the

general context of the world energy
situation, and U.S. responses
to it,
as the global scenario where
Mexican petroleum must, by necessity,
play
Its role.
In order to better understand
the meaning of the energy crisis, it is necessary to underline
the peculiar characteristics of
petroleum, as a raw material of not
only economic, but also political
and

strategic importance.

Petroleum is

a

critical factor in determining

the possibilities of any nation, in
terms of both domestic viability

and international relevance.
be considered:

1)

In this context, three categories
should

those countries which have oil;

2)

those which do

not have oil, but control financial resources
to acquire it; and

3)

those which have neither oil nor sufficient
financial resources to buy
it from foreign producers.^
a

International politics and economics, to

significant degree, are contingent upon the changes in price,
supply,

and demand of petroleum.

This is a fact of present times.

Much of the economic growth in the post-World War
on cheap energy.

II

era was based

From 1967 to 1973, the demand for hydrocarbons in

the three main consuming regions. Western Europe, Japan, and the

United States, increased by more than 500 million barrels annually,

while production in these same areas expanded by less than
this amount.

a

tenth of

Thus, imports by these regions grew by 95% during this
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entire period, fro.
4.9 to 9.5 billion barrels
per year.

Practically
the increment in consumption
was made possible through
an increase
1n production by members
of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). More
specifically. 80% of the increase
came from
all

Middle East countries.
2

This constitutes the background
of the energy

crisis of the 1970's. and of
the growth in power of OPEC
countries.

Petroleum prices were kept at

a

low and stable level

through the

worldwide control of the market
by the fabled "Seven Sisters:

-

Exxon.

Shell. Mobil. Texaco. British
Petroleum. Standard Oil of California,
and Gulf.
These companies, in effect, operated
as a cartel from 1945
until

1973. ccrcerting their transactions
in the international oil

trade, in order to maintain prices
low.

One of the results of this

successful policy was that alternate
sources of energy were gradually

driven out of the market.

During the 1960's. oil prices diminished

progressively in real terms.

This made possible the penetration of

petroleum as the predominant energy source in
Western Europe and Japan.
In the United States,

the effect of low oil prices was felt at
various

levels, all of which would contribute later on
to increase U.S. depen-

dence on foreign oil sources:

the domestic market was protected by

means of import quotas, which made U.S. oil prices rise
well above
those in the international market, and thus affected adversely
U.S. in-

dustrial and trade competitiveness vis

a vis

Western European countries

and Japan; coal production declined; starting in the 1970's,
natural
gas production also diminished; and the timetable for the construction

of nuclear plants was significantly delayed.^
The main oil companies were able to maintain

a

low-price structure
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by means of increases in
production.

In this way. even though
the

price per barrel of crude
declined, oil-producing countries
registered
an absolute increase in
tax revenues:
from, 1.381 million dollars
in
I960 to 4.886 million in
197o/ But the situation was to
change soon,
as the oil-producing
countries looked for ways to
obtain nore substantial profits.
The first initiative for the
creation of OPEC belonged to

Venezuela.

This country, in 1949, offered
its cooperation to Iran in

the negotiations then underway
between the latter and the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company..

rwards, Venezuela's information
on its tax agreements

with the oil companies would be used by
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other

oil-exporting countries in their demands for
additional revenues.

In

1953, a formal agreement was signed between Iran
and Saudi Arabia for

the exchange of inform.ation regarding
prices and oil policy.
in Baghdag, in September.

Finally,

1960, as a reaction to the persistent trend

towards lower oil prices [8% less in 1959; 6%
less in 1960), representatives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela, announced the

creation of OPEC.^

There were three principal factors that contributed to the develop-

ment of OPEC:

the need, from the point of view of the petroleum-produc-

ing countries, to check the capacity of the oil companies to
lower

prices at will; the awareness on the part of the already-established

producers that the entrance in the market of new, lower-priced producers
could affect their operations; and

a

new confidence by the oil -export-

ing countries in their own technical achievements, enough so to com-

pensate for any possible reaction by the oil companies.^
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A few years later, in
January. 1968. the Arab countries
members

of OPEC signed an agreement
that created the Organization
of Arab OilExporting Countries (OAPEC).
Even though the OAPEC agreement
stipulated
that it would not affect the
functions of OPEC, the fact that
the Arab
countries felt the need to underscore
their common economic and political objectives was indeed
signif icant.^ Arab militancy,
reinforced by

political-military events in 1973. i.e.
the "Yom Kippur" war. that galvanized Arab countries into action,
came to the fore in unprecedented
oil

price increases:

from 2.48 dollars per barrel in
1973 to 11.56

dollars in 1974. that is. an increment
of 366%. ^

This action, in ef-

fect, signaled the end of the era of
cheap energy.

The energy crisis, in plain terms, has
meant

a

disruption in the

production and commercialization processes of
the main energy source
in the contemporary world:

from

40^0

to 50% of all

tion comes from crude oil or derived products.

comes are not a matter easily agreed upon.

the energy consump-

But its causes and out-

According to various di-

verging perspectives, the roots of the energy crisis can
be located in:
the actual or imminent scarcity of world energy reserves,
especially

petroleum; the instability in the international oil supply, manifest
through price variations and insecurity in the supplies; and the environmental and social degradation due to the growing dependence on oil
and coal to meet energy demands.^

Obviously, the relative weight of

these factors, especially the first two. is directly related to the

political context.

Thus, it would be useful to analyze the energy

crisis in terms of its impact on, and reaction from, five basic groups
of actors:

OPEC; the international oil companies; the Western
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industrialized countries; Third World
countries; and the Soviet Bloc
countries
To a significant extent, what the OPEC
countries have done is to
take over the petroleum market structure
that had been created by the

main oil companies, and to continue fixing
prices also according to
political strategy, albeit
cal

a

different one.^°

a

But diverging ideologi-

perspectives within OPEC have threatened its
very viability as an

international cartel.

Specifically, the "hard-liners," such as Lybia

and Iraq, have frequently clashed with the
"moderates," mainly Saudi

Arabia, over matters related to price and supply
levels.

After the abrupt increases of 1973-74, oil prices began
to fall in
real

terms, i.e.

in relation to inflation.

Specifically, from January,

1974, to December, 1978, official OPEC prices declined 25% in
constant

dollars, 40% in constant Marks, and 50% in constant Yens.
tors contributed to this trend.
in the

Several fac-

First of all, the economic recession

Western industrial nations during the mid-1970

and the subse-

's,

quent erosion in the value of the dollar, brought about

a

reduction in

the demand for OPEC oil, and declining revenues for the cartel mem-

bers.

On the other hand, during the second half of the 1970's, new

sources of oil, such as Mexico, the North Sea, and Alaska, caused

a

temporary relative glut in the oil market.

Another factor that permeated the oil price structure during the
1970

's

was the continuing presence of the international oil companies

as kingpins of commercialization.
oil

The size and diversity of the main

companies, which limits their vulnerability, and their extensive

control of refineries, pipelines, tankers, and gas pumps, tend to
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explain their resilience.

By 1978. the sales of
the "Seven Sisters^,

had .ore than doubled
the level of 1973.

Most of the companies were

successful in arranging deals
with OPEC countries, through
which they
received a fee for pumping
the oil, and bought a
guaranteed share of
the production for themselves,
plus most of the remainder
at a fixed
price.

According to

a

1980 study for the National Office
of Economic Re-

search, written by the

forn^.er

head of economists of Allied
Chemical

Company. Avram Kisselgoff. the
price increases by OPEC also
brought
about higher earnings for the main
U.S. oil companies, in the
three
stages of operation:

production, refining, and commercialization.

Even though the relative increases
in their earnings tended to
diminish

through 1981. it is estimated that total
earnings for 1980 were still
30% above the 1979 level:

billion in 1980.

from 8.350 billion dollars in 1979 to
11

Earnings for 1981 were expected to amount to
11.7 bil-

lion dollars, and for 1984 a total of 14.960
billion dollars.

The role played by the oil companies

is

intimately tied to the

actions by the Western European and U.S. governments
in regards to the

energy crisis.

To begin with, the energy crisis is not by any means
an

isolated phenomenon, in its causes and consequences.

At

a

macro-level,

it is inscribed in the fram^ework of a linear vision of
history, central
to contemporary Western civilization, and to much of the
rest of the

world by the effect of demonstration, which assumes unending progress
and limitless expansion of the standard of living.

Without entering

here into a revision of the various estimates of availability of natural

resources, i.e. of the exploitation of the physical environment.
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such a Vision is ultimately
a fallacy from either

material or a moral

a

perspective.

But this topic is well beyond
the objectives of this
volume, and a brief mention will
suffice. At a micro-level,
the energy
crisis is related to the general
economic situation in the countries
members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), i.e. inflation, unemployment,
and the deficits balance of pay-

ments.

In regards

to energy policies since 1973-74,

there have been

instances of sharp disagreement among
OECD nations.

Diverging political responses by
oil-importing OECD nations to the
sharp increases in oil prices were, from
the beginning, divided in two
currents.

mation of

One, headed by the United States, tried
to promote the forF,

r--nn front

in the International

September. 1974.
in

to counteract OPEC.

This initiative culminated

Energy Agency (lEA), established in Brussels in

The lEA has encouraged cooperation among its members^^

order to "...promote

a

secure petroleum supply, according to reason-

able and equitable conditions

."-^^

The opposing tendency, led by France, maintained that such

a

front

would not be able to achieve the needed unity among its members, and
thus would not have the negotiating power to check OPEC's maneuvers

Indeed, to a certain degree. Western European countries, and to

a

.-^^

lesser

extent Japan, nave frequently favored bilateral negotiations and inde-

pendent agreements.

Such a course of action might appear to be contrary

to the interests of the lEA, the United States, and the big oil

panies.

Parallel

to this, since 1973, governmental

com-

control over the

energy sector in Western Europe has increased significantly.^^
On the other hand, U.S. initiatives provoked an uncomfortable
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political situation for OECD countries
that were potential oil exporters, such as Canada. Great Britain,
and Norway.

Some of these nations,

as a matter of fact, concurred
with OPEC measures.

After all. it was

the increase in prices itself that made
the exploitation of oil profit-

able in areas such as the North Sea. that
had previously been economi-

cally unfeasible.

Nevertheless, by early 1981. the European Economic

Community was considering

a

project to constitute

a

"petroleum bank."

as a common reserve to act as a safety value
against supply deficits and
19

pnce

raises.

From a general perspective, some authors see the energy
crisis as
a

syndrome of

a

global crisis of the capitalist system, unable to main-

tain a rate of growth akin to raised expectations.^^

Within this con-

text, there is the view that the energy crisis has been to a certain

degree the result of price manipulation by the oil companies, with the

objective of increasing profits.

Likewise, one of the positive results

for the United States would have been the partial reduction of the com-

parative trade disadvantage of recent years vis
and. mainly, Japan.

21

a vis

Western Europe

However, this point of view misses facts such as

the growing deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments, and the ero-

sion of U.S. global political leadership, both direct results of the

energy crisis.

At any rate, even though there might be reasons to think

that the U.S. government tended to stimulate actions by OPEC until
1973, as a means to bring about a raise in prices in the international

market to levels closer to U.S. domestic prices, after that year OPEC
policies were by far too forceful, unpredictable, and disruptive of the
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international monetary system,
to serve U.S. interests. ^2
If the increases in
oil prices have pushed
inflation to perilous

levels in Western developed
nations, among the Third
World oil-i.porti ng
countries of Latin America,
Asia, and Africa, the
impact has been catastrophic.
In 1978, Third World
countries, with 71% of the
world population, were consuming 10.5
million b/d of oil; by contrast,
the United
States, with approximately
6% of the world population,
in that same year
consumed 18.3 million b/d.23 i,
3p,,e of the fact that Third
World
countries consum.e only about 16%
of the total energy, their
current payments deficit grew from 7 billion
dollars in 1973 to more than 70
billion in 1980.

The standing debt of almost 100
developing countries in-

creased six

er during the 197C's. to a total
of 376 billion

dollars by 1980.^^

Developing countries must pay oil bills
that amount

to 50 billion dollars per year
and that, on the average, absorb
26% of

their export earnings; in some cases,
this last figure is considerably
higher, for example, in 1980, 60% for Turkey,
40% for Brazil, and 30%
for India.

Oil expenditures are expected to increase
to 110 billion by

1990."^^
In the United Nations,

the danger of an economic paralysis of the

Third World has been given growing attention, as
proof of the urgent
need for a "New Economic Order" that would be based
on

a

monetary re-

form, a transfer of financial resources, and an equitable
planning of

energy production and consumption.^^

Even though the possibilities of

an OPEC "Special Fund" for helping developing countries solve
their

financial problems have been widely considered, no effective and quick

solution is to be expected from these quarters.

In their price hikes.
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OPEC has given only marginal
attention to their pledge of
1975, in
Argel, to assist developing
countries.

At the October, 1981. summit of
22 leaders from industrialized
and
developing nations, held at Cancun.
Mexico, near consensus was reported
on the need for the creation of
an energy affiliate of the World
Bank.

The proposed agency would manage

a 30

billion dollar fund to help fi-

nance exploration and development of
energy resources in Third World

countries.

In this context,

States would be essential.

the active participation of the United

However, the Reagan administration has op-

posed the idea, favoring instead the action
of private enterprise.
In the context of the energy crisis,

those nations which have oil

and the political -military capability to
act on
to assert their presence and objectives.

a

global scale, will

try

Specifically, the Soviet Union

would appear to gain from financial turmoil in Western
countries, including inflation, recession, and social malaisse, and
from stagnation and

increasing political upheaval in Third World countries.
ergy crisis must be placed in

a

Thus, the en-

proper framework, political as well as

economic, strategic as well as commercial, and as

a

danger signal that

points to the fact that the means and ends of development must be redefined, in order for the Western world to stand up to the challenge of
an economically finite, and politically perilous environment.

There have been contradictory signals, since 1973, regarding the
future energy supply scenario.

According to some observers, the rela-

tive oil glut since the second half of the 1970's, a result of Western

economic recession and growing oil production, means that scarcity was
just a passing phenomenon.

The optimistic forecasts in regards to
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petroleum supplies have been
partly based on the assumption
that new
technologies will make possible an
increase in the recovery rate
of deposits.

But the discovery of new sources,
by itself,

augment petroleum supplies.

is

supposed to

According to some 1975 estimates,
by 1985

potential production of oil will be
twice as large as consumption:

the

exporting capacity of oil-rich countries
would amount to 65 million b/d,
while the import needs of industrialized
nations would be covered with
32 million barrels.

A study of OECD published in 1977 expected supply

by OPEC countries to reach the level of
45 million b/d by 1980, well

above the estimated world demiand of 33.5
million b/d.

By 1985, there

would be an excess supply of between 13% to
37% of OPEC's production
capacity.

By October, 1981, new and hopefully more accurate predic-

tions underlined that there could be surpluses for
the next five to ten

years, as

a

result of continued slow growth in world economies and
fur-

ther energy conservation.^^

On the other hand, new sources such as Mexico and the North
Sea

have considerably increased total output.

Additional possibilities are

found in China which, according to the China Business Review, published
by the National Ccunrll for U.S. -China trade, would be exporting 50

million tons of oil a >ear by 1990.

Indeed, by August, 1980, China was

producing 106.15 million b/d. a level equivalent to that achieved by

Great Britain in its North Sea wells.^^

All

in all. some estimates put

the amount of oil remaining to be discovered in the world at around

1

trillion barrels, with 30% to 40% of it expected to be found offshore.
TO

some in deep water areas that have yet to be explored.
In the midst of the maze of estimates regarding oil

supplies and
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prices, it is obvious that
these depend on contingent
situations of a
triple nature:
economic; political; and those
related to time hori zons
In order for the price of crude
oil

would have to be
mand),

a

a

to decline significantly,

there

sizable drop in world demand
(especially U.S. de-

growing reliance on alternate energy
sources, and

expansion in the oil production of
non-OPEC countries
tions are not likely to coincide on

a

.^"^

a

permanent

These condi-

sustained basis.

Many recent indications tend to confirm
the previous argument.

A

1977 analysis of future oil supplies concluded
that, regardless of the

rate of economic growth and oil prices,
up to

a

50% increment above

then prevalent levels, before the end of
the century there would be a

substantial ga^ between production and demand:

demand would outstrip

supplies by a margin of 15 to 20 million b/d. that is,
total world demand.
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According to

a

a

26% to 28% of

report by the Office of Techno-

logical Studies of the U.S. Congress, oil production in
the Western

industrialized nations, under the most favorable circumstances,
will
remain stationary until the year 2000.
tion is expected to decline to

4

In the United States,

million b/d.

produc-

Additionally, by the

early 1980 's the Soviet Union may be forced to interrupt its oil exports to Eastern Europe.
A 1977 CIA projection estimated that the Soviet Union and its

Comecon Bloc are likely to have

a

petroleum deficit of up to 4.5 mil-

lion b/d by the mid-1980's, with its subsequent impact on the World

Market.
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Indeed, in 1981 the Soviet Union, the biggest oil producer,

increased its oil output by only 0.7%. the lowest rate of increment in

recent times, in contrast with a 4% rate during the previous four
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years.

38

At present, the Soviet
Union supplies only 75.
of the petroleum demand of Eastern
European countries, which
.eans that a higher
Share of the latter's
financial resources will
have to
be spent on oil

from other sources.

Developing countries constitute
the most dynamic force
in overall
petroleum supply and price
levels.
Petroleum exporters, which
number
more than 20 countries and
represent one-fifth of the
population of the
Third World, are industrializing
at an accelerated pace,
and increasing
their energy use at a rate
of 6.1%; oil-importing
developing countries
also share the oo.l of
industrialization. As an aggregate,
these countries will

pu,

.cial role in the 65% Worldwide
increase in energy

consumption expected by the end of
the century.

developed countries
GDP.

In all,

the 13

is

rising at

a

Energy use in less

rate at least 3C% higher than
the

the demand for crude oil

in the Third World,

including

OPEC members, will grow from 11
million b/d at present, to

close to 24 million b/d by the year
2000.

Import needs of developing

countries may not be satisfied unless
there is

a

drastic reduction in

sales to OECD nations, or a substantial
increase in overall production.

But oil demand elsewhere is expected
to decline only slightly, by about
2

million b/d. to somewhere around 64 million
b/d by the end of the

century.
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If the previous situation appears to impede
any sustained trend

towards stability in petroleum supplies and prices,
the political

milieu is even more unpredictable.

By 1978, sagging demand for petro-

leum was instrumental in making Saudi Arabia lead and
implement an

OPEC price-freeze through the last two-thirds of that year.^^

However.

144

the Iranian upheaval and
the Iraq-Iran War were soon
to show again the

intimate relationship between
political and economic events.
In particular, the war between the two
Persian Gulf oil-exporting
countries has
raised the possibility of a cut-off
in the transit of oil tankers
through the Strait of Ormuz. which
would economically strangle Western

Europe and Japan.
and more

thu:,

By October, 1980, most of the
Iranian oil exports,
.hirds of Iraq's exports had been
suspended.

This

amounted to a loss of 3.15 to 3.35 million
b/d for exports market.'^^
These factors contributed to

a

new round of price hikes.

By June.

1980, OPEC members had agreed to raise their base
price from $28 to $32

per barrel of crude oil. with

a

maximum $5 premium.

By mid-November

of that same year, the price had gone up to
$40 per barrel for cash

transactions, and up to $50 for 30-day sales, the
highest levels in
history.
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The precipitate price increases would put to test OPEC

unity, and bring about an abrupt reversal of the upward
price spiral.
Even before the price increases of November. 1980,

a

drop in the

demand of industrialized nations due to recession, and to burgeoning

existences that by the beginning of that year had reached the level of
5

to 5.5 billion barrels, were already eroding the basis for OPEC's

price structures.
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Saudi Arabia, by far the main OPEC exporter, in

order to prevent excessive raises in prices, by October 1980 had increased its production from 9.5 to 10.5 million b/d.^^

For their part,

the 21 nations members of lEA responded to the price raises by announceing in December,

1980, that they would reduce their oil

start to use their reserves instead.

47

imports and

These factors, in addition to

the bitter pricing battle that ensued through 1981, had by mid-year
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effectively undermined the unity
among OPEC members and
forced a downward revision of prices.
Skyrocketing prices and diminishing
demand
had, in effect, resulted in
a mini-glut.

The key to

a

price compromise has been the
high level of produc-

tion of Saua. nr^oia's less
expensive crude oil. nearly half
of OPEC's
total production of 21.5 million
b/d by October, 1981.
Apparently,
Saudi Arabia's policy has been
to maintain the price of oil
at

level

a

low enough to prevent conservation
measures and alternate sources of

energy from substartially eroding the
demand the petroleum.
same time, the Saudi

's

At the

benchmark price for their oil during
1981. at

$32 a barrel, effectively undercut competition from
other oil-producing

counter

^.^to

reaching

a

price agreement."^^

On October 29, 1981, at Geneva. OPEC again
established

price structure.

a

common

Saudi Arabia agreed to increase its price
$2 per

barrel, in return for a $2 reduction by other members
of their $36 base
price.

Thus, the new common benchmark price is at present
$34 per

barrel, frozen at that level until the end of 1982.

OPEC members are

allowed to attach surcharges to this base price, to account for
trans-

portation and crude quality differences, although there will be

mum of $4 surcharge per barrel.

a

maxi-

This means that under no circumstances

will the price per barrel of oil be above $38.^^

After 1982, OPEC

policy conceivably could seek pricing formulas that would link the
price of oil to the rate of inflation in the main oil-importing nations,
and to the value in real terms of certain key world currencies.

Such

an arrangement would strengthen a long-term tendency towards moderate,

progressive raises in petroleum prices.
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The end to the OPEC pricing feud.
i.e. to the dual pricing
structure that plagued the organization
during most of 1981, could
mean a
reassessment of the energy picture in
Western industrialized nations.
By November, 1981, demand in the
United States was again edging upwards,

while supplies were going down.

The new. stable OPEC prices might
re-

sult in decreasing efforts to develop
alternate energy sources.

No end

was in sight for the Iraq-Iran War. which
continued to limit output

from these countries.

Total OPEC production had, by October
1981,

fallen to 20.5 million b/d from
this context,

a

high of 31 million b/d in 1979.

In

if Saudi Arabia were to cut back on
its production, cur-

rently at about 9.5 million b/d, as an additional
measure to ensure

more bargaining power for OPEC, this could mean

a

new period of tight

petroleum supplies.
In regards

to time horizons for changes in oil

levels, the picture is not any rosier.

price and supply

On a short-range basis, it is

widely acknowledged by now that fuel supply difficulties will be an
almost universal phenomenon during the 1980
forms in different parts of the world.

's,

though taking different

According to

a

1980 CIA study,

world oil supplies are likely to last only between 60 to 90 years.
There is

a

"precipitate decline" of "giant" oil fields (those of 500

million barrels or more), and of "supergiant" fields (at least

5

bil-

lion barrels), which are being found only at a fraction of the rate of

previous years.

These huge fields are at present the source of more
CO

than 75% of the recoverable oil.

According to

a

global projection

of the energy sector to the year 2030, the period of "confusion" up to
the year 2000. during which the world will face a progressive scarcity

147

of "clean" fuels, must be
overcome by a period of
"transition." immediately afterwards, during which
energy needs will have to be
increasingly supplied by alternate sources.

The energy crisis, with its economic
and political variables,
contributes to shape an international
scenario according to the degrees
of

vulnerability of the actors.

In this respect, Helio Jaguaribe
has

noted several overlapping categories:

countries or regions without

resources to face the crises; those that
are being forced to revise
their economic and social policies to adapt
to the new conditions;

democratic nations whose consensus mechanisms
are being sorely tested
by the economic impasse; and those countries
whose legitimacy is based
on an apparently all-encompassing ideology,
albeit under diverging

methods of political control.
In an unstable

international milieu, qualified by these groups of

actors, disorientation as to the mutually acknowledged and
accepted

boundaries of political interplay could lead, according to Jaguaribe,
to three possible outcomes:

1)

a

Third World War;

2)

the consolida-

tion of a "world regime" under "shared direction" by the superpowers;
or 3) the emergence of a new international system, based on widely

agreed-upon economic transactions.^^

The definition of, and agreement

on the meaning, causes, and effects of the energy crisis, will be a

crucial factor in determining which path will be followed in the end.

Impact of the Energy Crisis in the United States

It is necessary to analyze the energy crises in the United States
in relation to general

patterns of consumption, for if the goal of
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development is limitless expansion
of demand, ours being
world, there is no possible way
of avoiding
later.

In this context,

is

a

a

finite

turning point s(
sooner or

it a crisis indeed, or rather
a shortcoming

of a particular mode of civilization,
i.e. industrialism, based
on an
excessive rate of energy consumption?
Of course, it could be argued
that the United States also produces
a disproportionate share of
the

world's industrial and agricultural
goods.

But this fact by no means

would dispose of the innate faults of
life style and

system of pro-

a

duction based on the irrational exploitation
of non-renewable resources,

After World War II, exploitation of petroleum
in the United States
accelerated sharpiy.

The United States, in fact, was

porter, mainly to Western Europe, until 1947.

a

net oil ex-

As early as during the

1950's, some U.S. geologists were disputing the
excessively optimistic

estimates of hydrocarbon reserves, among them L. G. Weeks
and M.
Hubert.

K.

By 1956, based on a revision of available data, Hubert
pre-

dicted that U.S. petroleum production would reach

years afterwards.

a

peak from 10 to 15

A few years later, in reply to greater supply expec-

tations raised by the main oil companies, Hubert reaffirmed that new

discoveries had already reached

a

maximum level in 1957, and that

proved reserves were at their highest in 1962.

Hubert was saying, in

effect, that during the 1960's, U.S. oil production would enter

a

phase

of decreasing yields.

Grim reality would confirm Hubert's assertions.
oil

What the 1973-74

price hikes did was to question the up-until-then assumed abundance

of cheap energy.

But the signs of an impending crisis were at hand

well before that time.

After 1961, proven oil reserves in the United
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States entered into a steady
decline.

The U.S. petroleum industry

could not keep up with the
staggering increases in demand
of the 1960's
and early 1970's.
Nevertheless, some of the most
important markets and
industries in the United States,
such as the automobile industry,
the

transportation system, and the home-heating
market, were developed on
the premises of cheap, abundant
energy.
Between 1955 and 1976. U.S. petroleum
demand almost doubled, from
8.5 million b/d to 17.4 million b/d.

increased at a slower pace.
peak. 9.64 million b/d.

In 1970.

Production of oil and natural gas

petroleum production reached its

By 1965, the United States had ceased
to be

self-sufficient in petroleum and, after 1970,
imports grew at
pace.

rapid

a

By 1976, the United States was importing
7.3 million b/d, that

is, 42% of national

demand.

Whereas in 1973 the United States

im,-

ported 35% of its oil, by 1977 the figure had risen
to 48%.^^
The sources of oil imports on which the United States
relied became increasingly less secure and more politically
explosive.
1976, Canada reduced its oil exports to the United States.

During

Parallel

to this, Saudi Arabia replaced Venezuela in the position
the latter had

occupied since World War II, as the main U.S. external source of crude
oil and derived products.

Imports from OPEC countries grew from 47%

of the total before 1973 to close to 67% in 1976.

This included a tri-

pling of purchases from Arab OPEC nations, a disturbing strategic prospect.

The cost of oil imports increased rapidly, from 4 billion dol-

lars in 1971, to 8 billion in 1973, 45 billion in 1977, and 42 billion
in 1978.

mark.^^

By 1979, the petroleum bill had exceeded the 50 billion
In his

"Energy Address" to the nation of April 5, 1979,
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President Carter presented

a

gloomy picture:

"Just ten years ago, we imported
hardly any oil
Today, we buy about half the oil
we use from
foreign countries. We are by far
the largest
customer for OPEC oil, buying
one-fourth of that
foreign cartel's total production.
This year
we will pay out 50 billion dollars
for imported
dollars for every household in
the United States. "61
*

Domestic oil production has failed
to meet increasing demand.
1978, oil

imports diminished somewhat as oil from
Alaska's North Slope

added 1.2 million b/d to domestic supply.

only

a

In

However, this proved to be

temporary respite, since it was rot reinforced
by stringent re-

straint measures, and it was partly erased
shortly afterwards by the
effects of the Iranian upheaval on world oil
supply and prices.
As a result of government measures, but mostly
because of economic

reasons, during the first two-thirds of 1980 crude
oil imports by the

United States dropped from 8.3 million to
sented a contraction of 19.3%.^^

5

million b/d.

This repre-

However, price increases nullified

any possible gains from this decline in demand.

In April,

1980, govern-

ment officials were announcing that:
"With the doubling of oil prices in the last 12
months, we are spending 90 billion dollars per
year for imported oil
and the price is rising
all the time.
Our 1980 oil im.port bill is equal
to the net assets of General Motors, Ford, IBM,
and General Electric combined.
If we continue to
spend for imported oil at this rate, in 12 years
we will have exported cash equal to the trading
value of all stocks listed on the New York
exchange -- well over a trillion dollars. "64

—

There is no way to overestimate the impact of the energy crisis
on the American economy.

Since the first oil price increase

round of

1973-74, the U.S. economy has been painfully vulnerable to trade
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innbalances and Inflation.

The unhappy combination of
inflation and

recession so prevalent In
the mid and late 1970's
was directly related
to OPEC's price increases.

Specifically, foreign oil price
hikes have meant that
substantial
income has been shifted to
OPEC which otherwise would
have been spent
on goods and services within
the U.S. market.
The fact that energy
demand is relatively fixed in
the short run, i.e. it cannot
be reduced
significantly by conserving fuel or
by using substitutes for
oil, made
it unavoidable for consumers
to pay higher energy bills.
Indirectly,
higher energy prices have had
repercussions on everything that
uses oil
or substitutes, even for
several years after the initial
impact.
Internally, this has implied additional
inflation; externally, growing

trade deficits.

The depreciation of the dollar in
foreign markets dur-

ing the late 1970's completed the
vicious circle, by further raising
oil

imports and inflation.

In short,

the net effect of the energy cri-

sis has been a decline, or at least
a stagnation, of the American
stan-

dard of living, this in spite of the 12%
reduction of oil prices in
real

terms from mid- 1974 to 1978.^^
A comparison of the average economic growth
rates in the main

Western industrialized nations during the periods
1950-1973, and 19731978, clearly presents a picture of

productivity.

a

fall

in the rates of growth and

In the United States specifically,

the growth rate fell

from an average of 2.6% during the first period to 0.4%
during the
second.

One of the main reasons for the decline was the sudden in-

crease in energy prices.^^
By April, 1979. one of the primary immediate impacts of the
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curtailment of foreign oil
supplies on the U.S. economy,
in spite of
constantly higher prices, was
the reduction of industry
stocks to dangerously low levels.

This augured a crucial need
to dispense partially

with gasoline production in
order to rebuild distillate
fuel oil stocks
for industry.67 But the energy
problems referred to a much wider
framework than the simple reduction
of oil consumption:
"The task ahead is clear.

We have to bring the
°^ '"''9y under control,
sJo^
Si?'
stop thl"l.?fr"''^
the outflow of dollars,
and wean ourselves
away from the excessive dependence
on
East
on. which has grown to the point whereMiddle
it threatens our national security. "68

The energy crisis represents a
danger to the United States from
two sources:

domestic malaise, and foreign strategic
dependence.

In-

ternally, unless policy measures to
prevent them are effective, pro-

gressive increases in the cost of fuel and
rationing,
the

-

a

breakdown of

-nsportation system, unemployment, and inflation,
could wreak

havoc with America's social structure and
even its political system.

Externally, the security threat from vulnerable
sources of supply,

which are concentrated in the politically volatile
area of the Middle
East, underline the need to find appropriate solutions.^^

United States Energy Policy

If the voice of alarm had been given since the 1950

's

by some

scientists worried about the growing gap between U.S. energy production
and reserves, on the one hand, and demand on the other, it was not until
the early 1970

's

that political circles began to show their concern

about the situation.

During 1971, President Nixon expressed his
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awareness of a possible energy
scarcity, and proceeded to
promote research and development of new
sources. By April , 1973.
these programs
had not given the expected
results, and Nixon proceeded
to eliminate
government restrictions on petroleum
imports. When the crisis of
late
1973 arose, the response of the Nixon
administration centered on production:

oil

companies were given incentives,
such as the authoriza-

tion to raise prices, as a means
to increase the domestic supply
of

petroleum.

Other signs of government action
were the adoption of

general 55 m.p.h. speed limit all
over the nation.

a

Nixon's "Project

Independence," geared as its name implied
to achieve energy self-sufficiency and sever external links of
dependence, fell short of its goal.
Some of the reasons for its failure were
an excessive optimism regarding the production and price levels
of alternate sources of energy, and

envi ronmental

cons i dera ti ons

The failure to increase domestic supplies led
to conservation measures.

A 1974 policy project by the Ford Foundation
stressed the need

to cut in half the annual

conservation.

rate of increment in energy demand through

This reduction, according to the project, would not af-

fect the growth of the economy, but it would effectively
contribute to

reduce petroleum needs through the end of the century.
the first integral

ings.

The project was

policy approach designed to face energy shortcom-

However, because of strong opposition from the private sector,

it was never implemented.

During the 1976 elections, the energy question was not
theme of the Ford-Carter campaign debates.

a

central

Both men coincided in the

triple need to cut petroleum imports, to free the prices of natural

gas, and to support a strategic
petroleum reserve.

While Ford empha-

sized strong Federal budgetary
support for creating

a 90-day reserve.
Carter went further and proposed
an energy plan that would
deal with^

the various dimensions of
the problem.^^

After his election. Carter placed
James
of the energy sector.

R.

Schlesinger in charge

The bitter winter of 1976 reinforced
the objec-

tive of a comprehensive energy
plan, but political problems
related to
Carter's inability to deal with
Congress were to plague its enactment.

The energy plan that finally emerged
in November. 1978. after pro-

tracted negotiations in Congress, was
inal.

Nevertheless, it was

a

recognition to

government regarding energy problems.
position of priority.

modified version of the orig-

a

a

new awareness in the

Energy questions had gained

a

An indication of this fact was the creation
in

1977 of the Department of Energy at the level of a
Secretary, headed
by Schlesinger.

Carter's Energy Plan. i.e. the National Energy Act,
was in reality a package of energy-related measures

tives:

,

centered on two basic objec-

conservation and utilization of alternate energy sources.

In

regards to conservation, the National Energy Conservation Act of
1978

required Governors to submit plans to the Secretary of Energy on the

procedure through which oil and gas dealers would advise customers

about conservation measures in each state.

conservation by putting into effect

a

Furthermore, it encouraged

series of grants, loans, and

federal programs to assist public and federal facilities in installing

energy-saving devices and switching to solar heating and cooling.^^
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 reinforced these measures by granting
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tax credits to homeowners who
installed energy-saving equipment,
and
by imposing a tax starting with
1980 automobile models, on those
which
did not meet a minimum standard
of economy. The Public
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act was based on the
principle that electric rates should

encourage the conservation of energy
and the efficient use of resources.

In regards to the promotion of
alternate energy sources,

the

Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
of 1978 tried to reduce the
nation's dependence on imported oil by
expanding domestic coal production; this would be achieved by limiting
the use of oil or natural gas
in certain facilities, which would then
turn to coal

for their energy

needs.

Another section of the energy package, the Natural
Gas Policy Act
of 1978. created for the first time
ral

gas.

a

single national market for natu-

Through this Act, all states now gained access to

natural gas production, which had previously

m

of the

been out of the inter-

state market, due in part to the higher prices available in the
producing states.

Since this situation had caused gluts inside the producing

states, it was expected that the nation as

more abundant supplies.

a

whole would benefit from

Initial price increases would be smaller for

homes, schools, and hospitals than for large industries.
to new natural

gas, price controls would end by 1985.

In regards

The Natural Gas

Policy Act purported to help reduce dependence on imported oil by stimulating home production through increased prices, and accelerating the
switch from gas to more abundant energy sources.

The National Energy Act acknowledged that growth in world oil

production could not keep pace indefinitely with demand.

While new

oil

findings might postpone the
day when oil production
started its inexorable downward trend, the
Act underlined the fact that
new finds

were not replenishing existing
reserves.

Thus, there was

a

crucial

need for conservation and use
of alternate energy sources.

During 1979, energy questions
remained one of the priority
policy
areas in the Carter administration.
to set forth a phased decontrol

The central preoccupation was
now

of oil prices, to begin on June
1, of

that year throughout 28 months,
until September, 1981, when Federal

government controls on oil were to cease
anyway.

The objective of

phased decontrol would be to encourage
production of oil and gas.

Thus,

it appeared that conservation and
alternate sources of energy by them-

selves were not enough to face the energy
crisis.

However, since de-

control could further augment what the Carter
administration deemed to
be already large profits by the oil companies,
there would also be a

"windfall profits tax" on the oil companies, in
order to retain part

of the extra earnings and channel them into an
"Energy Security Fund."
This Fund would be geared to "protect low income families
from energy

price increases, to build

a

more efficient mass transportation system,

and to put American genius to work solving our long-range energy prob-

lems."
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Congress would later approve these mieasures.

In addition to the previous announcements. Carter proposed other

steps to encourage production.

One of these would be the resumption

of previously stalled talks with Mexican officials, in order to reach
an agreement on sales of Mexican natural gas to the United States, "at
a

price that is fair for both countries.

ally clear the way for an agreement.

These talks would eventu-
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The details of Carter's new
offensive on the energy field
were
spelled out in what was called
a "Response Plan," that
included conservation as well as production
measures, such as:
crude oil price decontrol mechanisms; increased
production from sources such as
the Naval

Petroleum Reserve at Elk Hills; State,
local, and private initiatives
to reduce petroleum use; natural

gas projects; electric energy
trans-

fers; a lead phasedown for gasoline;
emergency building temperature re-

strictions; immediate reductions in Federal
energy consumption; emergency weekend sales restrictions; and
allocation and price control
rules in case of emergencies.^^

To present

a

coir^prehensive view of the new initiatives

or, as

President Carter put it, "to build on the
foundation of the National
Energy Act." by May, 1979. the Department of
Energy designed the Second
National Energy Plan.

This plan addressed three fundamental themes:

U.S. dependence on potentially unstable supply
sources, which implies a

vulnerability to interruptions and sudden price increases;
the possibility that supply and demand forces might cause world and
domestic oil
prices to rise well above the rate of inflation, depressing
the long-

term economic growth index; and the need to develop an energy strategy

that holds down economic and political costs to the United States.

The National Energy Plan

II

introduced

a

near term (1979-1985).

a

mid- term (1985-2000). and a long-term (2000 and beyond), strategies.

The challenge of the near term would be to insure appropriate energy

producing and consuming equipment in degree and kind, so as to start
reducing dependence on foreign oil.

During the mid-term, the United

States would continue to hold down energy consumption and oil imports.
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and to develop the capability
to shift from reliance
on oil and gas to
new and higher-cost forms
of energy technologies.
Finally, the challenge for the long-term
would be to go beyond the
"transitional" energy
supplies of the mid-term, such
as some renewable
technologies, enhanced
oil recovery, oil shale,
and coal-derived products,
towards a set of
"ultimate" technologies, such as
renewable and advanced nuclear
technologies.
"The Nation's long-term objective
is to have renewable and

essentially inexhaustible sources
of energy to sustain
omy.

healthy econ-

a

"^^

The Agenda for Action of the National
Energy Plan
number of Federal policies and
programs.

II

included a

Grants and tax incentives

would continue to be instrumental
in increasing energy efficiency,
thus
enhancing conservation.

Financial

incentives and the reduction of in-

stitutional barriers would be major tools
to raise domestic oil and gas

production.

The use of coal, as the Nation's most
abundant fossil en-

ergy resource, would be encouraged in
place of oil and gas wherever

economically and environmentally feasible.
pected to continue to meet
needs.

a

Nuclear reactors were ex-

growing share of the electrical energy

And, finally, an effort was to be made to
enhance the capacity

to use renewable resources such as solar and
geothermal

energy.

By mid-1979, the Carter administration again underlined
its com-

mitment to deal with the energy crisis.

The 1977 oil

import level was

set as the maximum allowed, leaving conservation and domestic
production as the only avenues for higher energy consumption.

targets, import quotas were set.

To insure these

A commitment of funds and resources

was made to develop alternative sources of fuel.

Carter asked Congress
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to require by law that U.S.

utility companies cut their
massive use of

by 50% within the following
decade, and switch to other
fuels, especially coal. He also urged
Congress to create an Energy
Mobilization
Board, in charge of completing
key energy projects.
Finally. Carter
oil

reemphasized

a

conservation program, at the State,
county, and city

levels.

Carter's energy proposals faced
numerous obstacles from pressure
groups, within Congress itself, and
from lobbies, which favored above

everything else the liberalization of
prices as incentives to production.

Carter's proposals, which originally had
underlined the need for

conservation and the use of alternate sources
of energy, progressively
incorporated measures such as phased decontrol,
whether by own conviction, or perhaps in order to lessen the
opposition to his programs.

Some observers have also pointed out that the
energy proposals were

designed in too much of a hurry and secrecy, which
harmed Carter's al-

ready-strained relations with Congress.

On the other hand, the barrage

of legislative initiatives received by Congress may have
weakened their
passage.
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There has been

a

continuing debate over the role of the American

oil companies in the energy crisis since 1973.

Obviously, there is

a

wide, and hard to discern, margin of negotiation between the U.S. gov-

ernment and the oil companies.

There are both coincidences and diver-

gencies between the perspectives of the two in regards to national security, the standard of living, economic stability, and the proper rate
of profits.

There are questions regarding the degree of compatibil-

ity between the interests of the U.S. government and those of the oil
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companies.

The issue remains undefined
and open to debate.

During
1979 the Carter administration
became worried over the
role of the oil
companies in the gasoline
supplies shortages of 1978-79.
However, in

mid-1979 report by the
Department of Energy, it was
stated that'no
evidence had been found of
hoarding
a

of oil by refiners, and
that the

refiners had kept their stocks
within normal levels.

Perspectives.

present?

What are the perspectives of
U.S. energy policies at

In regards to exploration and
production,

are being carried on.

intensive efforts

By 1979. world instability
in the petroleum mar-

ket was spurring domestic drilling.SS

drilling at deeper levels than ever.

By late 1980. oil companies
were

15.000 feet or more.

During

1980. a record 60,000 new oil and natural
gas wells were estimated to

have been drilled in the United States;
by comparison, only 27.602 wells

were dug in 1973.

At the same time, an attempt was being
made to de-

velop new techniques to recover some of
the 75% of oil that remains in
the subsoil after using conventional
pumping methods.

According to

official sources, these efforts are expected to
succeed in keeping oil

production in the United States near current
levels of approximately

million b/d. through the year 2000.

In addition,

9

by 1985. petroleum

consumption is expected to be lower than current levels:

up to an 8%

reduction that would allow a savings of as much as 1.5 million
b/d.^°
In 1980,

the Department of Energy had projected conservation mea-

sures that by the year 2000 could bring about savings on
the order of

approximately 20% in energy use.^^

Among alternate sources, coal
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constitutes by far the brightest
hope.

Under the authority of
the Fuel

use Act, during 1980 the
Department of Energy was
ordering industry and
utilities to convert fro. oil
to coal, with the goal
of displacement of
the equivalent of a million
b/d of oil by 1990.
However, many environmental problems related to
the burning of coal remain
to be solved.^^
In August,

1980, it was announced that the
biggest con^ercial plant for

the production of oil from
coal would be built in West
Virginia, at a
cost of 1.400 million dollars;
the investment would be partly
guaranteed by West Germany and Japan,
which would benefit from the
technology.

Crucial to the achievement of the
previous objectives would be the
rational distribution of energy
throughout the United States. This
will

involve the construction of much
additional infrastructure, in-

cluding pipeline systems.

For example, the size and development
of

additional Alaskan reserves and California
production will determine
the size and desirability

of a west to east pipeline.

By late 1980

the U.S. pipeline network continued
to grow steadily, despite infla-

tionary costs for construction.^^
A key part of U.S. energy policy, in regards
to lessening the po-

litical vulnerability of the United States vis a vis
foreign oil

sources, is the strategic petroleum reserve.

In 1977,

President Carter

proposed the creation of such a reserve, in the order of 500
to 1,000

million barrels of oil.^^
already in reserve, and the
reached by 1983.^^

By March, 1978, 150 million barrels were
1

billion objective was expected to be

However, by 1979, the U.S. Department of State

opposed the Strategic Reserve, arguing that it would destabilize the
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world market; leaders of the
oil industry, as well
as Saudi Arabia,
supported the view of the State
Depart.ent.58
.^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
92 million barrels were in reserve,
sufficient for only 86 days of
normal consumption.
At that time, the Department of
Energy suggested that
the initial objectives fell
short of actual strategic needs,
and should
be increased four times over.^^

These discrepancies in official
U.S. policy objectives seemed
to
subside with the election of
President Reagan. Since early in
1981,
the Reagan administration announced
that the United States would buy

crude oil for the strategic reserve,
at an accelerated pace and directly
in the international market.

By mid-1981 the new Energy Secretary,

James Edwards, declared that the United
States was taking advantage of

more flexible market conditions, to
increase its strategic petroleum
reserves at

a

rate of 200,000 b/d.

expanded to 120 days of supply.

The ultimate objective has been
In this context, a significant de-

velopment by September, 1981, was the incorporation of
Mexico as

a

direct supplier to the strategic reserve.
If a lesson must be learned from a decade of various
approaches
to face the energy crisis,

it is the extreme difficulty of putting into

effect an efficient program of energy conservation in
economic system such as those of the United States.

a

society and an

According to some

observers, factors such as the American political process itself, and
the coexistence of multiple pressure groups, do not bode well for the

prospects of success.

1

n?

It would appear that energy policies should be flexible and multi-

faceted:

the goals of conservation and production must be carefully
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balanced.

However, the Reagan administration
is bound to direct its
efforts mainly towards production
and away from conservation.
This is
likely to imply a number of
things, such as:
a lessening of environmental standards, in order to
facilitate the use of coal; the
encouragement of the nuclear industry; and
the opening up of more federal
lands
for oil and gas exploration.
Indeed, early in 1981 the Reagan
administration moved to eliminate
the last oil price controls, well
ahead of schedule, in order to spur

domestic exploration and production.

Likewise, federal subsidies

in the industry were abolished,
an action which has resulted in
serious

economic difficulties for

sm.all

exploring and refining companies.

De-

control was bringing about the closing
down of various retail gas sales

operations, which had been maintained due to
government regulations
Furthermore, the Reagan administration has proposed
dismantling the

Department of Energy.

By October, 1981. U.S. imports were at their

lowest level since 1975, oscillating between 3.3
and 4.4 million b/d.
However, domestic demand was beginning to increase
again, while inventories are 19 million barrels lower than

million barrels.

a

year before, down to 200

This was taking place at a time when the mini-glut

in the international market seemed to be coming to an
end.-^^^

Whether under an approach that gives priority to conservation or
to production, some of the main worries that have underlined the urgency

of U.S. energy policy, such as the need for stable, nonvulnerable
sources of foreign petroleum, remain very much in effect.

And it is in

this context that the position of Mexico as a U.S. supplier finds its

relevance.
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Effects of Hexir .n nil Fvnorts
on

II.

s

n......--

.^^i-rt

In the light of special
geopolitical circumstances, i.e.
geographic

proximity, trade, strategic
considerations. Mexico's oil-exporting
potential is bound to have a
growing impact on the U.S. energy
situation
and policies.
In this respect, Edward J.
Williams points out that
"Mexican oil will take on added
importance as the drama of U.S.
energy
dependence unfolds." This importance
is manifest as a crucial
source
of petroleum in case of an
external threat to U.S. national
survival.
Mexico's basic political stability
and continuity, in contrast with
the
political unpredictability of Persian
Gulf and African sources, enhances
Its prospects as a reliable supplier.l°«

In short, according to

Williams:
"The United States certainly sees more
Mexican
oil as desirable under any circumstances,
and
IS not too difficult to project a
scenario
in which petroleum exports from Mexico
would
be absolutely crucial. "107

U

The point of view of Mexican analysts often
reaffirms the previous

assessment, albeit qualifying it with

a

dose of skepticism regarding

Mexico's prospective gains from the exchange.

In many cases,

it is

claimed that the United States has incorporated
Mexican hydrocarbon

wealth to its global energy plan, as
mony.

In this context,

a

means to maintain American hege-

the main objectives of the United States behind

its massive purchases of Mexican oil would be:
oil

to increment its crude

reserves; to insure the external supply of petroleum and natural

gas necessary to cover the U.S. domestic deficit; to sustain a "loyal

exporter" as a precaution against future conflicts with Arab countries
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or adverse OPEC policies;
and to solve the need for
secure energy
sources while U.S. energy policy
and consumption patterns
undergo necessary adjustments and new
alternate energy sources become
available.

Richard B. Mancke has summarized
from the U.S. perspective,
the
role of Mexico as a U.S.
petroleum supplier:
"Expanded imports of Mexican petroleum
will help
the United States to achieve
three important
domestic goals...:
reducing U.S. vulnerability
^'^
supplies, assuring
^h.t"?hriin?^TcE^!°"'
that the United States satisfies
its basic energy
and
reducing
environmental
109'^

damage^"

In terms of U.S.

national security, the view is widely
shared by

American analysts that it

is

in the interest of the United
States that

Mexico develops its hydrocarbon resources
"as rapidly and completely as
possible.

The reason for this derives from the divergence
in po-

litical, economic, and ideological perspectives
between the United

States and the group of countries that control

a

large share of the

world's oil exports, and from the growth in military
and navel strength
by the v.niet Union.

Obviously, the full insertion of Mexico in the

present framework of U.S. petroleum suppliers would support
the U.S. position in regards to actual and potential threats to its energy,
and
thus to its national security.

Indirectly, in reference to Mexican ex-

ports to countries other than the United States, the existence of
alter-

nate oil sources would also alleviate pressures on world supply and
prices."^^^
In a context of economic efficiency, Mancke sees three main areas

of economic benefits for the United States, arising from growing imports of Mexican oil:
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Sas or oil .ade from o
,
oil Ih
0
?p''n'^'^"''''^"^
shale,
nuclear power, and solar energy)
in
order
to ensure an adequate level

of energy sec^rily;
reduction in capital demands
and as a
?Lni?^''P
corollary less rigid capital
stock requirements and
strengthened exports, which will
3
improve the U S
balance of trade. "112

Mancke is suggesting, in fact,
that Mexico's oil exports to
the
United States might add a third
option, at least in terms of
timemargin, to the two basic alternatives
faced by U.S. energy policy,
i.e.
conservation, or increased domestic
production.
In short. Mexican oil
exports might solve, albeit temporarily,
the dilemma of spending billions in alternate energy sources,
or continuing to rely on high levels
of imports from unstable foreign
sources.

And. in what appears at

first to be an adequate suggestion.
Mancke states that "it would be in
the best interests of both nations
to negotiate firm guarantees calling

for a large and steadily growing minimum
amount of petroleum to be sold
by Mexico to U.S. firms each year."

In this way. Mexico would have no

financial or marketing problems for expanding
its production, and the

United States would have secure sources of petroleum.

-^^"^

However, there are some basic weaknesses to Mancke

's

arguments.

To begin with, the postponement of the critical U.S.
energy dilemma,
i.e. conservation vs.

increased domestic production,

is

by no means a

solution to the energy problem, and might even retard such

a

solution

by giving rise to a new spurt in domestic consumption, on the basis

that new. secure supplies have been assured.

And, whichever the path,

between conservation and increased production, proves to be the
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appropriate one. 1t .ust
undoubtedly be qualified by
restraint In demand increases. Moreover,
the negotiation of
sale guarantees of Mexican oil to the United
States on a long-ter. basis
are conditioned by

MexIco^s domestic politics.

Finally. Mexico's
soc1o-econo.ic situation

would not necessarily
Improve according to growing
oil exports.
The purchase of large
amounts of Mexican oil might
reduce the need
for capital demands In
the United States, but at
the price of postponing a definite solution
to the energy problems.
And. in any discussion
In regards to the
development of domestic oil and
alternate energy
sources. U.S. pressure
groups and domestic politics
must be taken into
account.

Mexican exports are bound to
have

mestic production.

a

large impact on U.S. do-

It has been estimated that
Mexican oil

place petroleum from Alaska's
North Slope (ANS) producers,

present no export option.

could disv,ho

have at

Thus, there Is an urgent need
to reconcile

the Increased Imports of Mexican
oil with present policies that
encour-

age sales of ANS crude in the Gulf
Coast refining market.

As a matter

of fact. Mexican exports might
undermine ANS sales both in the Gulf

Coast and in the West Coast refineries.

By August, 1978. Mexico was

discounting^!" its oil to the extent required
to gain
U.S. market.
as Mexican oil

a

share in the

As a result. Arabian light crude oil was
being displaced,

became available.

Furthermore, at that time "Mexican oil

(was) also displacing ANS crude oil. causing ANS
to be discounted on the

Gulf Coast as well.''^'^
This phenomenon might be beneficial tc U.S. consumers, since
ANS

producers "would be forced to discount Alaskan oil to the extent
nec-

essary to undersell Mexican oil and to maintain their market shares.

les

Slightly lower crude oil costs
for domestic U.S. refiners
could be the
result.""^ However, if Mexican
exports were to increase substantially,
at reduced price levels, the
situation might deter production
and exploration in Alaska's North Slope.
The competitive position of the
producers of ANS could improve by the
construction of the PACTEX Pipeline.
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because of the savings in transportation
costs over the present

transit costs of the Panama Canal route.

If this were to materialize.

Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO). the largest
ANS producer, which also has
a

sizable investment in PACTEX, would likely
discount its oil to the

extent needed to outsell Mexican oil in the
Gulf Coast refining market.
Since it has alternative markets, in the
end "Mexico will probably price
its oil just low enough to back out Arabian
light but not low enough to

displace ANS crude on

a large scale.

""^^^

However, there are contrasting views regarding the
extend of the

impact of Mexico's oil exports on U.S. Gulf Coast refineries
and

Alaskan North Slope crude Oil.

According to U.S. official sources, the

importation of sizable amounts of Mexican crude oil to Gulf Coast refineries "could render ANS crude oil unmarketable anywhere in the United
States except the West Coast, even with the PACTEX pipeline, unless ANS
prices are heavily discounted."
cal

And, needless to say, there are criti-

discounting margins beyond which ANS production and exploration

might be discouraged.
The effect of oil imports from Mexico on the U.S. domestic market
could be further underlined by reference to two additional indicators:
the "marker" standard in oil transactions, and transportation costs.

There are two important factors that help to establish the price of
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crude 011 and determine the
".arker" refining values and
transportation
costs.
Towards the end of
1979:

"...Arabian light crude oil (was)
oil against which other
crude oil

the

'marker' crude
measured
Due
differences between transportaiion
costs
for i^'h-'"?^
Mexican-Reforma crufe
0?^ to U.S.
u's" Gulf
cltfYnl'i'
0
Coast refineries, however, the
potential exists for significant
discounting of MexicanReforma crude oil, and this
discounting could ead to
the Mexican-Reforma crude
replacing the Arabian liqh?
crude
is

I

oil

as the

'marker.

'

"120

^

Specifically in regards to transportation
costs, these are deter-

mined by factors such as the size of
tankers, distances, and prevalent
world scale rates. Due to the fact
that freight rates are expected to
increase through the 1980's, "the
transportation differential between

Mexican and Arabian light crudes will
probably widen over the next decade,"

As the transportation differential

increases, "this discounting

in conjunction with West Coast
surpluses could create downward pressure

on the price of ANS crude. "^^^
In short,

oil would:

the import of significant quantities of Mexican
crude

bring about pressures to discount U.S. Gulf Coast
price for

ANS oil, which would reduce the netback to the
wellhead; in the absence

of

a

West Coast pipeline (PACTEX), hinder ANS production and explora-

tion; progressively push both Arabian and ANS oil out of U.S.
Gulf

Coast refineries.

These possibilities raise potential Federal policy

issues in regards to the need for incentives and compensations to

Alaskan North Slope producers in order to sustain exploration and development of oil fields there.

Other areas of concern would be the

potential levels of discounting by the various actors, estimates on

quantities and geographic penetration in the United States of Mexican
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011. and availability of oil
for the Strategic
Reserve Progra.
On the other hand, in
all likelihood the
U.S. balance of trade
would benefit fro. the
growing imports of Mexican
petroleu..
Factors
such as geography,
population density, and
economic growth objectives
underline the fact that
Mexico will purchase
increasing amounts of U.^.
goods. According to
Mancke:

T^oreign exchange earnings
for ll s
u
and services, a policy
that encourages a rise
n Mexico's share of
the total world oil trade
w 1
lead to a net increase
in the demand for U S
exoorts
Therefore the net effect.
.would be to reduce
^eauce Se
^
the 5
U.S.
balance of trade deficit. "123

^li/
goods

.

However, it would be an
altogether different proposition
for the
United States to openly encourage,
or pressure. Mexico to raise
its
level of petroleum production
and exports, even though it
might benefit
the U.S. balance of trade,
without due consideration to the
domestic

socio-economic impact in Mexico.

Any significant increases in
Mexico's

hydrocarbon exports must be carefully
weighed against the overall effect
in Mexico's internal milieu.
And, obviously, domestic conditions
in

Mexico are of utmost importance for
the United States.

Mancke seems to

assume that the more oil Mexico produces
and exports, the better off it
will be. in terms of stability and
"rapidly rising living standards "^^4
.

But this is not necessarily so.

As a matter of fact, unrestricted de-

velopment of Mexico's oil industry, with

a

corresponding increase in

exports and earnings, might well have the
opposite effect, in social,

economic, political, and ecological terms.
By 1979, Mexico had already displaced, in order
of importance, two
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traditional U.S. petroleum
suppliers. Venezuela and
Canada.
is
by now clear that Mexican
hydrocarbon exports can indeed
contribute to
alleviate the energy problems
in the United States.
However, as it has
been seen, their impact is
complex and intimately tied
to U.S. domestic
energy policy. Regardless
of the extent of Mexico's
petroleum export
potential, its ultimate significance
is contingent upon the
future patterns of U.S. energy consumption
and production.
In a context of expanding oil consumption, in time
all of Mexico's exports
might turn out
to be just a transient
palliative. On the basis of a 1978
conjecture,
of 100 billion barrels in
proven reserves, it was estimated
that Mexico
would not be able to supply the
equivalent of more than 3 or 4 years of

u

petroleum consumption by the noncommunist
world, in terms of expected
1990 levels of petroleum needs.

-^^^

Mexico as an oil exporter represents for
the United States, on the
one hand, valuable time to reach an
adequate equilibrium between con-

servation and production, and on the other,

a

unique opportunity to lay

the foundation for a better mutual
understanding.
a

two-sided proposition that goes beyond

a

In effect,

this is

mere commercial exchange, to

encompass the complex social, economic, and political
amalgam of relations between the two nations.
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CHAPTER
MEXICO:

THE DOMESTIC CAULDRON

Socioeconomi c Environment:

A^la^nosis.

VI

1976 to thp Present

The goals of Mexico's process
of socioeconomic develop-

ment could be measured in terms of
the following criteria:
-A more equitable distribution
in income, through greater
efficacy

and honesty in the fiscal
mechanisms and a structure of progressive

taxation.
-An increase in productivity levels
in all the sectors of the economy.

This goal is parallel to the first
one since, as the possibilities

of consumption of the population
become greater, there must be an incre-

ment in the availability of goods.

Productivity is also

a

key factor

in slowing the inflationary spiral.

-A rate of employment creation above that of
the increment of the

economically active population.

This is a vital objective in promoting

the self-satisfaction of basic needs by an increasing
percentage of the

population, and thus freeing state resources for other critical
areas
of development.

-An improvement of educational levels, congruent with the modalities
of development.

-An improvement and extension of social programs, tending towards
an ever- increasing coverage of the population, indispensable for their
full

incorporation to the productive and creative activities of national

development.
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-An improvement in basic
infrastructure, in order to achieve
an
effective national integration.
-An extension of birth control
programs, in order to bring demographic growth down to an acceptable
level.

-The promotion of political-administrative
decentralization, and
the establishment of fiscal

incentives for industry in the interior
of

the country (outside the cities
of Mexico, Guadalajara, and Monterrey).

The objective of these measures would
be to slow down the excessive in-

crease of population in

a

few, overcrowded, and unbalanced
urban cen-

ters, with their subsequent negative
impact in terms of maladministra-

tion of public resources.

These previous objectives implicit in Mexico's
process of develop-

ment must be inscribed within

a

framework of complex social and economic

problems, intimately related to each other.

Official policy:

1976 to the present

.

During the postwar era,

a

series

of factors effectively contributed to strengthen Mexico's
process of

development, among them:

-Domestic political stability.
-A sustained rate of economic growth.

-Alternate sources of foreign currency (besides exports and international financial organizations), i.e. tourism.

-Self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs and petroleum.
-A low rate of inflation.

-Solvency in the world's financial markets.
-An "escape value" for unemployment and underemployment, through
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migration to the United
States.^
However, by the late
1960-s these factors had
ceased to have, to
various degrees, their former
positive influence.
From 1970 to 1976,
matters took a turn for the
worse.
Domestic political stability
was^
threatened by a flagging
economic performance, and by
the acrid conflicts between public officials
and the private sector.
Income from
tourism was increasingly
canceled out by the growing
expenditures of
^^exican tourists in other
countries, especially the United
States.
In
this way. Mexico lost an
important compensating element for
its chronic
trade deficit. Agricultural
production continued its long and
steady
decline, both for domestic
consumption and exports. During a
brief
period Mexico lost its self-sufficiency
in petroleum.
The rate of in-

flation soared.

As a result of the previous situation,
Mexico's posi-

tion in the international financial
markets was progressively eroded.

Finally, a precarious economic situation
in the United States made

Washington redouble, to be sure more in intent
than in effectiveness,
its efforts to stop illegal Mexican
migration.^

When the Lopez Portillo adirinistration took
over in 1976, the
stage was set for decisive political action in
order to overcome the
crisis, and embark upon new schemes of development.
nual

In his first an-

report, in September, 1977, the Mexican president
defined the then

prevalent situation:
"Mexico... is living a severe crisis. The development
of the country was sustained for a long time by political stability, moderation in price increases .. .and a
fixed monetary parity with the dollar
Of these three
supports we lost several years ago the proportionality
of prices, which unleashed inflation. .Later, our
.
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fen'?n^."f
fell
into a recession,

""employment Increased, we
the financial system
proved

According to Lopez Portillo.
inflation, massive movements
of capital, and radical changes
in the relative values of
currencies and raw

materials, had created an essentially
different scenario.

Thus, there
could not be a return to
previously acceptable rules for
socioeconomic
development. The old pattern of
growth, according to the President,
was
finished, and new approaches would
be needed.^

A key element characteristic
of Lopez Portillo's regime has
been
the reliance on planning mechanisms,
as a means to consolidate the

guiding function of the state in the
process of development.

During his

campaign for the Presidency. Lopez
Portillo had coined the slogan "Alliance for Production." i.e. between
the public and private sectors, as
a

response to the economic crisis.

In his acceptance speech of Decem-

ber 1. 1976, he defined the context of
operation of the Alliance, in

effect a new framework or organization in order
to produce, distribute,
and consume according to Mexico's own intrinsic
needs.

The Alliance

for Production would offer "to everyone viable
alternatives geared to

reconcile the national objectives of development and social
justice,
with the specific demands of the various factors in the economy."^
The Alliance for Production set the pattern for
grams, such as:

a

series of pro-

the Plan for Urban Development, the Plan for Industrial

Development, the Plan for Agriculture and Cattle Development, the

Mexican Food System, and various political, economic, and administrative
reforms.

By early 1980, all of these plans had been integrated into the
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Global Plan for Development,
1980-1982.

The Global Plan for Development
has defined the model Mexico
is to
follow as a nation, based on
"A productive system capable
of offering the national
goods necessary for the consolidation
of deve^opme t
and national autonomy, and the
social goods to cover
the normal needs of food, health,
education, social
security, and housing... "6

Within the framework of the National
System of Economic and Social
Planning, the strategy of the Mexican
government would be geared to ful
fill four basic objectives of
development policy:

-"To reaffirm and strengthen Mexico's
independence as

a

democratic

just, and free nation, in the economic,
political, and cultural spheres

-"To provide the population with employment
and a minimum of welfare, giving priority to food, education,
health, and housing needs.

-"To promote high, sustained and efficient economic
growth.
-"To improve the distribution of income among persons,
factors of

production, and geographic regions."^

At present, two elements determine the priority of Mexico's
development efforts:

petroleum, and food production.

By March, 1980, with

the creation of The Mexican Food System (known by its Spanish acronym

of SAM), the setting of limits to oil exports, and the postponement of
Mexico's entrance to GATT, the model of development promoted by the

Mexican government appeared to emphasize the goal of national autonomy.
The Mexican Food System has tried to overcome the lack of response
by private enterprise in regards to the agricultural sector, namely in
the area of basic foodstuffs for domestic consumption.

The official

encouragement of and preoccupation with food production would be
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summarized by K^pez Portillo
in crude terms:
"...The objective is national
self-sufficiencv
It
wou d be painful for us that,
having so ved the'e erqy
problem we were to fall into
the trap of losing (the

An additional indication of
the importance the Mexican
government places
on food production is the
Law for Increasing Production
in the agricultural and cattle industries.
Enacted in early 1981, this law
con-

stitutes

a

further attempt to encourage
productivity in this sector.^

But the petroleum industry is the
key factor that has brought renewed confidence and high expectations
in regards to socioeconomic de-

velopment.
a

The petroleum bonanza means for Mexico
the possibility of

new model of development, able to
compensate for domestic disequilib-

riums.

Official Mexican government assessments of
the significance of

the oil wealth have shown clear optimism.

By March, 1978, President

Lo'pez Portillo could already declare
confidently that "petroleum will

erase the ancestral misery of the Mexicans
report, on September

1,

In his second annual

.

1978, the Mexican President underlined the re-

covery of the nation's economy and predicted accelerated
economic growth
for the next few years.

By early 1979, in the words of Lopez

Portillo, petroleum had become the "axis of progress. "^^

In other

words, the exploitation of oil means the opportunity for Mexico to

"liberate itself economically and socially.

"^"^

More than that, on its

petroleum wealth lies the future of Mexico:
"That a country without petroleum fails, cancels its
possibilities of development, is lamentable but explainable; but that in these moments, in this last
third of the XX Century, a country with oil should
become disorganized, to the extreme of not solving
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its economic and social
problems, would be grave
Such a country would definitely
cancel its hislori^"'"'^ '
Pl^^^ in

h?ltory''u'

The expectations arising from Mexico's
petroleum wealth were underlined in a mid-1978 study by Mexico's
National Bank.

Petroleum could

be. according to this analysis,
the key to national development.

It

would generate funds for various
industries, provide the necessary energy for an increase in the production
of goods and services, create demand and employment through Pemex's
purchases, strengthen Mexico's financial stability in foreign markets, and
promote the industrial capacity to achieve new projects.

Indeed, according to a prestigious in-

ternational analysis firm based in Mexico. 1981
was expected to be the

first of two years of accelerated growth, with
a goal of upwards of an
8% increase in the GNP.

A "powerful

petroleum sector" would be the

basis for a year in which "the Mexican economy will be
one of the most

dynamic in the world."^^

Mexican government officials have frequently expressed their assurances that the country's development will not come to rely exces-

sively on oil.

Since mid-1977. President Lo'pez Portillo has often re-

iterated that Mexico's diversified economy will allow it to place the

exploitation of petroleum within

a rational

context and that petroleum

will not be the axis of national development.'^''
By early 1979, Mexico's Secretary of the Treasury, David Ibarra
Muffoz, and the General

Director of the Bank of Mexico, Gustavo Romero

Kolbeck, had announced a new strategy to generate foreign funds, in

which petroleum would pass to occupy

a

second place in importance.
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while the exports of manufactured
and semi.iaborated
products would become the pivot of economic
development.
In August. 1980. Pemex
Former Director. Jorge Dfaz
Serrano, emphasized that
Mexico's economy
was not becoming
"petroleum-bound." but that, on
the other hand, the
financial inputs from hydrocarbon
resources constituted a fundamental
element to attain social justice.
Mexico, said Di'az Serrano, "is
not
an oil

country, but

in themselves,

a

country with oil

..

.hydrocarbons are not an end

nor the final objective of
the efforts underway. "^^

The self-assurance and ebullience
of Mexico's public officials

since 1977 has been positively
reflected in U.S. and international
government and financial circles. Late
in that year, France's Le Figaro
was predicting that "Mexico was
destined to become a new Saudi Arabia."
a favorable assessment of the
situation, apparently .^^

By April. 1979,

The Petroleum Economist considered
Mexico's rapid ascent as an important
oil

producing and exporting country as "the most
stimulating event since

the 1973 oil embargo."

According to that London-based publication, the

revision of Mexico's financial and monetary
policies by the Ldpez
Portillo administration had placed the country
again on sound basis,
and attracted a new wave of foreign investments.^^

By mid-1978, the

U.S. press was giving increasing attention to Mexico's
oil wealth, em-

phasizing the promising perspectives for sustained economic
growth under new pragmatic policies.

An assessment.

How does the socioeconomic situation in Mexico stand in

the context of governmental policies, rhetoric, and forecasts?

To begin

with, there must be a distinction between two often interchangeably
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used terms.

Eccno.lc growth is not the
equivalent of development.
The
latter Involves a conjunction
of economic and social
progress. The relationship between these two
factors is critical. A
balanced process
Of development would tend
to spread among the various
sectors of the
population the gains achieved
through economic growth. Social
progress,
for its part, enhances the
possibilities of economic growth by
expanding
the domestic market.
Following this appreciation, it
could be effectively argued that
Mexico's postwar "stabilizing
development." while stimulating industri-

alization and economic growth,
resulted in

a

deterioration of the dis-

tribution of income and unemployment
rates, and the stagnation of the
agricultural sector.

Likewise, "shared development" failed in
its ob-

jective of improving income distribution,
because it lacked

a

compre-

hensive fiscal reform and resorted instead
to external financing.
Redvers Opie has underlined six main problems
related to Mexico's

development:

inflation; demographic growth; lagging agricultural
pro-

ductivity; low levels of industrial efficiency and
international com-

petitiveness; the problem of the "mix" between public and
private enterprise; and the need for direct foreign investment capital.

The tradi-

tional avenues of solution to these various problems involve
definite

views concerning the direction Mexican development should follow.

For

example, an improvement in agricultural productivity would be the means
to both expand the domestic market and create a surplus for exports.

Increased industrial efficiency would go hand in hand with
the structure of manufacturing

ports market.

a

shift in

into capital accumulation and the ex-

Mexico's "mixed system" would orient itself towards
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greater participation by private
enterprise.

And foreign direct invest-

ment capital, mainly through
the action of multinational
corporations,
would contribute to job-creation
and general economic
development.
Mexican sociologist Rodolfo
Stavenhagen challenges the
previous
perspective of the situation,
through a number of "myths" which
should
not be confused with reality.
One of these myths is that
growing exports are a solution to r^exico's
problems.

If exports consist mainly

of raw materials and
semi-manufactured products, this would
underline
the lack of autonomous internal
development.

On the other hand, exports

can indeed contribute to improve
the balance of trade, but only if
im-

ports diminish, too.

A deterioration in the terns of
exchange can also

spur inflation.^^

According to Stavenhagen, another myth would
be that an increase
in production contributes automatically
to the general welfare of the

population.
stuffs

Deficits in the production of basic articles such
as food-

are often related not to a low level of output
but to an unbal-

anced structure of production and an unequal system of
distribution.
third myth would be that measures such as

a

devaluation and/or

alization of prices can improve economic health
structural changes.

a

A

liber-

without substantial

Finally, there would be the myth that only large

entrepreneurs can increase production in the agricultural sector.

This

production is usually geared to exports, which is detrimental for the

domestic market, and takes away financial and technical resources from
the poorest regions and populations.^^
It is fashionable in Mexico these days to mention that the post-

war model of development

is

no longer valid.

It would be pertinent to
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analyze the shortcomings of
the process of development
during the
1950's and 1960-s. which tended
to worsen domestic
economic disequilibriums and social inequalities.27
..^^^^^ .^^ ^^^^.^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
now under the aegis of
petroleum.
In many academic as well

as financial

performance following World War

II

circles. Mexico's economic

was widely described as

a

"miracle."

Specifically, high indices of
economic growth, related mainly
to the
development of the industrial sector,
an impressive infrastructure,
improvements in the social services,
and political stability,
were^some
of the signs of the miracle.
A critic of the "miracle"
during the
early 1970's, Fernando Carmona
et.

al

.

,

questioned these assumptions

by referring to certain fallacies
such as:

the official manipulation

of statistical data; the lack of
equilibrium in the economy, in sectorial as well as social

terms; the "bureaucratic-political
labyrinth,"

that enhanced nepotism and favoritism;
the failure to improve signifi-

cantly nutritional, health, and educational
standards among great sectors of the population; and the monopoly of
political power.

However, the authors of the Mexican Miracle failed
to suggest alternatives to the situation they explored.

Furthermore, whatever social

and economic progress Mexico has experienced during
the last few de-

cades should not be dismissed lightly, especially when
the enormous

increase in population, and therefore in demands, is taken into consideration.

Faced with internal diversity and external limitations, the

job for Mexico's political leadership has not been easy, and its

achievements would seem to be substantial.
Nevertheless, there are some clearly identifiable drawbacks.
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Writing in 1979. Enrique
Padilla Aragon. argues that
Mexican development tends to be dependent,
fluctuating, unbalanced, and
unequal. 29
To a great extend Mexico
relies on foreign investments
and loans.
But
the determining factor is its
strong dependence on a single
market, i.e.
the United States.

Says Padilla:

"...our economic development accel-

erates or is set back according
to the economic policy of
the United
States in relation to the world
and to us.-^O Mexican development
also
fluctuates, i.e. it is a cyclic type of
development.
It suffers from

various types of disequilibriums,
i.e. between occupation and income,

productivity in agriculture and industry,
regional imbalances, and a
breach between exports and imports.

Finally, the main problem, ac-

cording to Padilla. is "redistribution
of income and the internal market."

In the early 1970's,

15% of the total

income.

33

50% of Mexico's population perceived only

To

a

varying degree, since 1976 these four

characteristics have continued to define Mexico's
process of development.

Mexican development until the early 1970's had enjoyed
both growth
and stability.

This was possible, according to Roger D. Hansen, be-

cause financing schemes followed the "monetarist" admonition of
avoiding governmental deficits, as well as the structuralist dictum
that in-

vestments in infrastructure must be kept at

a

proper level.

credit financing was available at moderate interest rates.

something has obviously gone wrong since then.

Foreign
However,

By early 1981, official

Mexican estimates put the rate of inflation at close to 28%. and the
IMF expects inflation to reach the figure of 32.5% by the end of the

year.

Washington sources have stated that, in spite of an average 8%
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rate of increase of the
GNP in 1979 and 1980,
inflation is limiting
Mexico's progress.35 Po, his
part. President Lopez
Portillo has referred to inflation as the
"cost of the consolidation
of progress,"
i.e.

industrialization and modernization.^^

Nevertheless, inflation remains a
serious threat to the Mexican
economy.
Part of it is undoubtedly
related to the external sector,

i.e.

result of turmoil in international
financial markets, and the high
costs of imported capital goods
for the petroleum industry.
But there
a

are significant domestic
components, three of which could be
identified:
a growing domestic demand
which exceeds

the supply of goods and results

in bottlenecks in the economy;
the fact that imports which might
satisfy

domestic demand and lower prices are
constrained by trade barriers; and
wage compensations demanded by Mexican
organized labor to offset inflation, which have often resulted in
actual wage increases, and

sequent spur in demand for limited products.

a

sub-

However, any actions by

the Mexican government to counter this situation
would run contrary to

developmental and nationalistic objectives and, thus,
would be politically unfeasible.

Inflation has also been spurred by the critical situation in the

agricultural sector.

Starting in the 1940's, Mexico's economic growth

was based on the primary sector.

The government invested heavily in

irrigation, and agricultural production began to increase by 4.4%

year.

According to Richard

provide:

D.

a

Hansen, the agricultural sector had to

increasing amounts of foodstuffs to the rapidly expanding

urban population; raw materials; export earnings to finance the import
of capital goods; labor for the secondary and tertiary sectors; savings
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for industrial and infrastructure
inves^ents;

from the industrial sector.

a

market for the goods

Mexico became virtually
self-sufficient

in food production, and its
output of raw materials for
the industrial

sector increased rapidly.

Agricultural exports since 1940
grew at

a

rate of 6% annually, and represented
from 25% to 50% of total exports
income.

A sizeable proportion of the rural
population became available

for urban occupations.

other economic sectors.
a

Savings from agriculture were
transferred to
And. finally, rural Mexico seemed
to represent

growing domestic market for Mexican
industry.
But agriculture, the hen that laid
the golden eggs for Mexico's

process of development, increasingly faltered.
put grew only by an annual average of 1.6%.

From 1965 to 1976, out-

In the words of Redvers

Opie:
"At some point in the process of industrializing
the country, the contribution of Mexican agriculture
to GDP could be expected to decline.
But total

agricultural production would seem to have declined
too early and too rapidly. "39

The participation of agriculture in the total goods and services

produced in Mexico, which was 20.2% in 1950, diminished to 9.4% in
1965, 5.6% in 1975, and 5.2% in 1979.^°

From 1970 to 1979. the agri-

cultural sector's contribution to Mexico's foreign trade declined by

23%.^^
The reasons for the crisis in the agricultural sector are varied.

At the beginning of 1980, the surface under cultivation and the grain
AO

tonnage obtained were basically the same as 15 years earlier.

During

the 1970 's, agriculture suffered from a scarcity of investments.^"^

Cultivation of basic grains for domestic consumption, such as wheat.
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corn, and beans, has
dropped, while crops for
export or cattle- feeding,
such as sesame and sorghum,
have increased their
volumes/^ This
has

been propitiated by
speculation in the basic
foodstuffs market by
Mexican as well as multinational
corporations. The situation
of scarcity in basic agricultural
products contrasts with the
expansion of the
cattle industry, geared towards
beef exports/^
Due to a combination of
drought and frost, between 1979
and 1980

Mexico's grain harvest collapsed
catastrophically.

Through the entire

decade of 1970's, grain imports
by Mexico amounted to 16.637
million
tons.
By contrast, during 1980
alone the figure would reach a
total of
12 million tons, the largest quantity
of grains ever purchased in its

Mstory.

The huge purchases brought havoc
to Mexico's railroad sys-

tem, in charge of transporting
the grain imports from the U.S.
border,

and apparently unable to cope
with the task.'^^
in the agricultural

The traditional surplus

trading balance had, by 1980, turned
into

a

deficit

of 180 million dollars, due to low
production and massive imports.

Continued sizeable purchases were predicted
for 1981, in the order of
10 million tons of grain.

The "easy" solution to the agricultural problem,
i.e. to import

foodstuffs with funds from petroleum exports, would
seem to hinder the

implementation of structural changes in the countryside,
needed in order
to achieve a more rational

and effective production.

Nevertheless, the

Mexican government appears to be aware of these problems.
in 1978,

Since late

President Lopez Portillo had emphasized that "oil (was) not

enough; without foodstuffs, there can be only

a

half-way development."^^

The Mexican President, by late 1980, was counting on the Mexican Food
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System (SAM) to achieve
for all Mexicans.51

m

sufficient minimum level of
foods consumption

a

December. 1980, the Secretary
of Patrimony and

Industrial Development. Jose Andres
de Oteyza. was underlining
that the
best utilization of earnings from
petroleum would be in the agricultural
sector, to encourage food
production.
In his fifth annual

report of September, 1981, the
Mexican Presi-

dent announced the recovery of the
agricultural sector.

During 1980,

harvests were the highest in history,
i.e. 23.489 million tons of basic

foodstuffs, an 11% increment over the
previous record figure of 1978.
and 29.5% in excess of the 1976
level.

are forecast for 1981.

Likewise, new record figures

The production of fertilizers more than doubled

during 1980, from 2.2 to

5

million tons.

The Mexican government seems

to have made the decision to reach
self-sufficiency in food
to neutralize dependence on the United
States.

as a means

By 1982, present trends

point to self-sufficiency in corn and beans.
The Lopez Portillo administration has taken strong measures
which

involve extensive subsidies to producers and consumers of
agricultural
products.

Besides the rise in production itself, the surface under

cultivation is expanding rapidly,
to 1979 levels,

a

17.9% increase in 1980 in relation

to a total of 12.7 million hectares.

proving to be very costly.

During 1980 credits to the agricultural

sector increased by 61%. and for 1981 it
to 290 billion pesos.

The strategy is

is

estimated they will amount

Basic price guarantees to producers increased by

40% during 1980. and 1981 will represent an apportionment of 38 billion
pesos.

Still. Mexican officials point to the fact that oil income is

being spent at home.
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According to

a

Mexican critic. Raul Olmedo.
even if self-suffi-

ciency in basic foodstuffs
were to be reached, it would
mean nothing to
income and employment levels
in the rural sector are
not raised.

Olmedo thinks that insufficient
food production is

a

result of a low

level of demand, which springs
from the weak consumption
possibilities

of great sectors of the
population.

Whereas potential demand is enor-

mous, as precarious indices of
nourishment attest, real demand,
based
on earnings, has not grown
accordingly.^^

Some Mexican officials are apparently
well aware of the social

implications from this agrarian dilemma.

By late 1980. former Mexican

Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Javier
Garcfa Paniagua, declared that the
social

inequalities in the countryside were "brutal. "^^

Income distri-

bution problems are deep-seated, and they are
likely to plague Mexico
through the remainder of the century.

However, the level and intensity

of these inequalities, and the success or failure
of the government to

improve them, might well determine social peace
in Mexico.
a

By mid- 1980,

group of Mexican analysts were warning that the Global
Plan for De-

velopment would not reach its goals, since it was addressed
to problems
pertaining to

a

certain economic juncture, i.e. the so-called exhaustion

of the model of import-substitutions, and not to deep structural
problems, such as the maldistribution of income.^®
Income distribution continues to be extremely unbalanced.

While

certain small groups receive a disproportionate share of the total income, the bottom 40% of the people subsist on barely 12% of the income.

This unequal concentration of economic wealth means that the living

conditions of the majority of the population are well below what they
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could be. were there

a

.ore equitable distribution
of the national in-

come.

By September. 1981.
the Mexican President
was addressing the
issue of income distribution.
According to Lopez Portillo.
the impressive economic growth rates
of 9.2% in 1979. and 8.3.
in 1980. are having
a clear i.pact on
the increment of family
income, of 4.7X between 1977
and 1980.
From another perspective,
the various social security
institutions cover 48 million
people, i.e. more than 65% of
the population.
20 million of whom have been incorporated
since 1977.^5

But conclusive
proof of improvements in the
distribution of income remains elusive,
and the quality of benefits
under social programs varies sharply.

Socioeconomic pressures are directly
related to demographic growth.
Mexico practically doubled its
population between 1960 and 1980, from

36.881.000 to 69.752.000 people.
increased from 59.2 to 64.4 years.

During this period, life expectancy
In spite of partially effective

official efforts at birth control,
Mexico still has one of the highest
rates of demographic growth in the
world.

around 3% annually.

means that its population of 70 million
will double in 24 years.

This

One

of the most formidable problems derived from
these facts is the age

structure of the population:
old or under.

more than 45% of the people are 15 years

There are simply not enough resources to achieve an
ade-

quate level of nutrition, health, education, and housing for
such an

overwhelming proportion of minors.
This phenomenon of rapid demographic growth in Mexico could be

better understood in the following terms:
-The estimated demographic growth for relatively short time spans,
of 20 to 30 years, leads to levels of population density similar to
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those of developed,
industrialized nations, without a
nearly comparable
urban, industrial, or
agricultural infrastructure.

-Mexico's economic policies, and
efforts at developmental
planning,
cannot by any means underestimate
the impact of the demographic
factor,
not only in terms of total
population increases, but also of its
structure, i.e. the fact that the
economically active portion of the
population continues to decrease
relative to the dependent sectors.

-Demographic growth, and population
structure, generate an evergreater need of investments on equipment
and social services

than is

the case in countries with smaller
demographic increases and a more

balanced age structure.

In particular,

the educational and formative

process, together with the sanitary, assistance,
and housing capabilities, are under constant pressure from
growing demands.

Closely related to demographic growth, the high
rate of urbanization causes multiple and sharp problems, among them
the incapability to

create urban-industrial jobs in sufficient numbers, and
to supply ade-

quate social services, equal to the prevailing needs.

Almost two-thirds

of the Mexican population live in urban centers, and
peasants continue
to migrate to the cities, most of them to jcin the ranks
of the poor,

marginal population of the urban slums.

Accelerated urbanization frus-

trates the efforts to provide adequate public services to an ever-in-

creasing population, and depletes resources that, otherwise, would be

channeled towards the agrarian sector.

centralization in

a

Industrial and bureaucratic

few, large cities emphasize the negative effects

of urbanization.

Unemployment and underemployment represent one of the fundamental
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obstacles to achieving better
distribution of income.

Although data is
not altogether reliable,
it is estimated that both
of these phenomena
affect close to 50% of Mexico's
population. The main causes of
unemployment are demographic growth
and the situation in the
agricultural
sector.
The age structure of the
population determines that the
country has an adult labor force
of only 18 million. This
means that
barely 28% of the population
support the remaining 72%. Still,
less
than half the workers have
permanent jobs.
the level of unemployment is
staggering:

The task of bringing down
the Mexican economy would

have to create more than a million
jobs per year.^^

In other words,

the indices of employment creation.
2.5% a year between 1950 and 1970,

and 2% from 1970 to 1979. must be
brought up to

a

goal of 4.2%. in

order to safely surpass the annual
increment of job demand, of 3.4%.^^

President Lopez PortiUo
on vast industrial

is

placing the hopes for employment creation

investments.^^'

P.y

September. 1981. the Mexican

President was reporting that during the period 1977-80
industrial production registered

a

growth of 8.1% per year.

creation of 3.250.000 new jobs.^^

This contributed to the

But. in the past, because of tenden-

cies towards capital-intensive industrialization, this
scheme has been

only partly successful
Here, again, hopes are also placed on the oil industry to create
66
jobs.
But the petroleum industry is basically a capital-intensive

industry, employing relatively few workers per plant.

Thus, the success

of a liaison between the oil industry and the employir,ent market would
depend, rather, on the ability to transfer funds from the first into
a wide

arrangement of productive activities.
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In this respect,

there are a number of
critics who maintain that,

far from representing a
contribution to Mexico's economic
standing,
petroleum exploitation has
increased its economic vulnerability.
In
other words. Pemex has borrowed
and spent more than it has
received
from its exports.^7 ^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
to confirm this assertion.
By the beginning of 1981.
the Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial Development
announced that, in 1980. income
from petroleum exports amounted
to 10.4 billion dollars (more
than
twice the level of 1979). but the
cornr.ercial and payrr.ents deficit
grew

because imports totalled 18 billion,

7

billion more than expected.

On the other hand, during the
second three-month period in 1980, Mexico

paid 2.88 billion dollars in foreign
debt services, while petroleum ex-

ports income only reached the amount of
2.565 billion.
In the

midst of economic turmoil in 1976. the Mexican
government

had approached the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for

a

loan, which

was granted under certain conditions, i.e. an
austerity program which

would have set limits to Public Sector deficits as

a

percentage of GDP.

Petroleum changed this situation, and relieved Mexican economic
policy
from IMF pressures.

At present, international financial institutions

and banking consortia are more than willing to lend to Mexico.

As a

result, Mexico has incurred a steadily growing foreign debt.

Towards the end of 1980, the public foreign debt was officially

estimated to be 34 billion dollars.

If the private foreign debt is

added, the total rises to approximately 53 billion dollars.
1981, the debt service grew by 36%.

During

But official sources in Mexico

point out that the proportions of the public foreign debt in relation

to GDP has been reduced to
close to half of what it was
in
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And the government does not plan
to utilize oil income to defray
the

debt^^
As a result of the mid.1981
worldwide oil glut, Mexico's reserves
are expected to be cut during
the year from a projected 20 billion

dollars to approximately 15 billion.

This has affected adversely the

projected public budget for 1981. which
had originally amounted to
2.333 billion pesos. 31% higher than the 1980
budget.

In spite of

domestic measures to reduce public spending
by 4%.^^ Mexico will have
to borrow about 8.5 billion dollars
during 1981.^^

It is true that Mexico's total

international reserves are at

a

record high of 1C.397 billion dollars, 66% over
the 1980 level and the

highest in history.

However, in this respect it should be noticed

that the central bank's reserves, as

a

percentage of the bank's total

assets, have fallen from between 30% to 50% during the 1950
1960's. down to 14% by July. 1981.

and

's

These facts, together with

a

rise

in consumer prices of 106% between 1977 and 1980, point
to the possi-

bility of a sharp devaluation of the Mexican currency.

The peso has

been allowed to "float" since the 1976 devaluation, and it has slipped

from a parity of 22.74 pesos to the dollar in late 1977, to 25.62 by
November, 1981.

But, as a matter of fact, the central bank has sup-

ported it by holding pesos in Mexico's financial markets.

In any

case, it Is likely that the peso will continue to slip steadily, rather
than undergo a sharp devaluation, albeit at a rate as yet difficult to

anticipate.
The liquidity of Mexico's financial system suffers from a heavy
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imbalance in its foreign
commercial transactions.

This is not a new

Situation:

Mexico's balance of trade, with
the exception of the
year
1949. has been unfavorable for the
last 49 years. But the
present
characteristics and volume of the
deficit are indeed different.
Specifically, two key factors that
determine the performance of
the external sector since 1978 are the
steady growth in imports, and
the decline in manufacturing exports.

Imports have increased partly
as a

result of growing domestic demand,
derived substantially from the expansion of the petroleum industry.

And the balance of trade in the

manufacturing sector has worsened, in spite
of continuing domestic
energy subsidies.
billion dollars.

The total commercial deficit for 1980
was 3.265
By 1981 the Mexican government was
trying to reduce

imports by the Public Sector, with mildly
encouraging results, but non-

petroleum exports continued to be sluggish.
a

traditional compensating factor as

a

On the other hand tourism,

source of reserves, is declining

due to rising domestic prices.^^

According to the Mexican government's Foreign Trade Cabinet,
Mexico
has a substantial deficit in its commerce with
the United States.

1975 to 1978, petroleum exports brought about

a

From

reduction of this def-

icit, from 26.390 billion pesos in 1974 to 12.387 billion in 1978.

How-

ever, the dynamism of the Mexican economy resulted in renewed sharp in-

creases in imports, which soon neutralized income from sales of petroleum.

By 1979, the commercial deficit with the United States surged to

38.712 billion pesos, and tendency continued during 1980. when
of 64.512 billion pesos was reached.

In

a

level

1977. petroleum started to

play a preponderant role in Mexican sales to the United States.

In
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1978. oil accounted for 39.5% of sales,
and this figure had risen
to
61.2% by 1980.
During this latter year. Mexico
became the third com-

mercial client of the United States
in order of importance.
terms, there would seem to be

a

In general

correspondence between the sharp in-

creases in Mexico's trade deficits, and
the consolidation of petroleum
as

its main export to the United States.

'^^

During 1980. foreign investments in Mexico
increased by 1.661

billion dollars, and were expected to go up
by

3

billion in 1981.

In-

vestments by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
registered an increase
of 347 million dollars in 1978. and 1.3 billion
in 1980, channeled

mostly to the manufacturing sector of the Mexican
economy.

Parallel

to

this, between 1979 and 198C the current account
deficit of Mexico in its

balance of payments with the United States grew by 230%:

from outflows

of 797 billion dollars in "hard" currency for 1979. to
2.631 billion by
70

1980.'"

The high indices of economic growth in Mexico during 1979 (9.2%)
and 1980 (8.3%) would seem to be related to
tors:

a

few basic detonating fac-

petroleum exports, purchases of capital goods for Mexican in-

dustry (especially that related to the oil industry), and the entrance
of new flows of investments.

Mexico continues to depend on the U.S.

market for these key components of its trading relationships.

The Political Pivot

An overview:

the State and the Private Sector.

According to Anderson

and Cockcroft, the Mexican government is primarily concerned with pro-

moting four national goals:

political stability, economic growth.

05

public welfare, and Mexicanization.

Political stability involves
the

perception of basic political
institutions, decision-makers,
and .odes
of transferring power as
legitimate by most of the people.
Economic
growth relates, as usual, to
increases in categories such as
industrial

productivity and per capita income.

Public welfare implies the
improve-

ment of living standards for the
bulk of the population.

And Mexican-

ization refers to the policy of
achieving national control, public
or

private, of the process of development.
In Mexico,

these goals are closely linked with the
mystique of the

Mexican Revolution, and the concepts of "mixed
economy" and "state capitalism." i.e. the State viewed as leading
the country to higher levels

of economic growth, social progress, and
national consciousness.

State

action takes place within a political space in
which the main actors
are, in order of importance, the Mexican President,
the "official"

Pantido Revolucionariolnsti tucional (PRI, i.e. Revolutionary
Institu-

tionalized Party), and pressure groups of varying nature
and political
persuasion.
The Global Plan for Development, 1980-1982, reaffirms the "pre-

dominance of the State and the Public Sector" in Mexico's economy.
In his

Annual Report of September, 1981, President

Lo^z Portillo

underscored that "planning for development supposes the leading function
of the State in its various processes. "^^

This preponderant role of

the State does not spring from direct control of most of the Mexican
econorny.

The Private Sector still contributes about half of the coun-

try's total investment, to 45% for the Public Sector and 5% for foreign

capital.

Rather, the State controls some key factors in the process of
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development.

Raymond Vernon has pointed
out the overwhelming
role of
the Mexican State in
regulating the supply of credits,
imports, and

public facilities.^^
The Public Sector comprises

a

complex of powerful economic
insti-

tutions.

Three of these, the Banco de
Mexico (Central Bank), the
National Banking and Insurance
Com.mission. and the Secretariat
of Finance
and Public Credit, regulate
the financial operations of
the Private
Sector. Traditionally, the
government has maintained a degree
of control

over prices in the Private Sector,
usually to protect domestic industry.
Several public financial institutions
such as Nacional

Financiera, are active in the promotion
of agricultural and industrial

activities.

State enterprises and decentralized
organizations, of which

Pemex is by far the most important, have
in recent years accounted for
10% to 15% of Mexico's GNP.^^

Since 1977, the growth index of State
decentralized enterprises
has been more than double that of the total
for the entire manufacturing

sector.

Even excluding Pemex. this accounts for 11% of GNP.

According

to official estimates, the 350 State decentralized
enterprises employ

470,000 persons and contribute with more than 75% of total exports,
although most of this latter figure is made up by foreign oil and
gas
^

sales.
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At first sight, Mexico's petroleum bonanza would seem not only to
restore to the State the influence it had lost during the crisis-ridden

mid-1970's, but to reinforce its role as the controlling force of the
economy.

In the words of E.V.K.

Fitzgerald,
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'
wil
ave for the first ti.e.
resour es of t ow
to allocate to economic and
social infrastructure
this should permit the public
sector to omp ete Ihe
''''''' ''^^'^

vesLnt''86

In other words,

likely

the growing financial capacity
of the State is

to have a substantial

impact on Mexico's "mixed economy."

Indeed, by mid-1980 the Mexican
Institute of Foreign Trade reported
that the Public Sector had attained
a surplus in its commercial
bal ance

during the first five months of
that year, amounting to 2.032
billion

dollars, which compensated in 79.4%
the commercial deficit of the private sector, of 2.559 billion dollars.
Hydrocarbon exports were the

decisive factor in the 199% increment in
exports income during this
period, relative to

similar period during 1979.

a

However, the Public

Sector had deficits in both agricultural
and manufactured products
transactions.
Thus, petroleum income would seem to alter the
previous political

equilibrium between the Public and Private Sectors.

The increase in

petrodollars for the government could diminish the leverage
of the
Private Sector to advance its goals.

Capital flight constitutes the

main element of pressure available to the Private Sector
to impinge
upon the orientation of national economic policy.

This possibility

would tend to weaken as the State increases its disposable funds
through oil exports.

exporting countries.
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This seems to be the general situation in oil

According to Marcos Kaplan,

"The multiple impact of petroleum in producingexporting countries is manifest and focuses on
the strengthening of the State and its functions,
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^^^^t^'ve autonomy, to re?r.Icm.-?''-r%*/;^
transmit nself to ""l'^^
all the aspects and leve
'eveibs or
of
national society. "89

However, the plain fact of the
Increase in the financial
weight of
the Public Sector, does not
necessarily mean that there
should be a

conscious attempt to swamp the sphere
of action of the Private
Sector.
From 194C to 1970, the role of
the state in Mexico was to support
do-

mestic private enterprise through
means such as tax exemptions

in

order to achieve an accelerated and
sustained process of industrialization.
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And there is at present no real indication
that the Mexican

government intends to do otherwise.

The recent Mexican refusal to

enter into GATT seems to confirm this
assessment.

Some Mexican ana-

lysts see schemes such as the Alliance for
Production, as basic incen-

tives to foster the activities of the Private
Sector.

In this context,

the larger enterprises would be the ones with
the most to gain out of

price liberalization policies at

a

domestic level, and government mea-

sures to support industrial recovery.
Indeed, President Lopez Portillo has emphasized the need
to protect

domestic industry against foreign competition, and from
implicit in Mexico's present stage of development.^^
October, 1981,
a

limitations

Specifically, in

the government's Public Works Bank (BANOBRAS), extended

credit for 680 million dollars to the Alfa Industrial Group, Mexico's

largest and fastest-growing private conglomerate, which was suffering
financial squeeze due to overextension of operations and the rise in
no
worldwide interest rates.
a

Pressure groups and political parties.

Mexican critic Roger Bartra
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stresses the manifestations of
Mexico's "heavy centralis,
and authoritarian presidentialism.According to Bartra. the
Mexican federal system is merely a legal formulism.

As the traditional power
of the re-

gional cacisues has eroded,
the sway of the central
government over the
provinces has increased. Most of
the governors are imposed
by the

Executive, says Bantra.

With the exception of four
state governments

that constitute a "crystallization
of regional power,"

i.e. the

states
of Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco,
and Veracruz, all the rest would
be

either in

a

situation of extreme dependence

or as mere administrators

v^:s

a vis

the central power,

for it.^^

On the other hand, the PRI has been
able to maintain an overall
control over political processes through
its three sectors:

the

National Confederation of Popular Organizations
(CNOP), which represents
the interests of Mexico's middle class;
the Mexican Confederation of

Workers (CTM); and the National Peasants'
Confederation (CNC).
A number of elements explain PRI control
over Mexico's middle sectors, such as the heterogeneity of CNOP's
component groups, which make
it difficult for them to act in unison, and the
expansion of the na-

tional bureaucracy, whose members depend on the government
for their

jobs.

Government employees constitute

are, thus,

a

the official

a

sizable part of the sector and

powerful force contributing to close identification with
PRI line.

Centralized control of Mexico's organized labor

through the CTM and its durable leader, Fidel Velazquez, gives the PRI
the capacity to mobilize workers in the urban sectors.

The hold of the

CNC throughout the countryside, based on its possibilities for patron-

age of peasants, remains practically unchallenged.
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But political power in
Mexico is by no .eans
monolithic. There
are new patterns of
authority, as well as new
political actors.^^ one
of the key elements
that must be Incorporated
into an analysis of
Mexico's changing political
environment is the growing
role of pressure
groups.

Taken as

whole, the Private Sector Is
perhaps the most formidable
source of pressure on the
central government. As Richard
B. Mancke
asserts:
a

"Ironically, it has been the
'nonrevolutionary
private sector that, historically,
has had the
most influence on the PRI. Though
officially
excluded from the PRI's formal
structure, there
are at least three structural
reasons why industry interacts closely with
government.
First
railways, communications, utilities,
and several
key industries, such as petroleum,
are all in the
public sector.
Second, government pricing, credit,
tarirt, and investment policies
have a direct
impact on private business. Third,
and probably
most important, the PRI is able to
control labor
and thereby wins the gratitude of
the private
sector. "96
On the other hand, the activities of
private business help to mo-

bilize employment and capital, vitally
important elements in Mexico's
process of development.^''

critics argue in favor of

In this respect,
a

full

some conservative Mexican

return to private capital of its tra-

ditional activities in the Mexican economy, especially
in the manufac-

turing sector.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the leftist leaning
Mexican magazine Proceso has given particular attention to what it
sees
as a political

environment, under President Lopez Portillo, extremely

receptive to the activities of the private sector.

The initial action
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by the government in
this sense would have
been the formation, in
December, 1976, of the -Alliance
for Production,- an
agreement reached
between the government and
leaders of industry and
organized labor.
With the objectives of
promoting investments and
economic growth. According to Prgcesp, since
1977 there has been an expansion
of the fusion
between private industrial and
banking capital which is bound
to
tighten its hold on the Mexican
economy.

Some Mexican critics go even
further in their analysis

appearance of

a

bureaucratic-entrepreneurial complex

ject of privatization of political
power.

and see the

as part of a pro-

This would amount, in effect,

to an alliance between the
government and private enterprise,

in order

to maintain the present model of
development, based on capital accumu-

lation, rapid economic growth, and
renewed industrialization.

How-

ever, present political processes in
Mexico cannot be viewed from such
a

narrow perspective, as the strengthening
of any particular group, no

matter how relevant it may be.
Nevertheless, the resources available to Mexico's
Private Sector
are formidable.

In a mid-1980 list of the 500 most important
enter-

prises in the world, published by the magazine Fortune,
there were 16

Latin American state and private firms, of which

3

were Mexican.

The

most important Mexican company was Pemex, third in Latin America
and
39th in the world, with sales for 7.290 billion dollars.
two were private firms.

The other

The Alfa Group, with headquarters in the city

of Monterrey, ranked 8th in Latin America and 299th in the world.
is

for

Alfa

the most important private enterprise in Latin America, with sales
2

billion dollars and total assets at a level close to

5

billion.
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Alfa has diversified its

activi' ties

beyond its initial nucleus
as

a

steel company, into
petrochemicals, touris.. electric
appliances, food
processing, and capital goods.
The VISA Group (Industrial
Securities.
S.A.), also located in
Monterrey, ranked 15th in
Latin America and
453rd in the world, with sales
for 781 million dollars.

The political demands by
Mexico's Private Sector have
traditionally
been channeled through a
representation of their interests
in Mexico's
bureaucratic-political apparatus. For
example, the Secretariat of Industry and Trade has generally
tended to represent Mexico's
manufacturing interests.

Likewise, the Secretariat of the
Treasury has over time

worked towards the maintenance of
sound financial management. ^^2

a

"good investment climate," and

^^^^^

^^.^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

have direct institutional means to
present its views in governmental

circles.
The Private Sector has

a

direct stake in the expansion of petroleum

exploitation, and present laws mandate the extensive
use of Mexican

subcontractors in the development of the industry.
oil

By the same token,

income would seem to strengthen the Mexican economy
and pave the

way for larger investments and operations by private
companies

."^^^

However, an overheated economy has also brought about rising
interest
rates, a sign of strain in the capacity of the Mexican banking
system
to finance purchases on credit.

In any case,

in spite of the willing-

ness of the Private Sector to expand its activities in the petroleum

industry, the State is unlikely to relinquish to any degree its direct
control of the industry

.

"^^^

The harmony of interests between Mexican and American business
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groups derives from their multifaceted
association.

Mexican private

firms in Monterrey and Mexico
City, as well as banking
groups such as
Bancomer and Banamex, share joint
ventures with U.S., Western
European,
and Japanese Multinational
corporations. Likewise, the Mexican
private
sector relies on credit financing
from U.S. conglomerates such as
the

Bank of America and the Chase Manhattan
Bank.^^^

After the January, 1981, meeting between
President Lopez Portillo,
and then President-elect Reagan, the
leaders of three of Mexico's most

powerful private sector organizations, Ernesto
Rubio del Cueto,

President of CONCAMIN (Confederation of Industrial
Chambers), Jose'
Porrero, President of CaNACINTRA (National Chamber
of the Transformation Industry), and Jorge Chapa, President of
CONCANACO (Confederation
of National Chambers of Commerce), stated their
hopes for

mercial relationship and

a

better com-

a

relaxation of bilateral tensions.

High on

their agenda is the need for lesser trading barriers
in the United
States to Mexican manufactured exports.
It would be safe to assert that the American Chamber of Commerce
in Mexico represents the views of U.S.

investors quite closely, since

in its membership of approximately 2,200 corporate members

"is repre-

sented the major part of U.S. direct private investment in Mexico.
Al

R. Wichtrich,

former President of that association, has stated that

its "main objective (is)

the United States

to promote trade between the host country and

There is no question in my mind that U.S. private

foreign investment is one of the best ways to stimulate the economic

development of Mexico."
Wichtrich praised the measures put into effect by Lopez Portillo
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early in his regime,
which gave Veassurance
of a ™ore understanding
and conciliatory
attitude toward the private
sector.
good working relationship
has developed between
the Mexican President
and the Officers of
the American Chamber of
Co^erce in Mexico. These
Officers, according to
Wichtrich:
a

"...dialogue with the Mexican
Government

we dn t;,u

"^""^
t^^y
f^^king a mistake and try to prove...Pr^'P'
how they shouldadopt ce-ta
n
''''''' investment would be more
welcome "11^
One of the objectives of
the American Chamber of
Commerce in
Mexico is to underline "this
mutuality of interests between
the U.S.

transnationals and the Mexican
government. "Ill

Jorge Dom<nguez has

noted in the behavior of this
pressure group an attempt to widen
and
influence the information available
to the Mexican government
and to

mold

a

more favorable political climate
for foreign investments.

At

the same time, "specific foreign
firms have also lobbied to defend

their particular interests against
adverse governmental policies," such
as the case of automobile and
pharmaceutical

firms in the 1960's and

John Pluntket. President of the American
Chamber of Commerce in
Mexico at present, views the relationship
between Lopez Portillo and
Reagan

as

instrumental in strengthening friendly relations
between the

"leading Latin American country" and the United
States.

Pluntket mini-

mizes the import of recent differences between
the two nations, as "a

problem of concepts and disagreements in the
definition of some terms."
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The United States is ready,
says Pluntket. to reestablish
a dialogue
for the benefit of both
countries.-^^"^

Likewise. Jos^ Carral

.

General Vice-President and
representative

in Mexico of the Bank of
America, has been encouraged by
signs of de-

creasing political and economic
tensions between the United
States and
Mexico, due to Reagan's personal
diplomacy, parallel to an increment
in
foreign investments in Mexico and
general conmercial relations between
both countries. ^^^
The American newspaper New Times has
underlined the divergencies
in Mexican public opinion referent
to ties with the United States in

the following terms:

"The government, bankers, and industrialists
are

pressuring in favor of closer links with
the United States, while several

opposition groups demand economic independence for
"^^^
the country.

While this distinction may be too sharply drawn,
it does reflect some
of the realities of the response by politically
aware forces in Mexico,

especially in light of the oil bonanza.
The increasing diversity and conflicting demands of various
political

groups point to the fact that the Mexican political system

coming more open in terms of political competition.

is

be-

The process of

Reforma Politica (Political Reform), consolidated from 1976 to 1979
under former Secretary of the Interior Jesus Reyes Heroles, has allowed
for an expansion in the number of registered political parties, their

assured (if minimal) representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and
greater access to mass media, which the government strongly influences.

At present there are, in addition to the PRI, eight registered
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political parties which will
present candidates in the
1982 elections.
These include three groups
that had enjoyed legal status
previously to
the Reforma Politic a:
the National Action Party
(PAN); the Popular
Socialist Party (PPS); and the
Authentic Party of the Mexican
Revolution
(PARM).
The five new parties include
three that
had
participated
in the 1979 congressional
elections:
the Corrjnunist Party (PCM);
the

Workers' Socialist Party (PST); and
the Mexican Democratic Party
(PDM).
Two other parties have been
legally recognized for the 1982
elections:
the Trotskyte Revolutionary Party
(PRTT); and the Social Democrat
Party
(PDS).

Additionally, there

is

the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT).
led

by one of Mexico's best-known
opposition leaders. Heberto Castello,

which the government has refused to register,
as well as other minor
groups.

^^^

The National Action Party (PAN), created in
1939, is the largest
and oldest political party in Mexico next to
the PRI.

To the right

along the country's political spectrum, the PAN
constitutes

a

pro-

business force, ideologically ccmmittedto free enterprise
and Catholic
values.

In spite of a continuous division among its upper
echelon

leadership, the PAN seems to have

a

unified policy thrust, which in-

cludes support for more domestic private involvement in the petroleum

industry.

PAN's candidate for President in the 1982 elections, Pablo

Emilio Madero, is likely to be the runner-up after the PRI's candidate,

present Secretary of the Budget and Planning, Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado.

Another alternative to the right of the PRI and, as

a

matter

of fact, the most conservative Mexican political party, is the Mexican

Democratic Party (PDM), which wants to promote the collaboration
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between church and State and traditional
family values.
The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and
the Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution (PARM), have traditionally
been allies of the PRI.

The PPS has attempted to rally
supporters around the issues of land
and
income redistribution, while the PARM's
views remain indistinguishable.
Both parties have accepted, with token
opposition, government policies
for the petroleum industry.

The role of both PPS and PARM is likely

to be preempted by the entrance
into the political

arena of the new

leftist parties.

Mexican leftist opposition parties have repeatedly argued
against
present Mexican government policies regarding petroleum
production and
exports.

Since early 1978. leaders of four Mexican parties of the left,

the Communist Party (PCM), the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT),
the So-

cialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), and the Mexican People's Party (PPM),

coincided in expressing the need to draw and implement an energy policy
that would truly respond to the national

interests, and warned against

the danger of continuing Pemex's "handout policy."

Present oil policy,

according to this view, is totally opposed to that put into action by
Cardenas in 1938.-^^^

Herberto Castillo, head of the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT), has
stood out in recent years with his acerbic criticism of the government's
oil

policy, both from an external and

a

domestic perspective.

Exter-

nally, according to Castillo, present policies are bound to increase

drastically Mexico's dependence on the United States.
says, petroleum exploitation is resulting in

with two contrasting sectors:

a

Internally, he

dichotomous society,

"one employed and benefiting from
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economic growth, and the
other underdeveloped and
relying on government
handouts for survival "^^^
.

The announcement by the
Mexican government early
in 1977 of the
construction of the gasduct
to the United States,
served as a catalyst
for the various leftist
opposition leaders to unite
against it.
Edward C. Williams has
pointed out that even though
the Mexican left
failed to thwart the project,
it did succeed in making
the government
effect a "strategic withdrawal."
Under fire from critics, who
advanced
a scenario of increased
economic dependence, pressures,
and even U.S.
occupation of Mexican oil fields,
the government changed the
emphasis
regarding the objectives of the
gasduct. The project, according
to
the revised official version,
would improve Mexico's internal
distribu-

tion system.

-^^^

More recently, Castillo has presented
his view of the logic of increased petroleum exploitation in terms
of greater dependence of Mexico
vis a vis the United States:

"The U.S. needs our oil and Mexico is

economically bound to that nation."

Speaking early in 1981, Castillo

pointed out that massive exports of petroleum
have brought about the

abandonment of various industries, and have
aggravated unemployment
problems in Mexico.

The Communist Party sees the issue in terms of

"systematic pressures from imperialistic capital"
to force Mexico to
raise its oil exports level, enter GATT, and change
its stand against

intervention in Central Am.erica.

"'^^^

By August, 1981, six leftist parties announced plans to
unite for
the 1982 elections.

These included the Communist Party (PCM) and the

Mexican Workers' Party (PMT). plus four other minor groups.

The project
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attempted to form a new leftist
alliance, to be called the
Unified
Socialist Party of Mexico, which
could have become Mexico's
second largest political force.
However, by November. 1981. the
alliance had collapsed.

The reasons for the quick end to
the leftist challenge were

not too different from other cases,
mainly a personality conflict
between Heberto Castillo, head of PMT.
and Arnoldo Mantinez Verdugo.

head of PCM.

More specifically, the issue referred
to the preference

by individual leaders to control

authority to

a

their own groups rather than relinquish

bigger organization, but also to the
reluctance by

Castillo to join forces with the Moscow-oriented
PCM.-^^^
Leftist groups in Mexico have usually relied on
intellectuals and

university students to strengthen their political
demands.

movement of mid-1968, which ended in
and military forces on October

point for leftist forces.

2

a

The student

bloody confrontation with police

of that year, remains as a rallying

At present the National University in Mexico

City (UNAM), as well as other provincial universities, are
footholds for

Marxist ideology.

However, leftist student groups have not recovered

from the internal divisions that ensued following the 1968 debacle.

On

the other hand, the government provides most of the financial support

for the public university system, and is directly involved in electing
high administrators.

Furthermore, it could be argued that the govern-

ment perceives universities as providing an "escape value" for pressures
from young urban sectors of the population.

ligentsia continues to be

a

Nevertheless, the intel-

strong source of criticism, some would say

the "conscience" of Mexico's political establishment which, in turn,

listens to its arguments.
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Independent unionism represents
another pressure group of
particular importance, since It
would seen, to threaten
official control of
labor through organizations
such as the Mexican
Confederation of
Workers (CTM). one of the
three sectors of the PRI.
and the Congreso
del Trabajo (Labor Congress).
Domlnguez has mentioned Mexican
automobile Industry unions as examples
of these changes In labor's
political
role.

Independent unionism would tend to
affect managerial practices,

through a higher resource to strikes,
and

a

more active attempt at par-

ticipation in policy-making processes
affecting production.
Local peasant organizations In
Mexico's southeastern states of

Tabasco and Chiapas have attempted to
retaliate against Pemex. pressing
i'or

demands regarding indemnizations for their
ruined or expropriated

lands.

126

The take-over of some of Pemex's installations
has brought

attention to the plight of the Mexican
peasantry and, occasionally, the
intervention of the army.^^''

However, it is unlikely that these re-

gional actions by the peasants, lacking real
organizational strength,

or

a

nationally established power base, can effectively
challenge the

control

that the PRI exerts over that sector through the
National

Peasants' Confederation (CNC).

The various political uncertainties since 1968, which reached

a

high point in the mid-1970's with increasing urban guerrilla
activity

and terrorism, might be having

a

detrimental effect on one of the foun-

dations of the Mexican political system:

military.

the nonpolitical role of the

The limitation of the military's role in politics should not

be automatically thought of as a permanently settled question for all

time.

As Martin Needier advanced in the early 1970 's, "...rather than
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regarding the achievement
of civilian control
In Mexico as a
definitive
accomplishment. It Is probably
wiser to think of 1t as
provisional "^^^
If the government
were to show steady signs
of weakness and
Instability
or ,f
had to resort too often
to the military to
put down civilian
discontent, such as It
happened during the early
1970's with the guerrillas in the state of
Guerrero when close to
20.000 troops were mobilized there, the Importance
of the military In the
political equation
would be bound to increase.

n

The Mexican military are
quite

a

susceptible subject in Mexico's

public life.

Proof of this surfaced in
November. 1980. when the Mexican writer Juan Rulfo. in a
discreet pronouncement put forth
in a
National University act to
protest against the most recent coup
d'etat
by the Bolivian military,
remembered that, historically, one of
the re-

sources of the Mexican political
system used to appease the aspirations
of the military was to offer
financial rewards and business
partnerships
to the generals, who then
abstained from directly attempting to take

power.

The indignant reaction from various military
circles was swift.

But there was also

a

direct intervention in the suddenly burning
issue

by President Lopez Portillo himself.

Rulfo's opinion as

a

The President publicly denounced

calumny and vindicated the military.

In any case,

the degree of the reaction to Rulfo's remarks
cannot but raise certain

questions about the vulnerability of Mexico's civilian
political machinery to potential military pressures.
In recent years

-^^^

there has been a substantial

get for the military and police.

According to

a

increase in the bud-

United Nations report

on disarmament, Mexico's growing petroleum wealth has turned it into a
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coveted prey for weapons
manufacturers.

Mexico's .llUary purchases
had by 1979 risen to
780 million dollars, the
highest in the Caribbean
and Central American area,
with the exception of Cuba
(which spent
1.065 billion approximately).
Mexico's a™ed forces total
125.000 men.
and the army is by far
the most important branch,
with 95.000 men.
Still, in relation to its
size. Mexico's military is
one of the smallest
in Latin America. ^"^^
The traditional low profile
the Mexican military have
kept in recent times may be giving way to
a more assertive presence,
m.ostly as a

result of Mexico's new status as
an increasingly important oil
producer
and exporter.
In particular, the potential
for difficulties arising
from the political situation in
the Central American area seems to
be

changing som.ewhat the priorities of
the Mexican armed forces, to the
southern Mexican states in terms of location
and. in terms of functions,
from basically social tasks to

a

truly self-defense force.

The army's

training centers increasingly on "regional
tactical and counterinsurgency operations," and its arms purchases,
mostly light armed vehicles
and individual weapons, are geared to those
objectives
In December,

."^"^^

1980, as he directed the biggest military maneuvers

ever staged by the Mexican military, in which 43.705 men from
the various branches swept the southern state of Chiapas, the Secretary
of

National Defense, General Felix Gal van Lopez, declared that the army
has the obligation to prevent any groups from any political
to enter Mexican territory and to violate its sovereignty.

sources saw the maneuvers as
not being used as

a

a

tendency

-^^^

Some

proof that Mexico's southern region was

refuge by Guatemalan guerrillas and, most important.
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to quiet down rumors about
violent confrontations between
Mexican

forces, perhaps Pemex's "security"
units, and groups of rural
rebels.
For 1981, the Secretariat of
Defense has a budget of
25,855 million
pesos. The main objectives
are the modernization of
military equipment
and an adequate level of
training and preparedness for
the armed forces.
Likewise, there are plans to
accelerate the production of war
material,
such as light weapons, mortars,
"^^^
and rockets.

Changes in the Mexi can po lit ica l
establishment.

The implications from

petroleum exploitation are permeating
Mexican politics at all levels.
Signs of impending political change
have come from the ranks of Mexi
go's

ruling political establishment.

There has been a displacement of the

center of gravity of political power, from
traditional posts such as
the Secretariat of the Interior (Secretaria
de Gobernacitfn)

,

the Secre-

tariat of Agrarian Reform, and the Secretariat
of Agriculture, towards

more professional and technocratic elites,
located in the Secretariat
of the Budget and Planning, the Secretariat of
Patrimony and Industrial

Development, the Secretariat of the Treasury (Secretariat
de Hacienda),
and Pemex.

As petroleum continues to be the lever of development,
and

the government tries to consolidate its reliance on planning
schemes,

these latter agencies would indeed seem to be headed for growing
political relevance.

The increase in political power of the Secretariats associated
with finances, planning, and energy, within the context of the petroleum boom, leads to the issue of the apparent process of technocratization of the Mexican state.

While in the extremely dynamic Mexican
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development milieu, political
approaches to problems will
certainly regain a .ust for the future
ahead, a growing reliance
on economic growth
and management, fueled by
the petroleum industry,
is likely to manifest
itself in the rise of technicians
and planners
to the top levels of

national decision-making.

noted

Writing in the mid-1970's.
Rafael Segovia

a

progressive loss of power by the
traditional "caciques," i.e.
"the men who use their local
implant and force to accede to
national

power."

Parallel to this.
"The new tendency seems to be that
of a different
cursus honorum to accede either to
the Presidency
of the Republic, or to the Cabinet.
... If this
technostructure is the most visible and
perhaps
most important, the progressive and
inevitable
techmfi cation and bureaucratization of the
state
eads to the displacement of the
traditional political class, limited more and more
to functions
that keep it away from the authentic centers
of
decision. "135

This tendency seemed to be confirmed on
September 25, 1981. when
the PRI announced its candidate for the
July, 1982, presidential elec-

tions. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Secretary
of the Budget and Planning.

De la Madrid, who was in charge of the Global

Plan for Develop-

ment, holds a graduate degree in Public Administration
from Harvard

University, has

a

long record in economic management, and is considered

to have strong ties to the business community.

"^^^

By mid-October, 1981. just as de la Madrid was preparing to begin

his campaign as official candidate, the head of the PRI, Javier Garci'a

Paniagua, resigned unexpectedly.

He was replaced by Pedro Ojeda

Paullada, a close friend of President Lopez Portillo who the Secretary

of Labor.

In turn, Garci'a Paniagua took over the Secretariat of Labor.
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As the head of Mexico's
ruling party directs and
coordinates the campaign of the Official
candidate, this move could
be seen as a consolidation of the political group
closest to the President,
and the demotion
of Garcfa Paniagua, who
had presidential ambitions
of his cwn.
Likewise, it would seem to show
underlying tensions within
the ranks of the
PRI, between the traditional
politically-minded circles, and
the emerging groups of technicians
^^'^
and bureaucrats
.

The clash between the traditional,
established politicians, and
the new technocratic groups,
has been brewing for some time,
as a source
of discontent and lack of
discipline within the PRI. These
divergencies
have been underscored by the oil
bonanza. A case in point was that
of

Victor Manzanilla Schaffer.
from the state of Yucatan.

a

PRI federal deputy member of
the CNC.

Agriculture and petroleum exploitation
have

been at odds since the intensification
of Pemex's activities in 1977.
A rare act of dissent within the normally
tightly knit PRI was staged
by Manzanilla. in October, 1977. when
he voted against a constitutional

amendment which gave Pemex broad powers to expropriate
lands needed to
proceed with petroleum exploration and development.

In effect,

this

amendment, which was passed eventually, formally placed
the petroleum
industry ahead of agricultural development.

After quite an upheaval

in the PRI-control led Congress, caused by this
unheard-of dissidence.

Manzanilla finally remained in his post and the controversy died
down.
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Nevertheless, in 1977 this incident already reflected sub-

jacent tensions beneath the apparently unruffled exterior of the gov-

ernment party apparatus, and may have played

a

part in redirecting

official attention to the plight of the peasants and the agricultural
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sector in general.
Parallel to the previous
developments,

a

tug-of-war has developed

since the late 1970's within the
new professional and
technocratic
groups, directly related to
contrasting views in regards to
oil pro-

duction and exports plans.

As Edward F. Wonder has pointed
out.

"...the bureaucracy itself is organized
along
lines that are more horizontal
than vertical,
with numerous agencies, often
displaying quite
different policy philosophies,
involved in the
same policy area, frustrating
planning, and
contributing to frequent shifts in policy
emphasis, even during the same administration
as the
President seeks to hold together his coalition. "139
A result of the previous situation
was the dismissal of Jorge D<az

Serrano as head of Pemex. on June
6, 1981.

Since 1977. four Secretar-

iats have been involved in planning and
implementing energy policy:

Patrimony and Industrial Development, Budget and
Planning, Treasury,
and Commerce.

These have often manifested diverging viewpoints in
the

administrative councils of energy industries.
the growing economic and political

To this must be added

importance of Pemex, as the most

dynamic sector in the Mexican economy.

The fact that Pemex is under the

jurisdiction of the Secretariat of Patrimony and Industrial Development,
helps explain the rift that developed between the head of the latter,

Andres de Oteyza. and Diaz Serrano. While the former head of Pemex advocated an ever-rising level of oil production and exports, de Oteyza

emphasized the need to curtail expansion of the industry within the
limits set by the Energy Program.
Until shortly before his dismissal, Dfaz Serrano was considered
to be the political

figure closest to President Lopez Portillo, and a
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potential PRI candidate for
the 1982 Presidential
elections.
By .1d1580. political rumors In Mexico
were ripe concerning the
possible creation of a Secretariat of
Energy, to be headed by
Dfaz Serrano, and to
comprise the petroleum,
electricity, nuclear, and coal
industries.
This did not materialize.
On the other hand. Dfaz
Serrano was attacked
by Mexican leftist
forces for his alleged
association with U.S. political and business 1nterests,l«
and for "Invading the field
of action of
Other government officials ."-^^^
By November, 1980. D<az Serrano
appeared to be politically damaged
by the Presidential decision
not to raise the domestic
prices of leaded
gas and diesel. a measure long
advocated by the former Pemex Director
in order to increase the
financial

base of the oil

industry

.

Never-

theless, in February. 1981, D<az Serrano
was designated as official

speaker in the anniversary ceremony of
the enactment of the Mexican

Constitution, a fact that seemed to underline
his aspiration to the
PRI's Presidential candidacy.

^^"^

However, everything came quickly unraveled for
ofaz Serrano as

result of the worldwide petroleum glut of mid-1981.

a

By April, 1981.

supplies were growing while demand declined in the
international oil
market.

Dfaz Serrano first reacted to the situation in late May,
by

stating that Pemex would maintain its prices, in spite of
oversupplies
in the market.
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Then, suddenly, just

a

few days later, Diaz Serrano

announced that Pemex, after all, would have to reduce its prices in
order to maintain its clients.
crude exports by $4

a

Pemex lowered its average price for

barrel, from $34.60 to $30.60."^^^

On June 6,

1981. Diaz Serrano presented his resignation to President Lopez
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Portnio.-^^^
The official reasons for the
dismissal of Pemex Director
were related to his disagreement with
members of the Mexican government's
Economic Cabinet, especially Secretary
of Patrimony and Industrial
Development. Jos^ Andres de Oteyza. over
the price reduction measures.

Other

critics mentioned that Pemex had turned
into an autonomous bureaucracy,
and that petroleum policy had been
increasingly divergent from Mexico's

national policy.

At the root of the disagreement was

Di^az

persistant decision to continue raising oil
production.

Serrano's
The debate

over petroleum and general development policy
in Mexico is bound to

continue for the foreseeable future.
The new Director of Pemex, Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma
Cid. is

former Secretary of the Treasury and
Portillo.

a

a

close friend of President Lopez

It is interesting to note that the PRI candidate
for the

1982 presidential elections. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. was
Under-

secretary of the Treasury when Moctezuma Cid held the top post.

In

any case, the change of Directors in Pemex did not make
Mexico immune
to international market forces.

Attempts by Moctezuma Cid to restore

the price of Mexican oil during June and July. 1981, led to an abrupt
fall

in exports.

Likewise, policies under the new Pemex administration

might not differ too much from previous guidelines, including the objective of diversification of clients and products.

However, there

appears to be at present a greater willingness to conciliate views with

respect to the pace of development of the petroleum industry.
Pemex
bonanza.

's

'^^^

workers union (STPRM), has benefited from the petroleum

There has been a change of guard in STPRM 's leadership, from
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the .en who belonged to the
generation that participated
in the nationalization of the oil industry,
and had traditionally
opposed oil exports, and to the United
States in particular, to a
younger group of
leaders who see the fortunes
of the union rising parallel
to the rapid

expansion of the petroleum industry.

Thus, the petroleum workers'

union is likely to support Pemex's
official policy, but not
without
proper compensation,
"In return for its consent.
STPRM's primary conditions are that its members be
guaranteed continued
hikes in relative wages, and benefits,
coupled with
assurances of no layoffs. "150

But the activities of the union,
and of Pemex in general, have

traditionally been mired by corruption.

Corruption is by no means

a

phenomenon exclusive of Pemex but, rather,
an endemic characteristic
of the Mexican system.

However, even in such

a

milieu, the situation

in Pemex has tended to be particularly
serious.

Some foreign assess-

ments are indeed glooniy:
"Some critics suggest that Pemex itself will have
to
be overhauled before there is any chance for
wise use
of Mexico's oil and gas .. .Riddled with nepotism,
plagued
by graft and corruption, the company is a model of
inefficiency, spending $9 to get each $13 barrel of oil
out of the ground (in August, 1978). The Petroleum
Workers' Union openly sells jobs, with the going rate
for a permanent post in the oil fields about $3,500.
And there are so many ghost workers on the Pemex payrolls that roughnecks call them 'aviators
'They
only touch down here to get their checks. '"151

The members of the STPRM constitute, in fact, an elite within

Mexico's entire labor sector, and the oil boom
their privileged position.
vanced:

is

likely to reinforce

As Edward C. Williams has succinctly ad-

"Corruption has always been

a

part of the Pemex scene, but
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indications point to its increase
as the economic pie
expands." The
economic bonanza is bound to
add fuel to .anage.entlabor disputes over
workers- benefits.^^^ So far.
the issue appears to
have been solved
through increasing concessions
to the union.
For example, in October.
1977. as news of the construction
of the gasduct were
spreading through
the Mexican press, it was
publicly known that the STPRM
would receive
of
the total investments on
2%
that project.
Critics kept asking for
reasons as to "why the first
beneficiary of said works should
be the
powerful and corrupt petroleum
syndicate. "^^^

Oxford specialist Lawrence Whitehead
has pointed out the dangers
of excessive centralization of
the oil industry in the following
terms:
"To keep Pemex as a state monopoly
in the new
conditions set by the boom, will permit
the powerful and arrogant oil union to
threaten the tranquility of domestic interests, and the
security
of the state itself. "154

An additional, and very visible
indication of the importance of

Pemex's administrative circles, is the
construction in Mexico City, at

present underlay, of

a

new. huge Pemex central building, to be
the tall-

est in the city, and which will even include

a

he!

i

port.

"^^^

In the past, efforts to stam.p out cases of
corruption, such as au-

diting Pem.ex's workers in order to stop clandestine
sales of fuel to
sugar refineries and industries, have been turned down
by union threats
to strike.
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Accusations of corruption have been thrust not only at

union workers, but at the highest levels of Pemex's management, by leftist groups as well as by the independent National Petroleum Movement
(MNP).

The latter, however, seems to lack any substantial support

within the industry.

Allied to leftist political parties, the MNP has
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repeatedly denounced corruption in
the STPRM. and its leader.
Hebraicaz
Vazquez Gutiemez has referred to
corruption as a cancer that
"threatens
the independence of the oil

industry.

Nevertheless, in his fifth annual
report of September, 1981,
President Lopez Portillo announced
a new "Law of Responsibilities,"
geared to strengthen fiscal instruments
and to supervise the finances
of high public officials.
p^^,^^^^^^^
November. 1980, the Mexican

President had announced reforms to the
government's fiscal code, in

order to prevent tax evasion through the
use of "name-lenders" (prestanombres)

Political tendencies.

At present the State reigns supreme as
the grav-

ity center of the Mexican political system.

But the progressive demo-

cratization of the PRI, i.e. the expanding number and
sources of its
components, as well as the proliferation of outside political
actors,

might seem to pose
is still,

a

threat to its stability.

by far, the keystone of the system.

The Mexican President
As Needier stated in the

early 1970 's, "...it is clear that in Mexico the leading political

actor is the President.

The political system

is

thus one of executiv-

ism rather than single-party rule."^^^
But, in spite of oil resources, both the institution of the Presi-

dency, in its role as mediator between public and private interests,
and the PRI, as the main political arena for such

stress.
cal

a

debate, are under

Jorge Domfnguez has appropriately described the present politi-

crossroads, characterized by changes in its "internal economic,

social, ideological, and political factors:"
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historical standards would
sugges?

pressures within

a

context of persistina snH It

gidui^r^ uis'^hir'^t^?'
^^^^e

th^n

^hat

: u

f

h.H

The ^pntr.i

^'^

°'*"-i
relatively weakpr
^^^"11 strong

states:
greater real dependency
nn ?ho
n ^
on
the U.S
in a political context
of less support
for such close relations.
The needs of the Mexican
economy require, for Mexican
officials at least
in the short run, such
a deepened dependency,
while
the needs of Mexican
politics require the opposite
D s coven es of hydrocarbon
resources r,ay have been
the Mexican miracle of the
1970's.
The 1980"s m!J
^
require a political miracle that
is as ^
yet not
in evidence. "161
•

It could be asserted that
the conditions of a developing
society

such as Mexico's, i.e.
population explosion, rapid urbanization,
social
dichotomy, economic inequalities,
and political flux, among others,
are
not conducive to effective party
competition, if the overall objectives

are political stabil ity, sustained
economic growth, and social develop-

ment in

a

evolutionary, rather than

a

revolutionary, setting.

One of the main foundations of Mexico's
ruling party has been its

flexibility, i.e. its ability to accomodate
different
cal

tendencies within its organization.

gro'jps or politi-

During the 1970's. several

factors contributed to strain this flexibility,
among them the reduction
in the rate of economic growth, with the
consequent inability to sat-

isfy fully the demands of various groups, and the
persistent deep in-

equality in the distribution of income.
is

The continuing question today

whether the PRI can handle the increased pressures of the process of

modernization, originating to

a

great extent in the petroleum boom.

The present political system may be undergoing a transition, but new
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forms are hard to visualize.

The social and economic situation
in Mexico, seen not
from the
beaming perspective of oil
exports and income figures,
but from that of
the living conditions of a
sizable segment of the population,
would
seem to be deteriorating. There
is a "critical limit,"
i.e. inflation,
less consuming power, each of
basic articles and services,
beyond which
an increasingly aware urban
population will not remain calm.
It is

impossible to foresee at what conjunction
of economic and social derriands,

on the one hand, and political
awareness, on the other, this

"critical

limit" might be.

The possibility that the Mexican government
will carry on its programs in an atmosphere of political
order depends on the question of

achieving

a

balance between economic growth and social
justice.

Oil

wealth is giving the government more time and
resources to stage needed
reforms, but again, it might worsen the situation.

Revenues from petro-

leum exports could aggravate corruption, inflation,
and the inequality
in the distribution of income, and could
easily be offset if agricul-

tural production continues to deteriorate.

On the other hand, petroleum

might offer new perspectives to Mexico's political system, if
resources
are channeled in the proper direction:

into the agricultural sector,

efficiently and with an emphasis on domestic consumption; and into
labor-intensive middle-scale industries, to create more employment
opportunities.

Thus, the internal impact of the oil bonanza still re-

mains to be seen.

Oil wealth could lead to prosperity, or to a mirage.

James W. Wilkie has referred to the Mexican political system in
terms of a situation of "permanent revolution," which draws deep from
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its very basis of sustenance,
ideologically and politically.

would seem to give rise to

a

This

state of "permanent crisis,"
or political

convulsion, in the midst of which the
system finds itself periodically.
With the danger of a final impasse.
The previous situation
underscores
a basic feature of the Mexican
system, i.e. the need for
continuous
bargaining.

In the end, says Wilkie.

does not work smoothly

"the Mexican political system

"-^^^
.

A parallel reflection on the issue
would be the widely cited "pen-

dulum effect," as Mexican leaders swing
from side to side of the political

spectrum, in search for stability.

However, under the present ac-

celerated process of social mobilization,
Mexico's political establishment may be willing to dispense with abrupt
political changes, notwithstanding the rationale for ideological renovation,
and embark instead
on a course of consolidation of more pragmatic,
professional, and tech-

nocratic policies and styles of leadership.

The selection of Miguel de

la Madrid Hurtado as the next PRI's presidential

candidate, who is

likely to uphold the continuity of the present administration's
policies, would tend to support this argument.

Nonetheless, one must be

cautious, for in the past predictions about the Mexican political process and Presidential successors have proved to be a dubious enterprise.

General

Impact of the Oil Exploitatio n

The "Petroleum Syndrome."

The impact of the oil exploitation is deter-

mined by endogenous factors, i.e. government policy, and exogenous
factors, i.e. world oil price levels.

The euphoria about petroleum

wealth has so far prevented to a certain degree an analytic criticism
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of potential pitfalls.
come just

For all

its magnitude, the oil

boom could be-

palliative, instead of a solution
to basic structural problems, and could aggravate bottlenecks
in the development process,
such
a

as corruption, inflation, and
the distribution of income.

In this

respect, domestic critics have
complained that Mexico's energy policy
lacks an organic relation with the
needs for profound changes in the

country's socioeconomic structure, and
that it is being increasingly

incorporated to the U.S. global energy
strategy.

However, an im-

partial assessment of the overall impact
would also have to weigh in
the fact that it is unrealistic to expect
overnight changes.

In regards

to a short-term outlook.

"It does appear... that the major problems facing
the
Mexican government today will still be there in 1^88.
regardless of the level of petroleum output.
Infla-*
tion will still be high, income distribution and
geographic development will still be unbalanced, unemployment will still be high, and the country will still
have difficulty producing domestically all its foodstuffs. To an extent, the continuation of these problems is simply an indication that 10 years is not a
very long time in the life of an economy. "165

The most crucial question regarding Mexico's petroleum exploitation, since it could very well

indicate the future direction of Mexico's

development, is whether the Mexican economy is becoming petroleumbound.

From the evidence available in the early 1980

's.

it would seem

that petroleum tends to overshadow the remaining sectors of the Mexican economy, and is having a substantial impact on Mexico's social
fabric.

An article for the August. 1979, issue of the prestigious

Mexican journal Comercio Exterior , concluded that "for the first years
of the decade of the 1980' s, Mexico would emerge as an economy
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fundamentally dependent on
its hydrocarbon
exports. "l^^
In a subsequent
Issue of

Con^ Extenor

of June. 1980. Abel
Beltran del Rfo. director
of Diemex. an econometric
project for Mexico
from the Uharton
Econometric Forecasting
Association at the University
Of Pennsylvania,
noticed the first symptoms
of the "petroleum
syndrome
Beltran categorizes oil-rich
countries as hybrid In their
process

-

of

development.

That Is. due to their Indices
of Inflation and their
sectorial disequilibriums,
they would seem to be
less-developed countries,
while Signs such as a surplus
in the balance of payments,
abundance of
finance capital, high rates
of savings, and scarcity
of labor, place
them in the category of
countries of medium development.

According to Beltran. the
indicators that would Indicate
the "petroleum syndrome" in any given
country include:
high level of petroleum
production; an overwhelming
participation of oil as a percentage
of
their exports; a growing surplus
in their external balance of
payments;
a

fast and unbalanced growth of
the petroleum sector, with the
subse-

quent bottlenecks; and accelerated
inflation, generated by excessive
demand and currency-convertibility
vis

economic symptoms would include:
In the world scenario; socially,

a vis

insufficient supply.

politically,

a

Non-

more relevant presence

rising expectations and demands, as

well as a get-rich-quickly and speculative
atmosphere; and culturally,
the introduction of foreign values and
customs that clash with national

traditions.

-^^^

By 1979. says Beltran. the first signs of
the "petroleum syndrome"

were clearly detectable in Mexico, albeit tempered
somewhat by the fact
that the process was just beginning, and that Mexico
has

a

good-sized
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and semi-1ndustrialized
economy.

Some of these signs were

participation of oil in Mexico's
exports,

a

growing

high rate of economic
growth

a

based on the exploitation of
hydrocarbons, persistent inflation,
congestion in Mexico's transportation
and communication infrastructure,
land speculation, and growing
foreign investments

There has been

a

general awareness about the
negative effects of

an excessively rapid
exploitation of oil.
1979 issue of Coninerxio

An editorial in the August.

against possible economic and

social distortions, i.e. the
existence of two nations or economies

within the same national territory,
due to their different degree of
development.

It was necessary, said the
editorial, to avoid the desta-

bilizing effect of excessive petro-funds,
to prevent excessive imports

which could eventually destroy Mexico's
industrial sector, and to control

inflation.

The main official instrument to manage Mexico's
petroleum industry
has been the Energy Program, with its
production and exports platform.

On February 4. 1981. President

Upez

Portillo's decree approving the

Energy Program and ordering its implementation
appeared in Mexico's
Official Diary.

Thus, the Energy Program became a law.

limit of 1.5 billion b/d until

The exports

1982, is expected to prevent an excessive

dependence on oil exports. ^^^
Some Mexican analysts emphasize the need on the part of the Public

Sector to reinforce its planning mechanisms, in order to condition the
oil

sector to the global requisites of national development.

needed to avoid an excessive "petrol ization" would be

a

Also

deep fiscal re-

form, a more effective industrial diversification, and a greater state
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participation, not only in the
design and control processes
of industrial development, but
in the production
process itself. ^72

Reflecting official concern,
by September. 1980. the
Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial
Development. Jose Andrews de
Oteyza.

stated as
one of the bases of Mexico's
economic policy the need to
guide developnient along the path of
greater equilibrium, and to
diversify the nation's economic structure
away from an excessive future
reliance on oil.

Petroleum resources should,
according to Oteyza:

back Pemex's expansion

plans in order for the industry
to finance its own growth; be
channeled

through taxes to finance government
programs in the fields of education,
health, basic infrastructure, and
general Public Sector productive projects; and benefit the community
through prices substantially lower
than
those prevailing in the international
market.

•^''^

There are indications that government policy

avoiding the "oil syndrome."

not succeeding in

is

Out of the official budget for 1981 Pemex

has one of the highest shares of 377
billion pesos.

^'^^

For 1981. Mexi-

can exports are expected to have a value of
25 billion dollars.

amount, non-petroleum exports will only account for

6

billion.

Of this

Accord-

ing to some sources, hydrocarbon exports, including
crude oil, gas, re-

fined products, and petrochemicals, are expected to
represent up to
82% of total Mexican exports.

Total manufactured exports, including

petrochemicals, will amount to only 3.500 billion dollars.
oil
2

exports, the Mexican balance of trade will still show

In spite of
a

deficit of

billion dollars for 1981.^''^
Thus, it would seem that Mexico's present high rate of growth,

to a great extent attributable to petroleum economics.

is

In other words,
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the recovery of the
Mexican econor^ during the
last few years would
not
appear to be extraordinary
at all, were It not for
the sectorial Impact
Of the oil boon,. And
,t Is clear that petroleu.
has become the medullar
-^^^
center of f^exican exports.

Following the fall of oil
prices In June. 1981, Mexico's
magazine
froceso raised the alternative of
a recession, as a result
of falU ng
income which depends basically
on petroleum exports, or a
higher foreign
debt to compensate for growing
deficits in comnerce.^" The
Secretary
of the Patrimony and
Industrial Development. Oteyza,
emphasized the need
to revise Mexico's exports
plans, in order to avoid the trap
of petro"^^^
leum mono-exports.

However, in his fifth annual report
of September, 1981. President

Lopez Portillo vehemently denied that
the Mexican economy might be in-

eluctably tied to its petroleum industry,
citing

a

number of figures:

petroleum accounts for only 7% of Mexico's
GDP; the Public Sector receives only 28% of its income from petroleum;
investments from the oil

sector account for only 12% of the total;
and only 38% of total foreign
income derives from petroleum sales.

Likewise. Bancomer (Bank of

Commerce) has pointed out that the Mexican economy

is

quite diversified

and does not depend on any single product for
its exports.

context, the preponderance of petroleum would be only

nomenon, as
1970

's

a

a

"^^^

In

this

temporary phe-

result of the urgent need Mexico had in the mid and late

to expand its production quickly to face the economic crisis.

Furthermore, there would seem to be
in the midst of the generalized oil

a

'^^^

relatively positive element

price drop of mid-1981, that is,

the halt to the process of higher reliance of the Mexican economy on

the

petrCeu. 1„dustry.lB?

Notwithstanding the fact
that Mexico was

forced to reduce prices
for Its oil because of
Internationa, .ar.et
forces, by July.
1981. this happenstance had
allowed dissimilar
polltlcal groups. I.e. the
PRI. leftist and
rightist opposition parties,
and
an concerned Secretariats, to
coalesce around the banner
of reduced
levels Of petroleu. exports,
quite a feat which Illustrates
the vagaries
Of Mexican political
life.

Fieglonal and ernlonlr.l

i

n^t.

Never before in Mexico's
history has

any single economic sector,
such as petroleum right now.
been such a
determining factor in the
Industrial location and organization
of economic activities. According
to a Mexican analyst, the
impact of oil
activities affected only cities
before; now, the magnitude and
nature
of their Impact is such that
it tends to "dominate all the
regional
space, that is. all the fonrs of
zonal production... "'es

jome indica-

tions point to the fact that the
regional and ecological impact of
pe-

troleum exploitation so far has not
been balanced at all.
In the Mexican states that are
the center of the present oil

boom.

Tabasco and Chiapas, Pemex's activities
have polarized conflicts such
as

inequality in Income distribution and
unemployment.'^''

dichotomy

Is

A social

emerging, between the native population,
dedicated mainly

to agricultural activities and increasingly
pushed out by oil projects,

and Pemex's workers, who enjoy
living.

185

a

substantially higher standard of

Since 1979, there have been frequent clashes between Pemex

and peasants in both states.

In occasion, groups of armed peasants

have blocked Pemex's installations.

In January,

1981, such an
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incident took place in the petrochemical
complex at Cactus, Chiapas.
Pemex's industrial areas in Reforma,
and various oil fields.
Military patrols were called in to evict
the peasants and protect the
in187
stallations.
Pemex. for its part, agreed in principle
to pay an in-

demnization to the peasants for damages
resulting from its activities.

^^B

The problems seem to have started during
1977. when the reform to

Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution transferred
to the Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial Development the power to
expropriate agricultural

lands.

Ever since, questions have been raised in regards
to how

well that Secretariat has fulfilled its role "to
harmonize interests

and in its case to indemnify "^^^
.

The Secretary General of the League

of Peasant Communities in Tabasco has denied that
peasants oppose oil

exploitation, but that such activities must be undertaken carefully,
and just indemnizations paid to those who are affected by them.'^^'^

On

the other hand, Pemex has stated that it does not have direct responsi-

bility over the formation of "misery belts" in the southeastern regions
of Mexico where it operates.

There are also "prosperity belts" propi1

tiated by Pemex's activities.

01

In any case.

President Lo'pez Portillo

declared in 1978 that Pemex's role is "to generate economic wealth, not
to solve problems."
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Nevertheless, these problems are indeed mul tifaceted.

There have

been a number of accidents related to Pemex's activities, significant
both in terms of environmental degradation, and economic losses.

These

would tend to underline either the haste with which Pemex has proceeded
with its explorations, the lack of proper caution, or both.

The
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Mexican magazine Proceso. in
an August. 1980. issue,
was stating somewhat sarcastically that Pemex
was discovering oil and gas
through accidents.
Such have been the cases of
the "Ixtoc I" well off
in the
Gulf of Campeche. and "Giraldas 22"
well, in the state of Chiapas.
The
Ixtoc well exploded on June
3. 1979. and spilled millions
of barrels of
oil

into the waters of the Campeche
Bay. one of the richest
fishing

zones in Mexico.

According to Mexican scientists,
the damages to the

ecology of the zone, and thus to
the fishing industry, have been
Irre194
versible.
Due to a "technical error," in August,
1980, the explosion
of the "Giraldas 22" well provoked
the spill of thousands of barrels
of
oil

and the burning of millions of cubic
feet of gas, in an apparently

unpopulated area of Chiapas.
In both of these cases,

-^^^

there were economic losses to Pemex that

amounted to millions of pesos.

But in some cases these losses are noth-

ing compared to the damages to agriculture
in the Southeast.

there is literally

a

At present

clash between the petroleum and the agricultural

industries in that region.

Not only because of disasters such as those

described, but through the noxious effects of the burning
of gas, various crops such as corn, cacao, and banana, as well
as grasslands, are

being destroyed.

This is happening in some of the most fertile regions

of a mostly arid country,

Mexico.

According to

a

December, 1980, re-

port by the National Research Institute on Biotic Resources, "Tabasco
is now a big swamp,"

devoid of all its former dense jungles, the remain-

ing Mexican tropical jungles of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Campeche, and Quintana

Roo are under siege, and in general, "Mexico is in danger of becoming
an extensive desert, a fact which could bring the country to an absolute
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food dependence. "^-^
Ixtoc

I

and Glraldas are not
Isolated accidents.

In July.

1980

^ huge f1.e at Salina Cruz refinery
destroyed o1, storage
tan.s, lefi
injured
30
workers, and consumed
140.000 barrels of oil.
with damages
estimated at 200 .lllion
pesos.
70% of the population
In that city
lacks all types of
services.^"
October of that same year,
the
Corlndon" well. In the northern
state of Tamaullpas, went
out of control and spilled oil and
gas In an area 43 km. off
Neuvo Laredo."8 The
causes of most of these
accidents have not been
satisfactorily determined. By mid-1980, peasant
communities In the Huasteca region
of
Hidalgo were bracing themselves
for the feared negative
social and ecological effects of Pemex's
i^inent exploitation of the Chlcontepec
fields. 59 In regards to
accidents. Pemex officials have
declared that
"they worry us. but do not scare
us." reaffirming their confidence
in
Pemex 's know-how.^""

m

Pemex periodically announces programs
to prevent contamination,
build schools and housing projects
for Its workers, and roads for
the
nation's infrastructure.
It has emphasized its commitment
to undertake
a dialogue with the officials
of the affected areas.

In order to remedy

the problems generated by the accidents, and
by Pemex's activities in
201
general.
Undoubtedly, there are positive contributions
that are also
a

result of the oil boom.

But a balanced assessment of the relation

between positive and negative impacts remains
to be made.

The Mexican sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, in
1978. foresaw
three possible scenarios for Mexico's development,
based on the influx

of petroleum resources.

The first scenario would lead to the exhaustion
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of petroluem reserves and

political convulsions.

a

grave domestic crisis, with
social and

The secoryj.to

tem, at least for a
generation, until

a

temporary respite for the
sys-

the reserves are gone.

And the
third, to integral development
in the framework of democratic
planning,

with diminishing dependence and
nation.

a

more real autonomy for Mexico
as

a

In this third scenario,
prosperity would be truly shared.

Some of the key factors that
qualify the three scenarios would
be:
the
degree of dependence and vulnerability
vis a vis the United States,

based on commercial transactions;
the state of the foreign debt;
the

domestic destiny of the petroleum
financial resources, leading to an
improvement or

a

deterioration of the distribution of income;
and the

role of the Mexican state, as a
democratic and benefactor, or as an

authoritarian state.
The weight of evidence by the early 1980's
points to

located somewhere around the second scenario

.

a

process

Mexico has not been al-

together successful in avoiding past pitfalls of
other oil-producing
countries.

The influx of funds from oil exports tends to have
destabi-

lizing social and economic effects that the Mexican
government cannot

quite cope with.

The fact that Mexico's international financial posi-

tion is considerably stronger than in the mid-1970's, cannot
hide the

domestic distortions due to the oil boom.^^"^
However, at present this process would not seem to be irreversible.

There is, for one thing, the awareness of government officials as manifest in their public expressions of concern.

Also, there is the fact

that Mexico's diversified economic infrastructure and plain market size,

contrast favorably with those of most oil-exporting countries.

There
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st,ll a t1.e .argin
available to Mexico, during
which Its government

^1ght devise effective .eans
to deal with the effects
of the o1l boo.
The Challenge is to utilize
a resource that is
crucially needed at
present. In order to build
foundations for a sustained,
Integral process
Of development in the
future.
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CHAPTER
UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS:

VII

DIMENSIONS OF THE DEBATE

Nature of U.S-Mpyir;, n Relations
The "Special Relationship

For some ti.e now, both
American and Mexi-

,"

can analysts have tended to
approach the subject of relations
between
the United States and Mexico
in the framework of what might
be called
a

"special relationship."

Regardless of periodic official
disclaimers by

both sides, the relationship
between the two countries is indeed
"special." Some key elements
illustrate this fact. Mexico and the
United

States share an undefended 2,000 mile
common border, through which

people and goods have moved back and
forth in an uninterrupted flux
since the nineteenth century.
is

In regards

to trade,

the United States

Mexico's first commercial client, while
Mexico is the third largest

trading partner of the United States.^
is the large and growing

Additionally,

a

unique factor

population of Mexican origin in the United

States, which represents a permanent link that
goes beyond the formal

country to country relations.

Mexico's petroleum boom is straining the

scope of this traditional "special relationship."

David F. Rondfelt and Caesar D. Serenseres have defined the
"special

relationship" between the United States and Mexico in regards to

three concepts:
rocal rights of

interdependence, intermesticity, and the special recip-

bordering nations.

The validity of the concept of inter-

dependence can be ascertained by the close links between the two nations, both in societal and economic terms.
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In addition to trade,

261

economic Interdependence

-nts

is

underlined by the volu.e
of U

S

invest

in Mexico

($6.3 billion by 1980), the
exports of Mexican petroleum and gas to the
United States, and the
purchases of American foodstuffs by Mexico.
I n ter.es ti c
i ty
refers to the fact that,
because of

-portant, mutually shared
problems, the usual
distinction between the
international and domestic
spheres tends to wane.
previous considerations add
a

right to

a

And, finally, these

to the idea that neighboring
nations have

reciprocal special treatment.^

Rondfelt and Serenseres advance
the proposition that these
factors
that tend to m.ake for
"special relationship" between
the United States
and Mexico, could likewise
be applied to the relations
between Canada

and the United States.

This initial conceptualization
of two special

bilateral relationships could very
well be the stepping stone for

a

"trilateral" vision of North America,
i.e. an interdependence between
the United States. Mexico, and
Canada, ^ not too far off from President

Reagan's idea of a North American Common
Market.
If it is true that the United
States and Mexico share many common

problems derived at least partly from their
"special relationship,"
such as unemployment, inflation, and
environmental pollution, it is also
a

fact that their priorities are different.

Calvin Pat Blair has re-

ferred to these differing perspectives in terms of
tween

a

a

confrontation be-

geriatric society, i.e. the United States, and

ety, i.e. Mexico.

a

pediatric soci-

The United States worries mainly about its access to

energy sources and raw materials, and has to deal with an aging
industrial base that renders it vulnerable to exports from foreign
nations

such as Japan, ready to encroach upon the U.S. domestic market.

On the
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other hand. Mexico has
an altogether different
set of problems, such
as a Sharply unequal
distribution of inccne. and
™st try to gain access
to .arrets for its
manufactures, as well as for
capital and technological imports, uphold
the rights of Its migrant
workers, and diminish
Its
dependence on oil exports.
Furthe™cre. says Blair, whereas
the United
States lives in permanent
fear of a radical leftist
Mexico, the latter
1n turn dreads the
possibility of U.S. oolicies
such as stringent protectionist measures or an
all-out campaign to deport
Mexican migrant
workers
James W. Wilkie has summarized
these "conflicting national
interests" between the United States
and Mexico in terms of a series
of
"dilemmas" facing both nations in
their relations with each other.^
Cn
the Mexican side, the structural
dilemmas would be the following:
1-

"Mexico's 'national interest' to
encourage tourism vs
interest' to develop industrialization."

it<;

'

n;.tinn;,i
n^tiona}

2-

"Labor intensive vs. capital economic
activity."

3-

"Need for U.S. investments vs. loans."

4-

trading partners throughout the world, in
order
to achieve
economic independence' and protection against
U S
recessions vs. reliance on its northern neighbor,

"Need for diversified

times of economic crisis."

especially
during
uurmg
m ^

5-

"Need for urban food and export food vs. need
to distribute land."

6-

"Need for an open U.S. border as escape valve for
excess labor vs
need to retain in Mexico the ambitious rural worker."

And. among the U.S. dilemmas:
1-

"U.S. 'national interest' to have a cheap reserve labor
pool vs
its
national interest' to close the frontier to 'excessive'
immigration

from Mexico."
2-

"Need to expand exports to Mexico vs. need to control imports from
Mexico."
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In conclusion. Wilkie
believes that "change within
and cooperation

between Mexico and the United
States means that there are
few 'solutions'
to common problems."^ Or.
in other words, in what
could be an unwilling
allusion to the Impact of the

oH

boo,, in

the relations between the
two

countries:

"Historically, U.S. -Mexican relations
have involved the diplomatic resolution of
common border
problems causing temporary tension
between the two
countries, but with the advent of the
197G's, new
kinds of tensions that reflect
structural changes
in the affairs of both countries
pressage the rise
of issues in the 1980's and
1990's that are not
susceptible to traditional diplomatic
solutions
that have marked U.S. -Mexican relations
in the

past. 7

There are at present varying opinions
about the special U.S.-

Mexican relationship that reflect both
acknowledgement of
situation and uneasiness about it.

a de

facto

On the whole, on the American side

It is possible to appreciate a mixture of
regard for Mexico's needs,

and an awareness of U.S. benefits from the
relation.

Mexican opinion,

on the other hand, tends to be qualified by
apprehension about American

intentions and possible advantages.
U.S. policies towards Mexico have often been labelled by
the latter
as

"inconsistent."

In the view of the U.S.

relations are, rather, "very complicated."^

Department of State these
Richard Nussio, from

Williams College, has pointed at "bureaucratism" as one of the prevailing realities in the bilateral

States.

relations between Mexico and the United

There are, says Nussio, more than 200 U.S. government agencies
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particTpating Tn decisions and
matters pertaining to Mexico.^
Perhaps as a response to
the increasingly complex
relations between
the United States and Mexico,
in April. 1979, the Carter
administration
decided to appoint a Special
Ambassador to Mexico, i.e.
officially an
"Ambassador at large and U.S.
Coordinator for Mexican Affairs."
directly
dependent from the President and
the Department of State.
The new Ambassador. Robert Kruger. was to
assist the President and the
Secretary
of State "in the development
of effective national policies
towards

Mexico and in the coordination and
implementation of such policies."
Likewise. Kruger was to serve as Chairman
of

a

Senior Interagency Group

on U.S. policy towards Mexico and
as U.S. Executive Director for
the

U.S. -Mexico Consultative Mechanisms.

As Coordinator. Kruger was to be

located in the Department of State, while
the Director of the Office of

Mexican Affairs in that same Department would
serve as Deputy Coordinator.

Carter's Presidential Memorandum on the subject of
coordination of
U.S. policy towards Mexico was delivered to his
entire Cabinet, in an

effort to assure the integration of any "overlapping
entities" into

coherent process of policy development and formulation.

a

Indeed, the

Presidential Memorandum seemed to reflect an official awareness of the
special relationship with Mexico, in view of the latter

's

growing impor-

tance as an oil producer and exporter:
"In view of the increasing domestic and international importance of our relations with Mexico,
and of the intensity and complexity of those relations in the years ahead, I have decided to
take steps to improve our ability to address
effectively
all issues which affect U.S.

265

relations with Mexico.... To
ensure that all u s
policies toward Mexico, and
all actions d recii;
U.S. national interests
ard are consistent with
our overall policy toward
Mexico, I ask
-that
each of you accord a high
priority to any and all
matters within your jurisdiction
affecting Sexico
consciously giving good relations
with Mexico I
continuing high priority in your
thinking and
panning; and -that all proposed
actions! which
have an effect on Mexico, be
carefully coordinated so as to be consistent
with overall u S
policy toward Mexico, and based
on the fullest
^'^^
Government

Sf^Mexico^^lr

A Mexican commentator. Joseph
Hodara, had some specific views
with

respect to the designation of a
"Special Ambassador."

This was a re-

sult, according to Hodara, of the
strengths and weaknesses of Mexico's
oil

boom.

The fact that Mexican affairs had been
translated directly

to the White House "reflected
the strategic importance accorded by

Washington to Mexico at present." since such
consulting and decision
mechanisms had been previously established only
in the realm of detente
and Middle East affairs.

"^^

However, the appointment of an additional ambassador,
albeit "at
large," which in fact meant a duplication of some of
the functions of
the regular U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, seemed
to contribute to a

situation of confusion and hesitation.

Mexican government officials

did not know precisely whom to deal with in the various areas of bilateral relations.

By early 1981, the Reagan administration, congruent

with its goal of streamlining policy-making and eliminating excessive

bureaucratization, initiated the dismantlement of this special agency.
However, Reagan emphasized the importance be placed on the relationship

with Mexico by meeting with Lopez Portillo in Ciudad Juarez, in January,
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1981. breaking his previous
promise not to confer with any
foreign
leaders before he assumed
the presidency.
The visit underscored the

strategic and economic position
of Mexico as the cornerstone
of U.S.
foreign policy towards Latin
America. Additionally Reagan
stated that
he personally would handle
relations with Mexico, without
need of any
intermediaries.'^'^

The views of other American officials
and scholars tend to reaffirm
the existence of a "special
relationship" with Mexico.

For example, in

1978 former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico,
Patrick Lucey, caused a stir by

declaring that "there are not two
nations on earth whose present and
future are as closely intertwined as
Mexico and the United States. "^^
James W. Wilkie has qualified the U.S.
relationship with Latin America
as a whole as

"overdrawn and overdone," while affirming that
this is

altogether different in the case of Mexico, where
the United States indeed has

a

special relation with its southern neighbor.

In this

con-

text, says Wilkie, "...it is in the United States'
best interests to

make it easy for Mexico to solve its own problems. "^^
Williams, David

F.

Edward J.

Rondfelt and Caesar D. Serenseres advance the opinion

that, while there are particular obligations that fall on the
United

States, as
a

a

result of its "special relationship" with Mexico, such as

greater understanding and sharing of the problem of migrant workers,

there has to be also

a

degree of Mexican reciprocity, in regards to

supplying petroleum and gas to the United States.

An official analysis

for the U.S. Senate concludes that

"Although some feel that the concept of 'special relationship' is theoretically outmoded in this day of
"global' perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, it
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remains a prominent concept
to be considered in
understanding United States-Mexican
re at^ons
The concept of "special
relationship.' ?n faci
could very well reach new
prominence
and import

dimension of Mexican en-

erg""17

Mexican official reaction, at least
openly, tends to be one of
suspicion towards the concept of a
"special relationship." According
to Rondfelt and Serenseres
the necessary incentives are
not present,

for both countries to embark
upon a new special framework for
bilateral

cooperation, and rather than upholding
special bilateral guidelines,

Mexico would seem to prefer to deal with
the United States on the basis
of legally accepted international
principles

work of discussions.^^

and a multilateral frame-

This view would seem to reflect, not an
open

hostility to the idea of a special relationship,
but

with it.

a

disenchantment

Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations. Jorge
Castaneda.

before his appointment and acting then as Ambassador
at Large, declared
in late 1978 that, as a whole. Mexico did not
believe any longer that

"there exists or can exist a special relationship with
the United

States."

Castaneda's comment was inscribed within a general framework

of Mexican official opinion, that as long as the United States
proceeds
to act unilaterally in areas such as trade and migration, a policy of

"special relationship" is merely rhetoric.

The concept of a "special relationship" is based to

a

significant

degree on the existence of an economic interdependence between the two
countries.

Hodara sees two possible results of a growing interdepen-

dence between the United States and Mexico, in the context of the
latter's oil boom.

A first scenario would have petroleum enhance the
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mutual benefits accruing
fro. interdependence, thus
contributing to
solve accidental differences
of opinion in regards to
matters such as
trade and fishing rights;
beneath a facade of diplomatic
rhetoric designed for public consumption,
both nations would encourage
more ex-

tensive commercial ties.
by an asymmetrical

A second scenario, however,
would be qualified

interdependence, which would lead to an
irreversible

Mexican subordination.^^
Some Mexican analysts tend to visualize
the second scenario.

Carlos Rico

F.

plainly considers "interdependence" as

a

mechanism that

reinforces U.S. hegemony and responds to
the logic of its foreign policy
objectives.

A key objective here would be to
transform Mexico into a

trustworthy and influential partner of the United
States in North-South

negotiations.

21

Heberto Castillo contemplates

a

conspiracy by the

Mexican government, which would be placing pro-United
States and business officials in central administration posts and
along the Mexican

states bordering on the United States

in order to "create a border

transition zone towards the eventual installation of an
Associate
State.

"^^

Olga Pellicer believes that the idea of

a

"special

relationship,"

while not offering concrete solutions to bilateral problems, has served
to legitimize close links between the two nations.

By late 1978.

Pellicer could discern an effort by American diplomats to reach an

understanding with Mexico, under the slogan of "interdependence." which
would in reality strive to further U.S. priorities such as
supply of Mexican petroleum and gas.

a

steady

According to Pellicer, various

political groups in the United States would be pressuring in favor of
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an "extraspecial relation"
with Mexico, geared to
propitiate the rapid

exploitation of petroleum
and its commercialization
towards the United
States.
In this context, adds
Richard Fagen,
'The importance of Mexican
petroleum at present
Percentaoe 0 IribSJion'ln^^'
exports, but rather a very
complex ^
function ''^l^
related to Mexico's role as
an
"'P^'^ expansion which, at the same
time, shares very close
geographic, oolitical
anH

nw

'^r^^^^^

biggLt^et;ofet^Jo^^Jume^?^

By June. 1980, the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Jorge

Castaneda. was emphasizing that
Mexico does not wish

a

special treatrr,ent

from the United States but. rather,
"...a relation based on mutual benefit. taking into^account the
relative degree of economic development
of
"^^
both

countries.

Perhaps it would be pertinent, in order
to clarify Castaneda's

statement to inscribe it within
Victor S. D'Souza.
national relations:
In the first type,

a

conceptual framework developed by

D'Souza distinguishes between three types of
inter-

domination, interdependence, and common interest.
the principal means to carry out policies on
the

part of the more powerful nation would be to
threaten the weaker country.

In regards to interdependent relationships,

would offer help to solve

a

the powerful

nation

particular problem of the weak country, in-

asmuch as it affects the interests of the former.

And, in relations

based on common interests, the objective would be to pay attention
to
the basic problems of the weak country, among which the particular prob-

lems affecting the powerful nation would be only aspects of the overall

framework.

In this last type of relationship the developed nation
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would leave aside Its
role as

a

'.powerful nation." and
behave Instead

as a "worried partner. "^^

D'Souza's classification
would seem to cover quite
appropriately
the attitudinal spectrum
in U.S.-Kexican relations.
While the Mexican
position tends to react against
domination and suspect
interdependence,
it does seem to
coincide strikingly with the
basis of a "cordon interest" relationship.

Linkages.

The concept of a "special
relationship" between the United

States and Mexico is intimately
tied to the global nature of
their nature of their relations.
Even though petroleum permeates
the entirety
of the complex amalgam of
U.S.-Mexican relations, it is but one of
many
issues, such as migrant workers,
trade, and environmental degradation.
In the past,

the Mexican government has preferred
to deal with all

problems in terms of

a

these

linkage, viewing them as a whole, while
the

United States would rather treat them
individually.

Petroleum may be

changing the U.S. perception towards the
concept of "linkage."
example, in March. 1979.

a

For

Joint Commission in Congress asked the Fed-

eral Government to take into account,
together with the issue of imports

of Mexican petroleum and gas, the problems of
bilateral commerce and

migration, "in the context of
between the two nations."

a

spirit of comprehension and cooperation

Calvin Blair has stressed that the various

topics in the agenda of U.S.-Mexican relations must be, by necessity,

considered as

a

package, which would tie the key themes and allow both

countries to obtain advantages in economic agreements.

Mexico will in-

sist, says Blair, on tying petroleum matters, so important to the
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United States, to those which are
important to Mexico, such as
Mexican
manufactured exports, access to
American technology, and the
treatment
Of Mexican migrant workers.
The present official Mexican
position towards linkage remains
vague
in regards to the theme of
migrant workers. On the eve of
President

Carter's visit to Mexico, in February,
1979, within three days of each

declaration. President Lopez Portillo
alternatively put forth conflicting statements on the issue.
all

First, the Mexican President asserted
that

the problems that divide the United
States and Mexico, such as pe-

troleum and gas price levels, illegal migrants,
and commerce, must be

analyzed jointly.

Two days later, Lopez Portillo emphatically
de-

clared that he would oppose any attempt at blackmail,
in tying the
issues of migrant workers and petroleum negotiations.^^

But the problem

of Mexican migrant workers is, indeed, an emotionally
charged issue for

Mexican public opinion, commonly fused with

a

good dose of rhetoric.

In regards to other, more clearly cut issues such as
trade,

position becomes less diffuse.

the Mexican

For example, reaffirming a crucial

"linkage" between trade and oil sales the Mexican Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, Castaneda, declared in June, 1980:
"...would it not be useful for those who influence
on the definition of policies in the United States
to begin to consider the relation that exists between Mexico's economic development, sales of crude
oil and gas to the United States, and the growing
need we have of access to that nation's market on
a less restrictive basis, so as to export the production from that industrial infrastructure that we
are creating. "32

At the same time, according to Mexico's view, the situation of
migrant workers is tied to the issue of trade.

From this perspective.
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Mexico maintains that lesser
trade restrictions on
the part of the
United States would contribute
to Mexican development
and employment
creation, and would slow
down Illegal migration to
the United States.
Thus, from the Mexican
perspective, trade would seem
to be the cornerstone of the global nature of
U.S.-Mexican relations.

As Lopez

PortiUo

declared early in his administration:
"...We are extremely concerned
that Mexican exoortc;
are confronted by a large
number of resi"ct?S s
applied by our northern neighbor.
We think the trarip
prob em should be viewed in'its
entirety, in terms
Of Us impact not on individual
interests, but on the
U.S. -Mexican relationship as
a whole. "33

Perhaps the most important recent
single trade issue for Mexico,
during 1980, was the domestic
debate over m.embership in the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

President idpez Portillo had

previously defined Mexico's potential
entrance to GATT as basically

a

"substantial modality of commerce with the
United States, since 7C% of

our foreign commerce

is

with that nation. "^^

In

other words, the lib-

eralization of trade barriers would take effect mainly
vis
United States.

a

vis the

When, in March 1980, Mexico finally decided not
to join

GATT for the present time, the official reaction from
the United States
was one of disenchantment, not to say anger.

Robert Kruger, Special

Coordinator for Mexican Affairs, described U.S.-Mexican commercial
relations as in

a

state of uncertainty.

Kruger emphasized that trade be-

tween the two nations, which in 1979 reached the record level of 18.7

billion dollars, an increase of 46% in

but at a slower pace.

a

year, would continue to expand,

The United States, said Kruger, was anxiously

looking forward to Mexican proposals regarding bilateral commercial
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relations, but negotiations
to that end would be
prolonged.^S
The reasons behind
Mexico's refusal to enter
GATT were closely
tied to its petroleu.
exports. On the one hand,
given the recent decline in Mexico's non-oil
exports, .e.bership in GATT
.ight have hurt
further Mexico's protected
domestic industry.
Petroleum also gave

Mexican political leadership
the necessary self-confidence
to try to
pursue trade advantages without
affiliating to GAH. Furthermore,
the
decision was also meant to be for
domestic consumption, quieting
a considerable nationalistic uproar.^^
But there was another
important consideration. Mainly because of the
availability of oil. Mexico would
not
be accorded guarantees
within GATT pertaining to less
developed countries.

In other words,

"it is not feasible to obtain a
preferential and

differentiated treatment (for Mexico)
within GATT."^''

Thus, the likeli-

hood of a disruption of the Mexican
economy, at least in terms of in-

creased dependence on the United States,
seemed to loom large in the
minds of Mexico's political decision
makers.
In regards

to trade. President Ldpez Portillo has
emphasized that

Mexico is pursuing "global agreements of
bilateral cooperation." i.e.
bilateral arrangements that encompass various
issues.

It seems likely

that for the near future Mexico will refrain from
joining multilateral
trade accords such as GATT, concentrating instead on
bilateral trade

packages.

However, although Mexico refused to enter GATT. in 1980 it

lowered tariffs and imports permits in all activities in which
domestic

supply was deemed to be insufficient."^^
The gasduct project in Mexico clearly illustrates the volatility
of U.S. -Mexican relations, in the framework of the petroleum boom.

As
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e ex

.cease. Us

activities 1n .exlco.
southeast, t.e.e «e.e
olu.es Of avalUMe
natu.a, ,as t.at could
not .e used do.estlcaU,

By.1d-m7.

Pe.ex s1,ned a letter
Of Intent to se,,
the , as to six
^ s
private distributor
cc.panles. at a price of
S2.60 per thousand cu
ft
(«F). The .eans to
transport the gas to the
United States was to
be
a gasduct. fro.
Cactus. Chiapas, to Reynosa.
Texas, which began
to be
bunt on October 7. 1977.
There were conpelling
economic arguments 1„
^avor Of the pipeline.
In short, the cost for
the project was estimated
to be 1.5 billion
dollars, and the construction
ti.e 24 .onths; at the
outset, the Pipeline would
represent earnings in foreign
exchange at the
rate of 3.3 million dollars
a uoji.
day.
However as th<.
nowever.
the a
duct< neared completion. the U.S. government,
acting on the specific
reco^endations of

'

Secretary of Energy James
Schlesinger, refused to allow
the companies
to buy the gas at the price
they had previously agreed
with Mexico.

The

argument of the Department of Energy
centered on the fact that the
United States could not pay Mexico

44 cents more than Canada for
an MCF.

Also, there were fears that
Congress would not approve the $2.60
price
tag. while American gas producers
were only paid up to

a

ceiling of

$1.75, according to Carter's energy bill.^^

Reaction to both sides of the border
was swift, and seemed to coincide in deploring the failure of the
deal, with its subsequent detrimental repercussions on U.S. -Mexican
relations.

In the United States.

The Wall Street Journal, among other major
newspapers, harshly criti-

cized the lack of a more enlightened approach
to the problem on the
part of U.S. government authorities.^^

Mexican reaction was twofold.

On the one hand, the Mexican government proceeded
to redirect the
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Pipeline to distribute and
use the gas domestically.

On the other

Mexican officials took advantage
of every opportunity
to denounce the
lack of frankness and
finesse manifest in U.S.
actions concerning the
deal.
The gas fiasco was the main
factor that darkened the
talks between L^pez Portillo and Carter
in Mexico

Carter's visit, at

a

in February,

1979.

During

luncheon toast, Lopez Portillo
lectured the Ameri-

can President on what he saw
as a U.S. practice of
treating Mexico with
a "mixture of interest,
disdain, and fear," and added:

"Among permanent, not casual
neighbors, surprise
moves and sudden deceit or abuse
are poisonous
rruits that sooner or later have
a reverse effect
No injustice can prevail without
affronting decency and dignity. "42
In June.

1980, the Mexican President still remembered
vividly the

gasduct fiasco.

At that time Lo^pez Portillo expressed
his opinion that

"the ties between Mexico and the United
States have deteriorated lately,

with respect to what they were in 1977."

And. again, he recalled how

his good faith had been betrayed by the
U.S. government when it can-

celled abruptly the deal between Pemex and the
American gas companies.

After protracted, off-and-on negotiations, which in
all amounted
to seven rounds of talks, on September 21. 1979.
the two governments

issued

a

Joint Announcement to the effect that an understanding had

finally been reached.

The agreement called for the sale of 300 million

cubic feet per day of natural gas by Pemex to U.S. purchasers, starting
as of January. 1980. at an initial

price of $3,625 million btu, subject

to reconsideration if the price for natural gas from comparable sources

were to exceed that amount prior to the starting date.^^

By Novem-

ber 21, 1979, the Department of Energy received an application to import
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Mex,can natural ,as
,y a

-X

consoni™

called Bcder Gas. Inc..
.ade up of

U.S. energy co.pan1es.«
and gave

U

final clearance on
December 29
1979. after an order Issued
by the Department's
Economic Regulatory
Administration (ERA), which
was responsible for
approving Imports and
exports Of natural gas.«
DOE officials stated
that "these approvals
(were) a further step 1n
establishing closer relations
between the U S
and Mexico."
a doubtful proposition
considering the bitterness
of the

preceding exchanges.
A case with serious
environmental consequences has
also affected

U.S..Mexican relations.

From June. 1979. to March
24. 1980. when it

was finally capped,the Mexican
oil well

Ixtoc

I

blew out and spilled

millions of barrels of oil into
the waters of Campeche Bay
in the Gulf
of Mexico.
Eventually, ocean currents carried
the oil to the Texas
coast, affecting close to 200
miles of beaches.

This environmental di-

saster affected the relations
between the two countries, and resulted
in

damages to sea life, beaches, tourism,
and property in still unknown

proportions.
The Ixtoc

I

disaster gave rise to

a

series of public accusations

and discussions between the two
governments in regards to delineating

responsibilities.

By February. 1981. the U.S. government
was trying

to determine the effect on its relations
with Mexico of a possible law-

suit against Pemex for the damages caused in 1979
as
Ixtoc

I

oil

spills.

a

result of the

Lawsuits were filed by the U.S. Federal government,

the government of Texas, and private concerns against
Pemex and firm

Permargo.
ter

a

subcontractor in charge of drilling the well when the disas-

took place.

However, a direct suit against Pemex would involve
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the Mexican government
itself, with the
possibility that general
relations between the two
countries would suffer.
In Mexico the Ixtoc

I

case aroused nationalistic
sensibilities

Following his September
28-29. 1979, trip to
Washington, President Lopez
Portillo declared that
Mexico rejected liability
damages, and compared
the issue to that of
the salinity of the Mexicali
Valley in northwestern
Mexico, Where the United
States has never paid for
damages to Mexican
agriculture from the high salt-content
of the waters of the
Colorado
River.
Although Ixtoc I was a serious
foreign policy issue for both
countries, the fact that other
issues of greater importance
might suffer, i.e. the question of
linkage, has contributed to keep
the problem
from going beyond certain limits
of diplomatic propriety.
From the preceding discussion,
it would appear that

a m.utually

binding package which takes into
account the overall set of issues between the two countries is perhaps
rather unfeasible. Both governments

would ultimately be opposed to such
an agreement, albeit from
ent rationale.

a

differ-

The United States remains committed to
global policies

and multilateral accords, and the American
political system itself

is

not conducive to "package" deals, due to
the multiplicity of government

agencies and lobbying interests operating on
the context of U.S.-Mexican relations. 51

From the Mexican perspective, nationalism and
the

ever-present theme of increased dependence on the United States
constitute a formidable opposition to

a

permanent "package" arrangement.

However, the interrelationship between numerous issues also
underlines
the fallacy of trying to approach them on an individual basis.

In

this respect, Alfred Stepan has advanced the need for a "more integrated
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bargaining framework:"
"...a bargaining framework
that recognizes thp
comp ete range of issues
at stake! anS one
which the United States,
precisei; in order ?o
advance its overall interests,
would aggressively seek out new form.ulas
for responding to
Mexico's special needs, especially
in the areas
of migration and trade. "52

Oorth^rican

!

Common Market

For some

tim.e

now. various public and

private sources in the United
States have seemed to advocate,
as

a

logi

cal

extension of that nation's "special
relationship" with Mexico and
Canada, a North American Common
Market.
For example. Redvers Opie
has

developed this point, in terms of

a

"geographical division of labor:"

"Canada, the United States, and
Mexico are in manv
respects complementary rather than
competing economies; and perhaps especially Mexico
and the United
btates are complementary. These two
countries have
a mutuality of interest in
protecting harmonious
development together. "53

Clark Reynolds, in

a

somewhat deterministic assessment of
the situ-

ation, advances the idea that there is

a

"silent economic integration"

between the United States. Mexico, and
Canada.

This process could be

furthered, says Reynolds, by formalizing closer
economic links through
mutual safeguards in regards to labor migration,
and the establishment

of standing commissions to deal with the ample
spectrum of problems

likely to arise between neighbors.

Reynolds suggests, in order to

promote the idea of a common economic region, that the
United States
should act as a partner, rather than as an overwhelming
leader:
"I feel that the United States would be well
advised
to reconsider the possibility of regarding the entire
North American Continent as an economic region in
which it is one important participant and in which
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it can play an increasingly
relative rolp
than absolute or dominant
role. '55

Specifically, in regards to
energy, Kenneth
study called "A Proposal for

a

E.

r;,+-ho.
^

Hill, in a 1979

Common Market Between Canada,
Mexico and

the United States." talks
in terms of a crucial
need for the United
States to foster, within a maximum
time lapse of 10 years, a
trinational

alliance between the three
countries with the objective
of solving the
U.S. energy problem, namely
to help supply the U.S.
energy demand of
19 million b/d of oil and 20 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas annu-

ally.

The United States imports 45% of
its petroleum and 5% of its

natural gas needs.

Among the mutual benefits of such
an alliance, says

Hill, there would be U.S.
guarantees to buy Mexican and Canadian
fuels

and stabilize prices, and to
purchase agricultural and manufactured

products from Mexico, free of trading
restrictions, as well as

a

solu-

tion to the problem of Mexican migrant
workers, through an elimination

of some of the present migratory barriers.

The Mexican and Canadian

currencies would continue to be tied to the
fluctuations of the dollar.

Furthermore, the United States would guarantee the
military security
of this economic corr^nity which would extend its
operations into the

Caribbean.

There would seem to be sound economic incentives for such
market.

a

common

For example, between them, the United States. Canada, and

Mexico drilled nine- tenths of all the wells in the non-communist world
during 1979, in

a

continuing unabashed drilling boom that has charac-

terized the petroleum industries of North America since 1973.^^

mid-1980,

a U.S.

business periodical was reporting that

a

By

broad trade
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but pacts for specific
Industrial sectors .Ig.t
be possible.
date for agreement
would be MeLrocnemicals,
petrochemiraU ;,nH
and the

t-p
profound. "

One oandl-

effects would be

By August. 1980. In a
series of meetings of the
policy co^Utees
of the U.S. Senate and
the Working Group on
North American Cc^erce
of
the National Association
of U.S. governors, the
need was stated for reciprocity on the part of
Mexico and Canada, in regards
to allowing the
access of U.S. products to
their domestic markets.
The discussions.
Which included the participation
of John Plunkett. President
of the"

American Chamber of Comerce
in Mexico, had as their
main objective the
delineation of strategies relative
to the establishment of a
North
American Common Market.
President Reagan has expressed his
support for the notion of
North American accord.

a

However. Mexico and Canada have
both turned down

the idea as a scheme that would
be mostly favorable to the United

States. ^0

By April. 1979, JesJs Puente
Leyva, President of the Energy

Commission of the Mexican Congress, went
public in denouncing the U.S.
goal of interdependence, or North
American Common Market, as contrary
to Mexican interests.

In mid-1980, during a visit to Canada,
Lopez

Portillo tried to put an end to speculations in
Washington regarding

a

North American accord, by declaring that Mexican
energy sources would
not be used to maintain the high standards of
living of other nations.

From the Mexican perspective, progress on this issue
seems to be

precluded by the disparity in levels of development and
income between
the United States and Mexico, which would foreordain, apparently.
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American predominance and
Increased dependency for
Mexico. Again,
nationalism underscores the
Mexican position. For example,

in October.

1978. as a reply to the Interest
manifested by Exxon and
Texaco to participate in the direct exploitation
of Mexican hydrocarbon
resources.
Pemex stated categorically
that Mexico would not allow
any such intervention by American oil companies.

Geopolitica l and Stratpg ir

j^n^n^.t ions

Mexico and the United States share
the same geopolitical space,
i.e.

the Caribbean and Central
American Basin.

There are common, as

well as contradicting, elements,
values, and goals, in the Mexican
and

American approaches towards this vast
area.

The Mexican position has

been reinforced by its new status as
an oil-rich nation.

Just as this

latter fact has impelled the U.S. government
to seek closer relations

with its southern neighbor, Mexico has
perceived, in its role as an oil-

producing and exporting country,

a

propelling factor for imprinting

new dynamism into its foreign policy.

This situation is shaping

a

a

sce-

nario fertile for joint initiatives, but also fraught with
potential

conflict between the two governments, in regards

to a series of security

and strategic points of contention.

Security

a nd

strategic questions

.

In 1976,

at the petition of then

Undersecretary of Defense of the United States, Robert

F.

Ellsworth,

the Pentagon prepared a report on "Energy Geopolitics, 1976-2000,"

which could be considered to be one of the antecedents for present U.S.
policies regarding the establishment of

a

close energy relation with
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Mexico. Venezuela, and
Canada.

According to the document,
the basis for

this relation were to
be found In the fact
that the United States
1s the
natural .arket for petroleum
exports fro. those countries,
and the
source of financial and
technological assistance. The
authors of the
study. Melvin Conant and Fern
R. Gold, believed that
Canada would accede
to such an association
rather willingly. However.
Mexico and Venezuela
posed a problem, derived from
their nationalistic sensitivities.
Thus,
the United States should
act with caution in its
approaches to those
governments, in order to avoid
any appearances of exploitation.^"

Specifically in regards to Mexico.
Conant and Gold concluded that
politically it would be the most
difficult case.
In order to appease
Mexican opposition, a "special
treatment" should be developed,
related
not only to energy matters,
but also to other bilateral matters
such as
trade and Investments.

According to the authors, access to
petroleum

resources would be determined by an
interrelation between geographic
factors and governmental policies, and
by

a

complex assortment of po-

litical and economic variants.
By mid- 1981. the Reagan administration
seemed to be pursuing,

still, the objective of an association with
Mexico. Venezuela, and
Canada.

Following an American initiative, the foreign
ministers of the

four nations met in Nassau, at the Bahamas, to
study the possibility of

launching a joint program of economic assistance for
the countries of
the Caribbean and Central America.

Commenting on the Nassau reunion.

President Lrfpez Portillo praised the efforts to achieve cooperation
in
fostering economic development in the region, as long as the right
of
the Central American and Caribbean countries is respected,
"to decide
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for themselves the

.o^s of ,ove.„.e„t

an.

socUl o.,a„1zat,o„

they aspire.
In the present
world energy context,

to

wMcH

the consolidation
of a closer

relationship between Mexico
and the United States
fro. the perspective
Of the latter, is
seen in ter.s of national
security,
other words
^ex.co represents a secure
source of energy for
the United States
According to Richard B.
Manege, two matters of
consideration threaten
the national security
of the United States:
the disparity in political
and economic perspectives
vis a vis a small group
of countries, mainly

m

on;

and the fact that this
problem of reliance on distant
sources is
compounded by growing Soviet
naval strength.
Thus,
'^"^

and natural gas
^PS""? °^
finnTi^
^'"P^^^^
would
Dermit ^\'n
permit
a political, economic,
and geographical
diversification that would, in part,
alleviate
these threats and enhance the
energy security
of the United States. "68
^'^"'^^

Besides these security objectives,
i.e. prevention of political
threats and geographic
diversification, Mancke has underlined
militarysecurity benefits in case of
conventional, limited, and undeclared
naval

wars, in which Mexican oil could
becom.e

United States.

a

life-saving link for the

Furthermore. Mexico would be more secure
in regards to

terrorist activities, because of shorter
transportation routes and the

possibility of bilateral arrangements for the
protection of Mexican
oil

fields.

In a late

1981

interview, asked about accessibility to

Mexico's petroleum for the United States, in
case of an international

emergency such as

a

war in the Middle East, President Lopez Portillo
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declared that it was
not a matter of
"conflict
^onriict of int
.
interests
but of
convergence of purooses
Uo n„= ,
'

a

P™'<^"'^ty and interrelation

Hat assured,, there
would .e an understanding.....

still, the Mexican
resident did not foresee
such extreme cases for
which there are no
contingencies in Mexico's
petroleum plans.

Official awareness in
the United States
about the security
implications of Mexican
petroleum has been manifest
in the last few
years
Even in early 1979.
at a time of low-ebb
in U.S.-Mexican
relations,
still in the midst of
the controversy over
the gas deal, President
Carter, while dismissing
then the urgency for the
United States of Mexican hydrocarbons for
i«diate co«rc1al use, recognized
their strategic value on a long-term
basis, especially in case
of war.^l By

September, 1980, the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury
recommended to "pay
careful attention" to
bilateral relations with Mexico
and Canada as a
means to assure a future
supply of oil and gas. The
report concluded
that "Mexico will probably
be the primary source of
petroleum and gas
imports by the U.S. during
the next decade."" In October
of that same
year, the American Ambassador
to Mexico, Julian Nava, openly
described
Mexico as a "key part of the U.S.
security strategy. "^^
The Rand Corporation, in
leum and U.S. policy:

a

late 1980 study called "Mexican
Petro-

Implications for the 1980. s." recommended
to the

U.S. government to increase U.S.
-Mexican interdependence, and not only
in regards

to energy questions.

The authors, David Rondfelt, Richard

Nehring, and Arturo Ga'ndara, stated
three possible solutions, from the
the U.S. perspective, to improve relations
with Mexico:
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Sarke?;!''"

'''''' ''''''''''

IfL'ItJi!'^^"'

°'

"

^'^-^ continued exports

'"^^^^

to U.S.

Which would include

^^Xl^::^ ^^^^^r-^r:^^
American countries with refining
capacUy!?4

-^erce
'"^

The Rand Corporation has
presented two alternative
policy concepts
for future relations
between the United States and
Mexico. The first
places emphasis on "internationalism,"
that is, Mexico would be
treated
much like any other developing
country emerging as a '•middle-power."
The second underlines the
concept of "con^unity." that is,
Mexico would
be viewed as a special partner
in the long-range development
of North
America. According to Rand, the
first approach assumes that
Mexico's

development would make it more independent
than interdependent vis

a

vis

the United States, and would
result in restrictions to the process
of

integration of both economies and
societies.

This approach would be

congruent with Mexico's desires to reaffirm
its sovereignty and diversify its foreign relations, and to
conduct its dealings with the U.S.
on the basis of international principles

.'^^

However, the "internationalist" approach would
imply, according to
Rand, a denial of Mexico's "special relationship"
with the United

States.

Furthermore, the more independent Mexican development is,
the

greater its economic competition with the United States, with
the subsequent added bilateral tensions.

Thus, giving support to the tenden-

cies in official U.S. circles which seek to promote a "special relation-

ship," Rand suggests the second alternative, i.e. fostering U.S. policies based on the concepts of community, partnership, and interdepen-

86

dence.

According to Rand. 1f Mexico
were to futHely persist
In Ignoring this possibility,
in the end the result
of such an attitude
would
lead to a reinforcement
of U.S. policies

to render It as an
increasingly

weaker and dependent client.^^
A work group created by
President-elect Reagan in
December. 1980,
to examine the present
conditions of supply of strategic
minerals to the
United States, warned of the
precarious and vulnerable state
of national
security, and recommended
economic integration strategies
and political
alliances with exporting countries
that are geographically
closest to
the United States, i.e. Mexico,
Canada, and other Caribbean and
Central

American countries.
a

Another recommendation suggested
the creation of

National Strategic Reserve of
thirteen basic minerals, eleven of

which are already supplied by Mexico
to the United States.
In this context, Mexico has been
selling the Pentagon crude oil

the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve
since 1978.''^

for

By August, 1981.

the U.S. Department of Energy had reached an
agreement with Pemex to

purchase 106 million barrels of oil over the next five
years for the

strategic reserve.

The agreement included 200,000 b/d of oil at $31.80

per barrel from September 1, 1981, until the end of
the year.

After-

wards, deliveries will be reduced to 50,000 b/d of oil, and
the price
renegotiated.

79

It should be underlined here that most of the Middle

Eastern producers have refused to sell oil for the strategic reserve.
On the other hand, the deal guarantees Mexico secure sales at a time

when it is still recovering from the lost reserves that resulted from
the June, 1981, drops in sales.

There is another angle of the U.S. problem of national security,

287

intimately tied to .exico^s
internal processes.
Richard R. Fagen. the

"'ti.e

This is, according
to

bo.b" of Mexican
development, with profound

implications for U.S. security.

In other words, a
distorted process of

development in Mexico, i.e.
economic growth without any
improvements in
the distribution of
income, could eventually
have grave domestic repercussions in Mexico and
destabilize the

countrys political system,
with

the subsequent multifaceted
impact on the United States.
In a scenario of
uncontrolled social

and political disturbances,

the U.S.-Mexican border
would be but a symbiotic membrane
that would

bring unrest to both sides.

The Rand Corporation is aware
of this di-

mension of the problem, suggesting
that Mexico should perhaps be a
conservative petroleum country. However,
in Rand's scheme of late
1980,
there was

a

calculated strategic perspective:

even though it might re-

strict its total oil output for reasons
of domestic stability, Mexico
would, nonetheless, widen its extraction,
transportation, and exports
capacity.

This excess production capacity could
be incorporated rap-

idly during a sudden international
energy crisis.

Another late 1980 report titled Petroleum
Geopolitics

,

prepared

for the Energy and Natural Resources Committee of
the U.S. Senate,

under the direction of James Z. Pugash, also recommended
that the United
States should encourage Mexico to create such an excess
production ca-

pacity, for strategic reasons.

The report underlined the need for

a

"mutually beneficial association that includes Mexican energy develop82
ment."
These potential arrangements would seem to run counter to the

exploitation goals of Mexico's Energy Program.
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^^mmcs.

There are a nu*er of
questions that could be
Inscribed
within the framework of
the Mexican o1, boon,,
which are at the
heart of
a process of
geopolitical reacco^odatlon
under way at present
between
the United States and
Mexico.
Historically,

a

key point of the U.S.
strategy for its in^ediate

sphere of influence in the
Caribbean has been

a

transisth.ian .eans of
transportation and communication
between the Pacific and
the Atlantic
oceans.
Even though the strategic
value of the Panama Canal
has

diminished somewhat in the nuclear
age, it remains a crucial
link in military
and political terms.
For some time in the XIX
century, the isthmus of

Tehuantepec in Mexico was considered
by the United States as
an alternate and cheap means of
communication. Due to the prospect
of saturation in naval

traffic of the Panama Canal, by
February 1980 the Mexican

government was reported to have initiated
work for the project AlfaOmega, with the objective of
linking overland the ports of
Coatzacoalcos
in the Gulf of Mexico, and Salina
Cruz in the Pacific.
oil

Parallel to the

ducts that cross the isthmus, various
types of cargo, including

American goods, are to be transported in
"containers," i.e. large metal
and wooden boxes, through 300
kilom,eters of Mexican territory.

The cost

of the investment is estimated to be
around one billion pesos.

These

works constitute

a

new factor in the closely connected U.S. and
Mexican

commercial interests, and additionally, a new
potential point of geopolitical contention.

Another matter pending resolution between the two nations pertains
to the jurisdictional

Pacific.

boundary limits in the Gulf of Mexico and in the

On May 4, 1978, the governments of the United States and
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Mexico Signed

draft treaty which,
according to U.S. geologists,
resuited "in (the) giving
away (of) some 25,000
square .iles of potential
albeit deep-water, petroleum
areas in the Gulf of Mexico."
It appears
that the west-central part
of the Gulf of Mexico
is a geological
region
promising in terms of petroleum
deposits, lying between the
oil fields
of the Texas-Lousiana
coast, and those of the
Campeche-Reforma region
in Mexico.S^
By September. 1980. faced
with a petition from the U.S.
a

Petroleum Geologists Association,
the U.S. State Department
had postponed the ratification of the treaty.
However, according to a spokesman of the State Department, new
"negotiations could fail, since it is
very difficult to make the
Mexicans change their way of thinking. "^^

Early in 1981, a study by the U.S.
geological survey indicated
that the deeper areas of the Gulf of
Mexico whose jurisdiction has not

been established yet could contain more
than

9

billion barrels of oil

and more than 18 billion cubic feet of
natural gas.

It is expected

that new technology will be developed so
that the oil industry may be
able to operate at depths in excess of
10,000 feet, where more than
75% of the potential wealth would be located.

Geologist John Hunt,

from the Woods Hale Oceanographic Institution, has emphasized
that the

Gulf of Mexico as

a

whole could be one of the three major areas in the

world in terms of oil potential

(the other two would be Alaska and the

USSR), once exploration and drilling techniques develop further.

These facts could well explain the delay in the ratification of the
treaty on Maritime Boundaries with Mexico.

In any case, by April,

1981, Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign Relations was still officially

awaiting the ratification by the U.S. government.
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But. by far. the .ain
geopolitical issue that
threatens to perturb

dangerously U.S.-Mexican
relations
and the Caribbean.
own
ical

the situation in Central
America

Mexico regards the area as

co«rcial expansion
influence.

is

a natural

region for its

and. albeit not officially
acknowledged, polit-

Furthermore. Mexico sympathizes
with "liberation move-

ments" such as the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua, and the
present insurrection in El Salvador.
Undoubtedly, petroleum wealth
has given Mexican
foreign policy an added ingredient
of self-assurance and dynamism.
In
this respect, from Mexico's
position, petroleum serves somewhat
as an

equalizer in its dealings with the
United States.
Mexico does not share the United
States' apprehension with respect
to communism.

This could be partly related to the
fact that the Mexican

government traces itself back to

a

revolution.

It is pertinent to re-

member that Mexico never broke relations
with Cuba, and helped Allende's
regime in Chile until its overthrow in
1973.
in Nicaragua are viewed with admiration.

Mexico is striving to be

a

Likewise, the Sandinistas

Though officially denied.

source of leadership in the Caribbean Basin,

and to play a larger role.

Conversely, it views with suspicion American

political, and military, overtures in the Caribbean and
Central America.
Needless to say, present U.S. perceptions of the situation
in
Central America and in the Caribbean, as well as its actual
policies,
tend to clash with Mexico's.

According to

a

December, 1979, report by

Radio Liberty Research. Mexico is the Soviet Union's ultimate target in
Central America, and present disturbances in the area could determine
a

scenario quite dangerous for U.S. national interests and national

securi ty:
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th^'c^rihi^:^''''"

nibbling in Central America
and

of constraining the flow of
Mexican o?
to't e U S
at a time when anti-American
forces already exercise a potential stranglehold
on the oil-rich
Persian Gulf. "89
Lewis A. Tambs sees as

a

backdrop of the situation

political game plan" by the Soviet
Union.

a

"grand geo-

According to this view, the

USSR would be applying the classical
principles of geopolitics, i.e.

encircle, isolate, and overrun, to the
Caribbean area, in order to interrupt American access to strategic
minerals and petroleum supplies.
In this context,

attack."

90

"even the oil fields of Mexico are under
long range

On the other hand. Moscow dismisses the
"Soviet threat" to

the Caribbean as a propaganda veil
its attempt to control

the United States uses to disguise

the world's hydrocarbon reserves.

In any case, the Reagan administration
would seem to agree with

the need for greater U.S. efforts to counter
radical

region.

influences in the

With Reagan's election in November,
1980, some political

observers foresaw

a

definite shift in the balance of forces in Central

America, towards the conservative side, as the United States
intensified
its involvement in that convulsed region.

By late January, 1981,

official spokesmen for the State Department were talking about the

Caribbean as the "third border" of the United States.
It was highly significant that one of the first foreign visitors

to Reagan's White House was Edward Seaga, Prime Minister from Jamaica,

who defeated leftist Michael Manley in that island's 1980 elections.
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and has been singled
cut by the Reagan
administration as a source
of
hope for the beleaguered
region.
In regards to Nicaragua,
by late
November. 1981. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig
pointed out that "the
horns are growing rather
short" to prevent the
Sandinista government
from turning their country
into "a totalitarian
state like Cuba." Hai
g
accused the Sandinistas of staging
a huge military
buildup through
Cuban assistance, and supporting
the insurgents in El Salvador.
White
House counselor Edwin Meese, as
well as Haig. had not ruled
out by late
any
1981
particular action, such as a naval
blockade, that might be

taken against Nicaragua.'^
A specific point of contention is
Cuba, visited by Lopez Portillo
in 1980. and with which the
Mexican government has increasingly
identi-

fied itself.
in the U.S.

Since January. 1981, during his confirmation
audiences
Senate, confronted by

a

question related to Mexico's pos-

sible defense of Cuba if that island were
attacked by the United States,

Secretary of State Haig opted for avoiding any
confrontation, and declared his intention not to enter into
The issue remains

a

a

dispute with Lopez Portillo.

stum.bling block in U.S. -Mexican relations, as the

Reagan administration sees Cuba as the main focus of
terrorist activities
in the Caribbean area,

and has threatened to resort to even military

action to stop Cuba's meddling.
Geopolitical contention between the United States and Mexico could
be fueled, additionally, by the apparent existence of substantial hydro-

carbon deposits in Bel ice, which obtained its independence from Great

Britain in September, 1981, and where Pemex

is

undertaking exploratory

works, together with other international oil companies.

Additionally,
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the intended construction of
an interoceanic petroduct
through Guatemala
by an American petroleum
consortium, as well as indications
that there
are significant deposits of
petroleum in the Peten region
of Guatemala

could likewise fully incorporate
that Central American country
into U.S.
political-military schemes .. .and create
another source of friction
with
Mexico.^''

There is no likelihood for an early
agreement between the United
States and Mexico in regards to a
mutually accepted modus Vivendi in
these various foci of potential geopolitical
confrontation.

As if to

emphasize his views on matters related to Central
America and the
Caribbean, and in

a

comment obviously directed at the United States,
in

March, 1981. President Lopez Portillo declared
that "for Mexico the

danger does not reside in ideologies, but in
intervention," and went
on to add that Mexico cannot stand by passively
in regards to such in-

tervention in the Central American and Caribbean countries.

Mexican President:

Said the

"(Mexico) wants a rational alternative, and not an

hegemonic fate."^^
Mexico's official support for revolutionary movements in Central

America and the Caribbean would seem to have
too:

a

domestic implication,

the insulation of Mexico from that very same turmoil.

In other

words, Mexican foreign policy would respond to domestic political needs,
i.e. as long as it sides with the insurgents in countries such as

Nicaragua and
quility.
is also an

El

Salvador, Mexico would expect to retain domestic tran-

However, this

not an all-encompassing explanation.

is

There

element of genuine revolutionary consciousness and tradition

permeating the actions of

a

government such as Mexico's, born of
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revolution.

According to Washington
analysts. Mexico believes
in the
inexorable course of revolutions.^^
In other words, the
Mexicans believe that their society
is the result of a
revolutionary process, such
as that under way in
Central America at present.

Some American analysts
perceive a missing element in
the logic of
the Mexican position,
determined by the breach between
rhetoric and
socioeconomic reality, i.e. Mexico's
own vulnerability to contemporary

revolutionary tendencies.

Despite the wealth and multifaceted
expecta-

tions to be derived from its energy
resources, the potential for social

unrest remains high in Mexico, due
to factors such as the precarious

distribution of income, and high birth rates.
to Central American turmoil

U.S. worries in regards

could be possibly explained, as much
in

terms of Soviet-Cuban meddling, as in
relation to

a

Mexican indulgency

apparently not quite justified by its domestic
situation.
In this respect, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.
U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations and one of the main Latin American
experts in Reagan's administration, has lumped Mexico together with the rest
of the Caribbean and
Central American countries, as governments with various
degrees of in-

stitutional vulnerability, and "vulnerable and dependent economies."
"All

these countries," says Kirkpatrick. "find themselves in permanent

risk of revolutionary destabil ization.""^^^
In this context,

the Mexican pluralistic model, seen by some Mexi-

can officials as an alternative between U.S. capitalism and Cuban

marxism, i.e. in Mexican terms "the institutionalized revolution."

might be
repeated.

a

unique consequence of historical processes that cannot be

102

In any case,

it remains to be seen whether Mexico's
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activist foreign policy in
Central America and the
Caribbean .ay be able
to induce Viable .odels
of government that emulate
some of the characteristics of the Mexican system.

Under certain conditions, the
Mexican position could be
undermined
by the meaning of Mexico's
energy wealth
to U.S.

During

a

national security.

late 1980 visit to Mexico, Clyde
Mark, Assistant to the Foreign

Affairs Division of the U.S.
Congress, declared openly that
if Mexico
were to critically limit its supply
of oil to the United States,
or if
this supply were subject to domestic
and/or external

threats, Washington

would likely send military forces to
gain control of Mexican wells.

If

such a military occupation were to
take place, said Clyde, a subsequent

return of the wells to Mexico would be
most unl

ikely.^*^^^

Olga Pellicer has somewhat substantiated
the previous assessment,
by suggesting that petroleum wealth, as
well as Mexico's foreign policy

towards Central America and the Caribbean, presage

a

frank intervention-

ist tendency on the part of the United States
over the Mexican State.

The reasons are plain to see, according to Pellicer:

"Independently of whether the Mexican project toward Central America is aggressive or not,... the
fact is that its foreign policy has become an
obstacle to the advancement of the project sponsored by other countries in the Continent. "105
As a sequence to

the previous situation, Joseph Hodara has delin-

eated three possible scenarios, related to Mexico's emergence as

petroleum rich country.

a

The first would be the "f inlandization" of

Mexico, based on the overwhelming control of the means of information
and intelligence by the United States, which would result in an inter-

mittent diminution of Mexico's freedom of action.

The second alterna-
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tive would be for Mexico to
"selectively disentangle" itself
progressively from the strategic project
of the United States. The
third scenario would be, simply, a frank,
reasoned, and "technologically
and in-

tellectually guided" process of
negotiation between the two nations.
In any case, the path
to either scenario seems to be,
at present,

tor-

tuous and fraught with potential
convulsions.

Petroleum and Mpxico's Foreign Pnliry
The bases of Mexico's foreign
policy.

Petroleum policy is not, obvi-

ously, the equivalent to foreign
policy.

Mexico has a long tradition

with respect to certain principles
of international conduct.

Neverthe-

less, its new role as one of the
world's leading oil-producing and ex-

porting countries is having a definite
impact on Mexico's formulation
and implementation of its foreign policy.

Specifically, petroleum

wealth is serving as the propelling factor
for the apparent consolidation of a more aggressive, self-assured role
in international forums.

The "continuance and coherence in regard to
principles and objectives"
of the basic lines of Mexico's foreign policy is
ascertained in the
Global Plan for Development, 1980-1982.

Mexico's foreign policy is

geared towards

"...preserving our sovereignty, strengthening our
independence vis a vis the rest of the world, practicing international solidarity, supporting domestic efforts at development, and participating in
the conformation of a world order that guarantees
these objectives and allows the development of all
peoples in this same international sovereignty,
equality, security, and justice that we wish for
ourselves. "107
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Within this framework, some
key principles can be
clearly under
scored:

°'
another, and the principle of
self-dete?latIo^:'

-The peaceful solution of
controversies.

'I'llilZrrlr.Z::.

''^

-

°^

^^-^^

in

mter.

-The legal equality of states.

-International cooperation.

"^^^

Mexico has traditionally practiced
policy.

precedent

a

basically defensive foreign

The reason for this attitude is
to be found in historical
,

i.e.

the proximity of the United States,
which has tended

to neutralize Mexico's potential

for an independent foreign policy.

According to Mario Ojeda. various
interventionist experiences throughout Mexican history, during the XIX and into
the XX century, which re-

sulted in the loss of territory, temporary occupations
of national territory, and interference in Mexico's domestic affairs,
have resulted in
"an attitude of repudiation to contacts with foreign
nations and isola-

tionism, self-determination and non-intervention became the fundamental

concepts of Mexican foreign policy."

These basic principles have also

been reflected in the Mexican objective of trying to avoid foreign dom-

ination as a fundamental requisite for domestic economic development. "^^^

Since the beginning of the 1940's, mutual understanding and cor-

diality in the relations between the United States and Mexico seemed to

substitute for the tensions and conflicts of the revolution and postrevolutionary period in Mexico, which climaxed with the oil expropria-
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tion in 1938.

There were obstacles,
related to issues such
as trade
and migration, but both
countries, on the whole,
tried to reduce their
frictions to a minimum. To
the United States, Mexico
became a trustworthy neighbor, with a
predictable behavior.
From the Mexican perspective, the postwar period of
relations with the United
States seems to
have been qualified by a
feeling of "geographic
fatalism,- springing
from the fact of a continuous
border with the most powerful
nation in
the world, from whose economic
and political influence it
was impossible
to escape.
It was during this period
that the concept of a "special

relationship" took hold of the imagination
of leaders in both govern"^^^
ments.
By the mid-1960's. Mario Ojeda
could perceive

a

gradual shift in

the conduction of Mexico's foreign
policy, from the traditional passive,

defensive, and isolationist attitude, towards
the international

scenario.

a

more dynamic presence in

This change, which seemed to have started

during the Lopez Mateos administration
(1958-1964), was

a

result, accord-

ing to Ojeda, of the maturity achieved by
Mexico, on the basis of sus-

tained economic growth and political stability.

As the capacity of

Mexico to resist foreign pressures was enhanced, there
was also
ual subsidence of the fear from domestic subversive
movements.

conclusion, said Ojeda:
"...it could be stated that Mexico's foreign policy
in a transition stage... from a passive, defensive
and isolationist attitude, Mexico is passing into a
more dynamic and internationalist phase in its foreign relations
But this transition is taking
place gradually. The country seems to be proceeding
pragmatically, testing the possibilities of a new
international status. The general conclusion would
is

a

gradIn

299

However, during Echevern'a's
administration from 1970 to
1976.
Mexico did attempt to conduct
an extremely active
foreign policy, based
on a Third World activism
that brought it into conflict
with the United
States.
Domestic difficulties and an
adverse international economic
juncture turned the experiment
into a failure.
By the mid-1970's. some
Mexican analysts foresaw the
imminence of a return to "bilateral
ity"
vis a vis the United States,
in Mexico's foreign relations,
due to the

critical weakness of the country's
economic-political system at the
113
time.
According to Ojeda, the effort to
diminish unilateral depen-

dence on the United States had resulted,
paradoxically, in

dependent country, and

a

a n-.uch

more

drastic weakening of the structural bases
needed

to follow a more independent
course in foreign policy matters.

An-

other Mexican analyst, Eugenio Anguiano, while
lamenting the frustrated
experience, suggested nonetheless its continuing
viability:
"In the end, it would be very costly, in political
and economic terms, to abandon the reformist
efforts
of the last two decades, only because of the
need
to solve the short-term crisis.
The Mexican state
has sufficient human and material elements, as to
continue to pursue multilateral relations, without
impairing bilateral relations (with the U.S.). "115

Indeed, Mexico would have these elements, mainly in the form of

petroleum resources.

As early as

February, 1977, during his first

official visit to the United States, President Lo^Dez Portillo confi-

dently declared that "Mexico
for help."

116

is

not bankrupt...! did not come to ask

Petroleum would come to be the crucial element in trying

to renew the search for a more independent Mexico, domestically and in
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regard to foreign relations.

By late 1978.

that petroleu. „as bringing
about

a

Ih^EcoaM

could assert

"...fundamental change In the
egul-

llbrlun, Of power In
the Western hemisphere.

It Is a sudden change
so
big and new that neither
the Carter administration
nor Mexico itself
have understood it yet."^^^

The initial fiasco in the
gasduct negotiations see.s
to have marked
a turning point in the
attitude of the Lopez Portillo
administration towards the united States.
In any case, by 1978
rhetoric had hardened in
regards to the inevitable new
relationship with the neighbor
to the
North.
In October of that year,
expressing his awareness that
neither
Mexico nor developing countries
in general have the priority
nor the

respect they deserve from industrialized
nations. Lopez Portillo would
declare that, on the basis of Mexico's
natural resources, there would
no longer be a "master-client
relation" vis a vis the United States,
but

an equal

partnership.

Petroleum, he would say during an interview

with CBS in February. 1979. "is for
Mexico, not for the convenience of
the U.S.."

And, again, at that time LcTpez Portillo
criticized the

wheeling-dealing of the U.S. government
failure of the gas negotiations.

as the main reason behind the

Shortly after the 1980 presidential

elections in the United States, the Mexican President
would emphatically

comment that "Mexico's destiny is above the political
fluctuations in
the United States."

120

An appreciation somewhat arguable, though under-

standable in terms of domestic consumption.
Parallel to the previous pronouncements, Mexican analysts were

underlining the need for coordination between Mexico's petroleum and
foreign policies.

Mexico's petroleum strategy, said Samuel Berkstein

K.
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in .id.l980. .ust be
geared towards an Increment
of three basic criteria
the evaluation of foreign
policy:
security, welfare, and
prestige

-

The objective of such a
strategy would be to
project into international
relevance the political dimension
of the petroleum policies
of the
Mexican state. -^^^
By mid-1980, the Secretary
of Foreign Relations,
Jorge CastafTeda,
could state with visible pride
that in ten years Mexico's
presence

amidst the community of nations
had enlarged appreciably.

Mexico, said

Castaneda, maintains relations with
138 countries and has
presented in
various international forums
initiatives in favor of justice and
peace.
In spite of new international

pressures, especially in the case of
pe-

troleum, and other limiting factors,
Mexico's foreign policy

is

more

active, and has gained elements for
negotiation that make it less depen-

dent on subjective appreciations such
as sympathy and conveniences.

Specifically, in regards to relations with
Washington, Castaneda
has attempted to tread a middle course,
conciliatory to the United

States but at the same time definite about the
objective of

autonomy for Mexico.

a

greater

CastafTeda recognizes that "the principal element

of Mexico's foreign policy is the nature and
degree of its relations

with the United States," because of obvious multiple
causes, i.e. geography, multiple exchanges, and the global

States.

im.portance of the United

This, says Castaneda, "cannot be denied by past problems or

historical experiences, it is simply a fact of life."

Parallel

to this,

however, Castaffeda underlines the idea that Mexico has abandoned the

"cautious and up to a degree defensive attitude" that tended to characterize its foreign policy, and has begun to play an increasingly active
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role in International
affairs.
hold traditional
principles
In other words,

This constitutes a
need 1n order to up-

and to defend specific
interests

the fact that relations
with the United States
are

the key component of
Mexican foreign policy,
does not .ean

a

passive

acceptance by Mexico of
political, economic, and
cultural dependence
The United States, according
to
CastafTeda.

Portant factor." but not

a

is

a

"key element." an

-'i..

"factotu." in Mexico's foreign
policy.

Thus,
for example, to Mexico
economic diversification
represents an essential
national goal, and not an action
directed against the United
^24
States.
In this context,

petroleum constitutes an invaluable
ally:

"...petroleum... must be seen not only
as a simole
product to be sold at the going
world price bSt
rather as something in such demand
that an additional value could be affixed to
it.
This could
consist -as it happens with other
nations- of an
extra cash price.
But in our case it has a much
more essential character. "125
U.S. and Mexican mutual exp ert^tinn.

Mario Ojeda has correctly noted

that Mexico's strategic value for the
United States increases in periods
of political crisis in the world and,
particularly, in the Western Hemi-

sphere.

The United States, says Ojeda, has usually

.recognized and accepted the need for Mexico to
dissent with North American policy in all that is
fundamental for Mexico, even though for the United
States it may be Important, but not fundamental.
In return, Mexico gives its cooperation in all
that
is fundamental or even important for the United
States, and not so for Mexico. "126

Ongoing processes, in particular those in Central America and the
Caribbean, may be changing this set of perceptions, as Mexico emerges
as a "middle power," with a growing influence on the national and

303

international policies of
the United States.
as

the key factor in

a

Petroleu. would be
seen

scenario for U.S.-Mexican
relations, qualified

by a .ainly technical
and strategic perspective
of matters by the
United
States, in contraposition
to a vision by Mexico
according to nationalistic priorities and tested
principles of international
behavlor.^^^
Some U.S. analysts believe
that Mexico's new assertive
foreign policy
carries a number of ominous
implications for the United
States, especially in regards to the crisis
in the Caribbean and
Central America,
and the stage would seem to
be set for a potential clash
between the

contrasting interests of Mexico and
the United States.
The Reagan administration
perceives the crisis in Central
America
and the Caribbean as an East-West
confrontation.

Thus, the socioeco-

nomic situation of the countries in
the area must be subordinated to
the

exigencies of the global U.S. -Soviet
conflict.

From this appreciation,

American foreign policy should be geared,
primarily, to contain SovietCuban expansionism through military
assistance to friendly governments
such as that in El Salvador.

There seems to be an urgency to prevent

the "domino effect," according to which
revolutionary movements akin to

Cuba's would extend their field of action from
Nicaragua to Mexico
itself.

of

a

Indeed, by November, 1981, the Pentagon announced
the formation

new U.S. military command for the Caribbean, whose area of
respon-

sibility will include waters and islands of the Caribbean Sea. Gulf of
Mexico, and "portions of the Pacific Ocean bordering Central America."

Pentagon officials declared that the move "reflects the continuing U.S.

interest in the vital Caribbean area."-^^^
However, as the American mood towards the crisis in the Caribbean
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Basin turns increasinqlv
Tiyiy aaarp<;cix/o
aggressive, the ^
means to carry out a
tougher
policy are not clearly
discernible. Alfred Stepan
has noted a deterioration of the traditional
instruments of U.S. foreign
policy in the
area.
For example. U.S. military
assistance programs in Latin
America,
which flourished during the
1950's. were by 1979 barely in
effect anywhere in the region. Bilateral
economic assistance to Latin
America,
which under USAID programs
played an important role in
the 1960's. had
been discarded by the late
1970's by "middle income" countries
such as
Brazil and Venezuela.
U.S. military intervention
faces significantly

greater obstacles in the 1980's
than in previous decades.

Stepan also

emphasizes the "domestic dimension" of
U.S. policies towards Latin
America, i.e. the 17 to 22 million
Hispanic Americans, largely Mexican

Americans, who are close to become the
largest minority in the United
States, and are reaching for growing
political power.
is the fact

Finally, there

of the emergence of new power centers in
Latin America, of

which Mexico is possibly the most relevant
due to its oil wealth, which
are bound to significantly shape American
foreign policy in the re-

gion.l^^
Mexico is opposed to
to achieve its objectives

a

reprise of U.S. reliance on military means

in Central America and the Caribbean.

By

mid-November, 1981, President Lo'pez Portillo declared that it would be
a

"gigantic error" for the United States to stage military actions

against Nicaragua or Cuba.

131

The Mexican government sees the crisis

in Central America in terms of a North-South dimension, i.e. develop-

ment.

Socioeconomic conditions are primarily the cause for the up-

heaval and, thus, only a political and not a military solution is
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feasible.

There 1s

a

difference of approach
between the Mexican and
the
An-erlcan positions, .ore
noticeable now that Mexico
has come out of Its
Shell 1n foreign policy
matters, simply, whereas
U.S. policymakers believe that conservative,
old-fashioned regimes would
be more convenient
for Its Interests In
Central America. Mexico
seeks to strengthen Its
role as a regional power
through the support of more
progressive governments.

^

Nevertheless, both the Mexican
and the U.S. governments
realize
that they must work together.
During the years of the Carter
administration, an important factor that
led to a deterioration in
the relations between the two countries
was the subjective dimension
of leadership perception. Lopez Portillo
and Carter were definitely
incompatible
in character, and they developed
a mutual

anim.osity that was to be re-

flected at the wider level of bilateral
relations.

With the advent of

the Reagan administration, this
personal equation of politics has im-

proved greatly.

The personal chemistry between Lopez
Portillo and

Reagan is, indeed, warm, and both leaders
feel at ease with each other.
This fact is contributing to create
tions.

a

new, improved climate for negotia-

The Mexican President, as previous Mexican leaders
sensitive to

nationalistic motivations, believes that mutual respect and
dignity must
pave the way for a better understanding.
has said

Lo''pez

"The problems are the same,"

Portillo, "but the attitude toward them has changed radi-

cally, and this means that treatment of them is possible.

""^^"^

For his

part, Reagan is seeking to personally gain the sympathy of the Mexican

leaders, through personal charisma as well as through well geared
publicity.-^^^
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Fro. the American
perspective. U.S. overtures
towards Mexico .ust
seen, somewhat as a
component of a tug-of-war.
WHereas Mexico 1s
puUed
by US self.concept1on
as part of Latin
America, and as a developing
country .e.ber of the
Third World. I.e. the
'South." fundamentally
In
agreement with the Non-aligned
Movement, the Reagan
administration believes that Mexico's ties
with the United States
and plain, basic geopolitics are bound to solidify
its identification with
U.S. policies
and objectives.
An important element that
would tend to score this
latter reasoning is the role of Mexico's
private sector in bilateral
relations. The
Latin American policy of the
Reagan administration, following
the norm
of previous Republican
governments, reflects a symbiosis
between the

interests of the Public and Private
Sectors in the United States.

Ac-

cording to this appreciation, U.S.
policy must be closely coordinated

with private American business
interests in the region, and by
extension
with the latter's liaison with Latin
American private concerns.
Former Ambassador to Mexico Robert

H.

McBride has noted that the

relationship between Mexico's private sector
and its U.S. counterpart
is

thriving.

According to McBride,

"...there seems to be a harmony of objectives and
an ability to work together on the part of
U.S. and
Mexican industry and banking which are absent from
government-to-government relationships. The powerful business groups in Monterrey have been
closely
associated with major U.S. corporations for most of
the post-World War II period, as have most of the
Mexico City business groups, the banking groups of
Banamex and Bancomer, and others. The intense desire
of the Mexican government to diversify its investments
sources in order to prevent 'dependence' on the U.S.
does not seem to be reflected in attitudes of the
private sector. "136
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Mexican analysts concur
that, indeed, the
Reagan administration
is
Placing its trust on U.S.
entrepreneurs to reach a
better understanding
between the private sectors
of both countries,
which would be expected
to have a beneficial
impact on governmental
circles as well.^^^
McBride has underlined the
special situation prevailing
along the
border, which is bound to
foster a growing association
of interests from
both sides, stemming from
factors such as trade,
commerce, and the
Suiladora program.^^S
^^^.^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^.^.^^^
tion. there is the Agreement
for the Exchange of Electric
Energy signed
in May. 1980. as well as
joint projects regarding
agricultural transactions.
Olga Pellicer sees as the obvious
attraction of these projects
for the United States "the
possibility to transfer the political
handling
of relations between the two
countries from the federal government
to
local governments. "^^^ According to
Pellicer:

"This permits to find, on the Mexican
side, interlocutors less reluctant to the open
acceptance of
greater Mexican-U.S. ties. The lesser
responsibility of local political leaders in the
maintenance of a defensive and nationalistic ideology,
allows them to proceed, without great political
costs, on an openly friendly dialogue with
their
American counterparts "140
.

On a broader scale, the re-emergence of Mexico
as an oil exporting

nation has underscored its economic bonds with the United
States.

between the two countries is soaring.

Trade

By 1980, new investments had sur-

passed the billion dollar mark, up from $374 million in 1978.

Projec-

tions for 1981 indicated that, only in the manufacturing sector, new
U .S.

investments would be well above the billion dollar mark, geared

ma1 nly towards the automobile industry.

'^^^

In short,

the economic
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panorama would not see. to
bear bad

presages for political
relations

between the two nations.
In this context, U.S.

expectations of Mexico's role
in Central

America and the Caribbean would
seem to be especially
high in regard to
diffusing the politically
explosive situation in the area.
Curiously,
the Mexican government seems
to willingly pursue this
role. too.
The

differences between the respective
positions, of course, spring
from the
degree of independence of Mexico's
foreign policy, and the diverging
appreciations of issues by the two
governments.
The previous proposition is not
new.

McBride has noted that in

earlier U.S. administrations the
Department of State had envisaged

greater Mexican presence in Latin American
affairs.

a

Specifically, it

was thought that Mexico could play a
part in hemispheric "bridge-building," regarding the Central American
region.

government was apparently trying to carve
potential role as
In

a

a

^"^^

niid-1981, the Mexican

niche of its own for its

"common communicator" in international relations.

"^"^^

reference to the view by the U.S. government of the
situation in

Central America and Cuba, Mexico believes it can
ultimately help to narrow the gap in perceptions and lessen misunderstandings.
Lo^'pez

President

Portillo maintains that
"...because we have open and frank relations, these
relations could be useful in communicating with two
parties that frequently do not communicate, provided
there is political goodwill to relax the area. "144

By November, 1981. during Secretary of State Haig's official visit
to Mexico City, Mexican officials reiterated their opposition to any

precipitate action by the United States against Nicaragua.

Mexican
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Secretary of Foreign
Relations, Oorge Castaneda,
underscored that -anti
interventionist" feeling was
widespread throughout
Latin America, and
added that "a sharp
response (to Nicaragua)
could be counterproductive "
However. Mexico was ready
to act as a "communicator"
in order to improve
relations between Washington
and Managua.^^^ For
its part, a spokesman
for the Department of
State declared that the
United States and Mexico
'...clearly do not have identical
views but thev
share a co^on concern in
the search for ways of
dealing with the problems of
Nicaragua.
"146

Petroleum as an instrumpnt of
Mexico's foreiq n.^oiic^.

The suddenness

with which Mexico has been
catapulted into

a

prominent position as an

oil-producing and exporting country
raises

a

num.ber of questions.

is

There
the suspicion that the "discovery"
of the petroleum fields in
the

southeast during the mid-197C's may
have been merely the official
announcement of a fact already known by
the inner circle of top Mexican

government officials.

One of the explanations for the secrecy
would be

related to the fact that fonner President
Echeverrfa. who apparently had

ambitions to become Secretary General of
the United Nations, viewed the

announcement of the existence of huge oil deposits
as indirectly harming
his candidacy with respect to OPEC countries,
which might then have seen

Mexico as

a

ern Europe.

relief source for oil imports by the United States
and West"^^^

On the other hand, former Pemex's Director Dfaz Serrano
underlined
the technical difficulties which had to be overcome just
for Pemex to

undertake drillings up to 5,000 meter deep in order to find the
new
deposits.

Only when these operations were possible could the finds be
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confl™ed.l«

According to Information
obtained by France's
the secrecy was
maintained because Mexico
wished to avoid an
011 consumption as In tbe
Middle East countries,
and to conserve Its
hydrocarbon resources."'
this respect. President
Lopez PortlHc
declared In March.
1978. that Pemex's
technicians had deliberately
withheld info^atlon
pertaining to the new
deposits, because of fear
of
squander by Mexican pol
Itlclans.
,t Is pertinent to
re.ember that
the Mexican political
system Itself tends to
secrecy, and neuralgic
issues are not openly
discussed. Additionally, an
obvious reason for
the reluctance to divulge
Information about oil reserves
could have been
wariness of growing economic
and political pressures
by the United
States.

UHc^

m

In any case,

the economic crisis of
1976. and the subsequent need

to court external and
internal confidence in Mexico's
process of development, led to a complete turnabout
in the previous policy.
The adminis-

tration of Lopez Portlllo aimed
to augment and verify the
claims concerning Pemex's reserves.
In general

terms, Mexican policy orientations
are significantly

conditioned by U.S. strategy and, in
certain cases, are
sponse to that strategy.

a

direct re-

The actions by the Mexican government
on the

issue of oil reserves illustrate this
causal relationship.

U.S. sources

were among the first to publicize the existence
of sizable hydrocarbon
deposits in Mexico.

Whereas by May, 1978, the Energy Commission of
the

Mexican Congress had tried to disprove what it
deemed to be an exaggerate estimate of Mexico's oil reserves by the
CIA, in contradiction with

Pemex's lower figures,

a

year later Pemex's former Director Dfaz
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Serrano was busy disclaf.ing
"a campaign 1n the
United States to underestimate Mexico's petroleum
reserves. ""^ By November,
1980, D<az
Serrano once again denied
assertions by the U.S.
Department of Energy
that questioned Pemex's
figures.

The previous scenario serves
as

a

background for the role of
petro-

leum as an Instrument of
Mexico's foreign policy.

It Is a scenario

qualified by restraints, as well
as by Increasing flexibility
for Mexican initiatives.

^^5a Pellicer has analyzed Mexico's
foreign relations in
terms of two possible outcomes:

interdependence with the United States,

or a national project of development.

In the process of redefinition
of

its foreign policy. Mexico faces a
series of conditions set by the ex-

pansion of its petroleum industry, such as
incoming pressures from the

United States, and the contrasting policies of
domestic groups in regard
to the possibilities of further integration
with the U.S.. or the pur-

suit of a national project.

From the American perspective, interdepen-

dence would seem to be the most appropriate path.

And here is found

a

net source of conflict between the two countries, that springs
from

nationalistic feelings commonly expressed in Mexico through
an anti-

American attitude.
political

Nationalism remains, indeed, the most powerful

ideology in Mexico, closely tied to the fortunes of the petro-

leum industry.

But the search for

a

nationalistic course of action in Mexican for-

eign relations must take into account
factors.

a

series of structural limiting

Jorge Domiliguez has aptly referred to

a

"triple dependency"
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that constrains Mexico's
overtures:

"Considerable continuities
are shown in the inter
national implications of
Mexican internal affair^

econo^^c""ucLure,
re" e^^clanv1i%H""'^""'^^'?^
especially in the economy's
general vulnpr
ability and in its links
to the U.s:.!'?here has
also been a deepening of
a triple d^o^ndency
well
beyond historical standards.
Mexico relies in!
^ single fam
o? proZrfVlf^ °"
Single country for i s
°"
?
?
Lrn Jionaf'''°"^^^
Internationa
economic relations (the United
States)
"^'^^'^ " X CO
Tor
?or such relations....
rlulT'' """^r
The autonomy of foreign oolicv
consequentlydeclines. To an unparalleled
degree
in

"

''''' '^'''^ '^ Economic
ne'eds'\nd'nn'"
^"^^"^onTeconomic foreign policy objectives
mncrK
mu t be subordinated to serve
them. .^The more
Mexico relies on petroleum
exports to meet its internal economic needs, the more
important it will
.

In sum,

"'^

'

coiitries

says Domi'nguez, "the deepening of
Mexico's triple dependency has

constrained the independence of the Mexican
government in the conduct of
foreign policy."^^^
The constraints on petroleum as an instrument
of Mexico's foreign

policy are well illustrated by the convulsions
of the industry during

mid-1981, as
cial

a

result of the worldwide oil glut.

There events had cru-

domestic, as well as external, repercussions.
By late 1980, Pemex was actively embanked on

levels of oil exports, and higher sales prices.

a

course of increasing

In December of that

year, Pemex raised prices for its exports even above the levels than

prevalent in most OPEC countries.
"Istmo" was selling at

a

At that time, the crude denominated

price of $38.30 per barrel, and the "Maya"

crude at $34.50 per barrel.
to these two types of oil:

Most of the Mexican reserves correspond
"Istmo," which is a light crude of 34°
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API
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and 1.8% sulfur content;
and "Mara." a heavier
crude of 23° API
and 3.42. sulfur content.
Increasingly. Mexican exports
correspond .ore
to the "Maya" crude,
extracted mostly from the
Gulf of Campeche.l=8
Likewise. Pemex was successfully
continuing Its policy of
markets diversiflcaticn. By January.
1981. Pemex exported, or had
plans to export
oil to nineteen countries '^^^
.

By April, 1981. the
international petroleum market
was feeling the
impact of lower levels of demand,
and a growing surplus in
supply. The
big Western importers had
been successful in reducing
consumption, at
the same time that Saudi Arabia
raised its production in order
to pressure other OPEC countries to
agree to a common price level.
These factors contributed to force OPEC
to tentatively cut production
down by
some 2.5 million b/d. a measure
that had no appreciable effect on
world

prices.

Starting in May, 1981, the previous
situation unleashed in Mexico
in rapid succession, a series of
events which were to demonstrate the

degree of vulnerability of Mexico's economy
and polity

market forces.

to international

By late May. Pemex announced that it would
not alter its

program of production and exports, nor its price
structure, in spite of
OPEC's decision to reduce output.

Shortly afterwards, by early June,

Pemex Director Dfaz Serrano had reconsidered the matter,
and acknowledged the need for Pemex to lower prices in order to retain
its cli162
ents.
At the time, the Secretariat of the Treasury estimated that

Mexico would have to contract an additional external debt for $1,200
million, to compensate for lost reserves.

'^^"^

The reduction in prices,

of $4 per barrel, was expected to bring about a loss of

m.ore than

14

60 billion pesos for 1981.
1„ relation to previously
estimated reserves
By early June, exports
were already down to 1.4
million b/d. 560.000

"Istmo" and the rest "Maya."^^^

The decision to lower
prices, albeit perhaps
unavoidable from an
economic standpoint, was
politically explosive. On June
6. 1981, D<az
Serrano presented his resignation
as Director of Pemex.
The decrease
in prices had not been,
apparently, unanimously approved
by the Economic
Cabinet.
Behind the dismissal of Diaz
Serrano loomed the fact of Pemex's
independent course of action vis
a vis other Secretariats
and the continuing debate over production
levels.

The pursuance of bureaucratic

autonomy and an ever-increasing
petroleum output ultimately cost ofaz
Serrano his post.^^^ commenting
retrospectively on the episode. President Lo'pez Portillo would express
his belief that "a precipitate action
reduced the exports price of our crude,
with

world's oil market.

a

chain reaction over the

"^^^

By mid-June, 1981. the Mexican
President was attempting to restore

stability to the petroleum industry,
by declaring that the production
goals would be kept, as delineated
in the Energy Program, and that
the

sudden drop in prices would be corrected.

secretary of Patrimony

and Industrial Development, Jose Andres
de Oteyza, reiterated the objec-

tive of revaluating the price of crude oil,
even if it meant
tion" of Pemex's list of clients.

a

"depura-

"^^^

The new Pemex Director, former Secretary of the
Treasury Julio
Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid, was soon to realize the
difficulties of trying to

manage

a

product such as petroleum, subject to the fluctuations of the

international market, according to considerations of
national interest.
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Moctezuma Cid proceeded to
prepare a program to overcome
the crisis the
proposals included:
to undertake a more dynamic
and flexible con^ercial
ization policy in the international
market, in order to obtain
more favorable prices and sales conditions;
to uphold the production
goals in
the Energy Program; and to
achieve

a

greater coordination between pro-

duction, commercialization,
infrastructure, and operation of
facilities.
By late June, 1981, Pemex
announced it intended to raise prices
back to their former level, and that
the possibility of reducing
exports
was under consideration. ^70 On July
1. as a result of "difficult nego-

tiations" with its clients, and as

a

step in recuperating from the eco-

nomic effects of the drop in revenues, Pemex
proceeded to increase its
prices by $2 per barrel of oil."^^^

The attempts by Pemex to raise prices resulted
in

cellations of purchases by a number of clients.

a

series of can-

The French Petroleum

Company, which had been buying 100,000 b/d from Mexico,
notified Pemex
that it would reduce its purchases by half.^''^

Companies from other

countries, i.e. United States, the Philippines, Sweden, Yugoslavia,
and
India, also cancelled orders, bringing the total of lost sales
up to

310,000 b/d by late June.
pesos daily for Pemex.

become official.
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This meant financial losses of 230 million
By early July, the previous cancellations had

These included four U.S. petroleum companies:

Ashland Oil, Charter Oil, and Clark Oil and Refining Co.

Exxon,

Lost sales

continued to mount, to 550,000 b/d.^^^
Parallel to the previous developments, on July 1, in San Francisco,

Pemex signed an agreement with 82 banks from eleven countries, in order
to obtain credits for $4 billion, the highest amount ever contracted by
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any country for a single
operation.

The Bank of America was
to be the

agent and twenty other banks,
including seven from Japan,
would administer the operation. The
Japanese banks were to contribute
$1,200
million, thirty U.S. banks were
responsible for $1,500 to
$1,600 million,
and 28 European banks would
account for the remainder.
Pemex officials
declared that the loan was a
transitory measure, while payments
for

exported oil arrived.
to acquire additional

Likewise, part of the credits was
to be destined

exploration and drilling equipment.

According to Alicia Girdn. in

a

study for the Economic Research

Institute of Mexico's National University,
by early July 1981, Pemex's

foreign debt amounted to more than
$13 billion.

Between 1970 and early

1979. Pemex's debt increased from $438.6 million
to $6,213 billion.

Shortly before the record $4 billion credit
operation, the total had

surpassed the $9 billion mark."^'^^
Faced with the possibility of financial disaster,
the Mexican gov-

ernment retaliated against France, which had been
purchasing 100,000 b/d
of oil from Mexico since February. 1979.

By early July, 1981. the French

Petroleum Company communicated to Pemex its intention to cancel
purchases

altogether for the rest of the year.

Apparently, the French were ap-

plying one of the clauses of the contractual agreement with Pemex, which

allowed any of the two parties to suspend operations for

disagreements developed over price levels.

'^'^^

a

trimester, if

In any case, on July 4,

1981, the Mexican government proceeded not only to suspend the petroleum

deal, but to eliminate all French companies from participation in Mexico's

projects of national development, as
lation of oil purchases.

178

a

reaction against France's cancel
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Nevertheless, negotiations
between Pen,ex and the
French Petrol eu.
Company were resumed shortly
afterwards, with the personal
intervention
Of President Francois
Mitterand. who stated that
it was essential
for

France to deepen relations
with Mexico.^"

By .id-Ouly. both sides
had

announced that the oil contract
regained in effect, and that
France
would continue to buy Mexican
crude, pending further
negotiations.
In the end. the episodes
of raid-1981 demonstrated
to the Mexican

government the high volatility and
unpredictability of the international
petroleum market, and the corresponding
obstacles to relying on petroleum for domestic development and
activism in foreign policy matters.
The storm subsided as quickly as
it had arrived.
By early August. 1981.
Pemex was able to announce that it
had recovered its petroleum
market.
Sales were up to 1.250 million b/d,
at an average price of $31.25 per

barrel.

This latter figure was the combination
of sales prices of $34

for "Istmo" crude, and $28.50 for
"Maya" crude.

Pemex's production

schemes were geared to a 50% mixture of each
of these two basic types
of oil.
Total sales for 1981 were expected to amount
to more than $15

billion, i.e. an increment of up to 50%, over the 1980
income of $10.4
billion.

In retrospect, events resembled a cycle, from
euphoria to

19,9
deception back to euphoria. °^
•

As a result of OPEC's new price struc-

ture agreed upon by November, 1981.

Mexico raised the price of its

light "Istmo" crude by $1, to $35 per barrel, and held the price of its
heavy "Maya" crude steady at $28.50.-^^^

By September, 1981. President

Lopez Portillo could speak of the drop in prices as a "transitory phenomenon."

184
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Nevertheless, the Mexican
government remains wary of
potential
future developments. There
has been a proportionally
quicker Incre-

™nt

of production and reserves
of heavy "Maya" oil.
especially fro. the
wells off the Gulf of Campeche.
over the lighter "Istmo"
crude from
Tabasco and Chiapas.185

^his fact could strain the
flexibility of re-

fining facilities in customer
countries, which might be an
obstacle to
growing Mexican petroleum exports,
under soft International market
con-

ditions.
In his

annual report, President

Upez

Portillo summarized Mexico's

tentative initial steps in the world
of the big oil exporters:
"The expectations raised by petroleum
and our sudden
presence in the world of its conflicts,
took us by
surprise, and we do not yet fully
understand its
meaning. We graciously accepted the
upwards price
movements, and at the first downwards change
became
discouraged and bitter
this resource (well)...
gave us the opportunity for progress if we
know 'how
to administer its abundance; if we organize
work. "186

The selection of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado as
the PRI candidate
for the 1982 Presidential elections would seem
to indicate that Mexico
will slowly but steadily increase petroleum production
and exports,

albeit attentive to the need for planning and efficiency in
the midst
of uncertain international market conditions for the rest of
the decade.

Conversely, market realities are bound to act as

a

constraint to the

determination of the Mexican government to continue utilizing petroleum
as a key lever to spur domestic development and to substantiate the

projection of Mexico's foreign policy objectives.

Mexican initiatives

.

In spite of the built-in constraints,

petroleum

constitutes a formidable element in policy formulation and implementation.
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Based on its petroleum
wealth, Mexico has embarked
upon a highly ambitious course in its foreign
policy, which has both
points of continuity
and contrast in regard
to previous stances.

According to Olga Pellicer,
the foreign policy project
of the
Lopez Portillo administration
has followed three basic
directions,
clearly manifest since 1980:
in the first place,
towards a diversification of its foreign relations,
both economic and political,
on the

basis

of the negotiating power
afforded by petroleum; secondly,

a somewhat
more discreet solidarity with
"Third World" positions,
parallel to a

selective strengthening of relations
with key countries in terms of
regional influence and prestige, such
as Sweden, Canada. Brazil, and
India,
and a more solid presence in
international forums such as the U.N.
Secu-

rity Council, where Mexico accepted

a

post after 30 years of declining

participation there; and thirdly, contrasting
with the pragmatism of the
two previous lines, support for
ideological pluralism and

a

maintenance

of the commitment to its revolutionary
origins, through its support of

revolutionary regimes such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua.

Thus, says

Pellicer, there is a mixture of pragmatism and
revolutionary tradition in

Mexico's foreign policy, with petroleum as the basic
pillar for its actions.

Officially, Mexico has denied any attempts at exerting

a

subregional,

or Latin American leadership, but this seems to be an impending
role.

Mexican analysts abound in the concept of a "sleeping giant," to describe
Mexico's leadership potential

.

"^^^

According to Edwin Deagle, from the

Rockefeller Foundation, the Reagan administration must recognize the
status of Mexico as an "emerging leader. "^^^

The President of Costa
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R1ca. Rodrigo Carazo,
has openly acknowledged
that Mexico exerts "in
a
certain way a leadership
role In Central America,
at the tl^e econo.1.

This leadership, or at least
the potential for it,

is demonstrated
by a series of actions on
the part of the Mexican
government, that confir, the efforts to delineate
a .ore assertive foreign
policy.
In regard
to the objective of economic
diversification, the achievements
would
seem to be substantial.
In 1976, Mexico sold all
its hydrocarbon exports
to the United States.
By January, 1981, Pemex was
exporting oil to

eleven countries, and had plans to
extend the list to eight more.^^^
By
July, 1981, the following were the
most important Pemex 's clients,
with
their respective levels of purchases:
the United States, with 658,000
b/d;
Spain, 198,000 b/d; Japan, 100,000 b/d;
France, 100,000 b/d; Israel and

Brazil, 60,000 b/d each; Canada and Sweden,
50,000 b/d each; Great Britain. 30,000 b/d; the Philippines.
10.000 b/d; and Yugoslavia. 6,000 b/d.^^^

Some additional factors illustrate the attempts
to diversify exports

markets and operations.

By January. 1981, Pemex announced that it
had

acquired a total of 34.29% of the stock of the Spanish
refining company
Petronor, with facilities in Bilbao. Spain.

This action not only

strengthened Pemex's operations in Spain, but also gave it
point to consolidate and expand its European operations

a firm vantage

.'^^^

By November, 1980, President-elect Reagan invited Pemex to establish

itself in U.S. territory, and to compete with its products in the American market.
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The Mexican government received the proposal in

a

"posi-

tive way," and Pemex announced that Mexico would commercialize its gasoline and petrochemicals in the United States through independent producers
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rather than through the big
U.S. refineries.l^^

3^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^

had plans to establish plants
of its own to distribute
gasoline and
diesel fuel in California,
Arizona and Texas. These
operations were

expected to compensate for the
problem caused to Pemex by the
fact that
up to 40% of the total volume
of gas and diesel it sends
to the Mexican
northern states, along the border
with the United States, is acquired
by American citizens who cross
the border.

-^^^

An area in Pemex's expansion plans
that has resulted in misunderstanding with the U.S. government
Cuba.

is

that related to dealings with

In 1978, during his visit to the
Soviet Union. President Lo'pez

Portillo raised the proposal for

a

triangular oil supplying agreement,

through which the Soviet Union would supply
petroleum to
client, Spain, while Mexico would supply it to
Cuba.

a

Mexican

By May. 1980. the

idea had been discarded, dur to the fact that
Cuba would have to pay

substantially higher prices, since the Soviet Union sells
oil to that
island at discount prices.

'^^^

However, Mexican cooperation with Cuba has continued.

By December,

1980, Pemex announced that through a protocol on cooperation agreed upon

by both countries. Mexican technicians would explore Cuba's sea platform
in search for oil.
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In February.

1981. the Chicago Tribune published

news in regard to a "secret agreement" between Mexico and Cuba, through

which the former would supply Castro's regime with petroleum machinery

manufactured in third countries.

-^^^

Pemex emphatically denied this

version.

President Lo'pez Portillo has acknowledged that disagreements between Mexico and the United States possibly lie in the diverging orien-
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tation towards certain critical
countries in Central American
and the
Caribbean, such as Cuba and
Nicaragua. But the Mexican
President believes that
friendship with Cuba is not a
condition
f?h^i'?''.
(that interferes with friendship
between Mexico
and the United States.
The United Stages has
rnendships with many countries of
the left
with
practically all of them except Cuba,
wh ch m^ke
one suppose that there are very
special
reasons
tor It. and not ideological
ones...
But Cuba and
sixteenth cen""^'^^"^
tu^y'^"20r^

However, increased cooperation on
petroleum and general matters between

Mexico and Cuba is bound to underline U.S.
-Mexican differences over
approaches to the problems of the Caribbean
and Central American region.
The Mexican government has repeatedly underscored
its vital in-

terest in the Caribbean and Central America.

By February, 1981, the

Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Jorge Castaffeda,
in

a specially

arranged meeting with the Mexican ambassadors to the
countries in that
region, emphasized the "maximum priority" accorded by Mexico
to the
202
situation there.
In regard to the mid-July, 1981, Nassau meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, the United States, Venezuela, and

Canada, to define programs of cooperation for the development of Central

America and the Caribbean, the Mexican government strongly made the
point that any form of assistance must be free of political and/or military components.
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The Mexican position is particularly forceful in the case of

El

Salvador, where Mexico is trying to promote a political solution among
the warning factions.

ernments issued

a

Late in August, 1981, the Mexican and French gov-

joint statement recognizing the Salvadoran rebels as
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a

representative political force"
the French-Mexican
declaration al[so
called for a restructuring
of the armed forces in
El Salvador befo)re
the scheduled 1982 elections
are held, and raised the
possibility of
bringing the issue of the
civil war In that country
to the United Natior
Security Council.
The U.S. government expressed
anger and indignation at the
FrenchMexican initiative. Likewise,
several Latin American nations
reacted

unfavorably.

By early September, 1981,
Argentina, Columbia, and Vene-

zuela issued

a

Duarte in

Salvador, and criticizing Mexico and
France for interfering

El

statement supporting the government
of Jose Napoledn

in that country's internal affairs.

The previous action raised the

possibility of an attempt to diplomatically
isolate Mexico, if the

Mexican government were to harden its
position in the matter.
In his

annual report of September, 1981. President
Lopez Portillo

reiterated his government's support for Cuba,
Nicaragua, and the leftist
insurgents in

El

Salvador, in the following terms:

"...during the last year we have centered our action
on the nearest area, geographically and politically,
to our own essence:
Central America and the Caribbean
holding high the banner of nonintervention. We have,
on repeated occasions, made clear publicly, privately
and in many ways, our disagreement and opposition to
all types of interference in the area, especially by
the superpowers
By further tightening the links
of friendship and cooperation that bind us with the
revolutions of Cuba and Nicaragua, we have underscored Mexico's attachment to the political principle
of the free determination of peoples. .because of
sympathy and affinity with the essence of their struggle-social justice-(Mexico) has helped them and will
continue to do so. "206
.

A key component of Mexico's foreign policy is the Energy Coopera-

tion Program for Central America and the Caribbean, i.e. the San Jose
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Pact, created by Mexico
and Venezuela in August.
1980.
The program
provides approximately
160.000 b/d of oil to nine
countries, at 70%
Of the going market
rate, and the rest payable
through long-term, low-

interest loans.207
011

^^^^^^^^^

^ .^^^

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^

terms for developing
countries represents

struction of

a

a

^^^^

solid step "in the con-

new economic order not
dominated by the superpowers,

riexico^also intended to set an
example for Venezuela's fellow
CPEC members.
I, ^,g^3^^ ^53^^ ^^^.^^
yenezue^. renewed the accord for

another year.

At that time the countries
benefiting from the program
were:
Barbados. Costa Rica. El Salvador.
Guatemala, Honduras. Jamaica,
Nicaragua. Panama, and Dominican
Republic. Savings for these countries

represented

a

total of one billion pesos per
year.^^^

The San Jose' Pact must be inscribed
within the context of Mexico's

strategy to promote

a global

energy agreement.

On September 27, 1979

in his address to the United Nations.
President Lopez Portillo unveiled
a

nine-point World Energy Plan, which would guarantee
the sovereignity

the participating states and create an agency
to finance the energy

needs of hard-pressed developing countries

.

The objective of the

Plan would be "to insure an orderly, progressive, integral,
and just

transition between two epochs of humanity," i.e. the era of petroleum
and that which will be based on new energy sources.

This proposal followed the international objectives of former Pres-

ident Echeverrfa's "New Economic Order," based on more equal and just

economic exchanges between developed nations and "Third World" countries,
which Mexico has tried to promote through its sponsorship of the "Charter of Rights and Duties of the States."

In November,

1979, 113 devel-
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oping countries (the Group of
77), presented in the United
Nations a
project for international economic
cooperation that included the World
Energy Plan as a medullar
part.
Industrial nations accepted the
project as an adequate framework for
.^^^
negotiations
In September,

1980, the United Nations proclaimed
a new interna-

tional strategy for development
during the 1980's, which included
a

restructuring of the global energy market,
on the basis of the Mexican
World Energy Plan.^^^ However,
opposition to the Plan developed from
some OPEC's members such as Algeria,
since it could diminish the bar-

gaining power of petroleum vis a vis the
industrial nations.

Mexican

initiatives in the field of energy have included
regional schemes as
well.

By early April, 1981. the Mexican and
Venezuelan governments

proposed the formation of

a

Latin American Multinational Petroleum

Enterprise, which would refine and distribute all the
crude contributed
by both countries, according to the terms of the San
Jose Pact.^^^

Since late 1980, the Canadian government has expressed its
interest in

participating in the Mexican-Venezuelan petroleum cooperation programs
towards Central America and the Caribbean.
By mid 1980, as a result of President Lo^pez Portillo's visit to

Brazil, commentators in both nations believed that the energy crisis and

Mexico's willingness to cooperate with Brazil, were likely to bring a

complete turnabout of previously coldrdations between "the two most

developed Latin American countries," in what could be on

a long

range

basis "the most important step taken in the last years towards Latin

American integration."
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In October,

officially announced the signing of

a

1981, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela

joint agreement on Latin American
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potential oil extraction and
exploration projects.

This trilateral

effort is designed to promote
schemes of technical and financial
assistance to Western hemispheric
countries. The accord is to be
carried
out through the participation of Pemex.
the Brazilian Petroleum Corp.
(Petrobras), and Venezuelan Petroleum,
Inc. (PDVSA).^^^
A tour d'horizon of Mexican initiatives
must include the Interna-

tional Meeting on Cooperation and
Development, informally known as the

North-South Conference, which took place at
Cancun, Mexico, on October
22 and 23,

1981.

Under the sponsorship of the Mexican and
Austrian

governments, leaders of eight industrialized and
fourteen developing
nations met to discuss international problems
related to issues of
food, energy, trade, and finance.

"Third World" countries would like

to obtain more favorable terms of trade, a stronger
voice in the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in general better
bargaining conditions.

pi q

The position of the United States on these issues, as expressed by

President Reagan at Cancun, relies on free trade and free enterprise
as the key to development.

Reagan emphasized that discussions must re-

main within the framework of international agencies, contrary

to the

wish of delegates from developing countries of consolidating the debates
into a single forum, ideally the United Nations General Assembly.

contrast. President

Lo^'pez

Portillo stressed the need to move towards

By
a

transfer of resources from the North to the South, and to establish guaranteed prices for raw materials and easier access to finance.
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Specifically, one of the demands of developing nations, their economics strapped by the high cost of imported oil, refers to the estab-
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lishment of an energy agency connected
to the World Bank, with

a

$30

billion fund to promote exploration
and development of energy resources.
Mexico strongly supports this scheme.

At the end of the conference,

spokesman reported a "near consensus" in
favor of the creation of the
energy affiliate.

However, the Reagan administration opposes
this

idea, emphasizing rather the efforts by
private enterprise.
In the end,

even though no specific agreements were reached
con-

cerning energy, nor in regard to food distribution,
financing and
trade, the conference was unanimously hailed as
constructive and positive.

The presence of President Reagan at Cancdn pleased and
encouraged

Third World delegates, and a vague compromise appeared to
develop, as
well as the apparent decision to meet again in the future.

As host to

the meeting, Mexico reaped very definite diplomatic rewards.

Presi-

dent Ld'pez Portillo, in September, 1981, referred to the North-South

Conference at Cancur as
"the most important international action
by Mexico during the last year, and that
reveals the active and dynamic character
realistic policy to influence events and
to invoke principl es "224

attempted
which best
of its
not only

.

Mexican policies and increasingly important not only in regard to
North-South, but also South-South relations.
trated by Mexico's stand vis

porting Countries.

a vis

This is clearly illus-

the Organization of Petroleum Ex-

There are several points worth mentioning here.

Pemex has considered OPEC's prices as the basic reference for adjust-

ments in its price and exports levels.

In this respect,

the presence

of Mexico in the international petroleum market could be argued to rep-

resent a stabilizing factor, as long as Mexico follows a policy consonant

with that of OPEC.^^^
On the other hand, Pemex's
growing exports since the
mid 1970's
have tended to diminish the
bargaining strength of OPEC.
Mexico has
refrained from selling its oil
in the "spot" market,
where i«diate

delivery schemes determine prices
according to the supply and
demand of
crude outside official national
and international controls.

However,
by July, 1981, the OPEC Bulletin,
the official publication of
that or-

ganization, was denouncing that Pemex
was, in fact, selling "Istmo"
crude directly to companies and
governments, in Notterdam, London, and
New

Y)

rk.

The "spot" market is anathema to
OPEC since it lessens that

organization's control over the market.

Pemex insists that it only

sells petroleum through bilateral accords,
and that no significant

volumes of Mexican oil have been detected in
the "spot" markets.
Some Mexican analysts argue that Mexico should
join OPEC, as

a

measure of solidarity with "Third World" countries,
and in order to
strengthen the position of that organization in other questions
such as
international trade and financing.

However, while indirectly support-

ing the price-levels set by OPEC, the Mexican government
has no plans
to enter that organization.

The reasons for this attitude are to be

found in the traditional Mexican policy of self-reliance and independence
in foreign matters.

Furthermore, in the past Mexico has publicly crit-

icized the "oligopoly commercialization practices" prevailing in OPEC,

especially as these have adversely affected development programs in poor
countries.
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It is not likely that there will be any variations in

Mexico's policy of remaining outside OPEC.
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Mexico is delineating
and global policies.

a

coherent connection between its
regional

In September,

1981. President Lopez Portillo
ex-

plained the reasons for Mexico's
greater attention to international
relations:

"...(there is) the clear conscience of
an active
interaction between domestic and
international
affairs
Much of what occurs in the rest
of the
world affects us decisively, and a
great part of
the principal solutions to our
problems lies
outside. "230
In his

Annual report. President Lopez Portillo
underscored Mexico'

opposition to "a new and unacceptable bipolarity."
based on
ons buildup by the super-powers.

demise of the Salt

II

treaty as

a

huge weap-

Likewise, he lamented the apparent
a

return to "Cold War" conditions, and

singled out the ominous neutron bomb as an added
threat to mankind.

In

regard to Mexico's traditional support for non-intervention,
the Mexican

President demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan
and Cambodia, and a peaceful resolution of the Middle East
crisis, ac-

cording to United Nations resolutions.

He also expressed the support

by the Mexican government of the independence of Bel ice, which Guatemala

does not recognize as

a

sovereign state, and the censure of South Africa'

occupation of Namibia and its apanther'd policies.
As Mexico pushes on with

a

more vigorous foreign policy, it would

appear that growing differences with Washington might undermine U.S. -Mexican relations Mexican stands on certain worldwide issues and regional
pop

questions are at odds with those of the Reagan administration.

The

Mexican government has made friendly gestures towards the Soviet Union
which, according to some American observers, means that "Mexico

is

more
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fearful of the United States."
due to geographical proximity.233

j^e
Mexican position on Central America
has echoed in NATO, as several
European allies of the United
States, i.e. Greece, Denmark and
the Netherlands, have supported the
French-Mexican resolution urging the
ruling
junta in El Salvador to negotiate
with the guerrilla forces there. ^^4

However, visible areas of dispute
may obscure the underlying fact
that, ultimately, both the United
States and Mexico share views on the

need for political stability as the
basis for peaceful development.
this regard. President Lopez Portillo
has expressed that,

"the relations between Mexico and the
United
States must transcend their traditional mold
and look for shared criteria and solutions.
"235
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CHAPTER

VIII

PERSPECTIVES

Forces a t Work in Mexican Develop mpnt
By the early part of the 1980's,
Mexico's process of develo

ment appears to have reached

a

crucial juncture, propelled to a

great extent by its petroleum resources.

A number of factors

qualify the situation.
It Is clear by now that Mexico has substantial
oil and

natural gas reserves, which guarantee for the short
and medium

ranges

a

steady expansion of its petroleum industry.

represents

a

This fact

wide flexibility for governmental policy, in regard

to both the rate and modalities of production of hydrocarbons,

and the overall process of development.

exploitation is having

a

Conversely, petroleum

strong impact on development, which

remains unbalanced, and its fruits unevenly distributed.

Furthermore, the exports sector of the Mexican economy relies

overwhelmingly on petroleum and its derived products, with the
subsequent inflationary effects on the domestic market, and
the danger of "petrol ization" of the economy.

Mexico remains today a dependent society, in economic,
social, and cultural terms, with its corresponding political

implications.

This dependency takes place primarily vis a vis

the United States.
a

However, Mexico has also achieved by now

significant degree of national integration.
346

Nationalism is
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the most powerful political
force 1n Mexico.

Historically, petrol eum

has been a rallying
point of Mexican nationalistic
elan, and is likely
to persist.
Thus, paradoxically, a
consolidation of dependency,

linked to petroleum exploitation,
would exacerbate nationalism.
The Mexican State, obviously,
is bound to play a critical
role in
such a scenario, both as a
promoter of, and benefactor from

nationalism.

Mexican nationalism is reinforce by
the perception of
official approach that borders on
ethnocentrism.

a U.S.

American official

and academic circles still, and
inexcusably, tend too often to see

Mexico as just an extension of the American
model of development.
This is, clearly, a biased perspective
that does not engender good
will among Mexican decision-makers and
public opinion in general.

There is

a

need to approach Mexico, and Mexican domestic
and foreign

policy, on their own terms, for what the country

is

intrinsically

as a society and a polity.

Likewise, the imperative and momentum of economic growth
can not

explain everything in Mexico.

Due partly to that same economic growth,

stability and orderly change are being constantly challenged by social
and political tensions.

Ideology, for example, whether in substance

or just rhetorically, plays a wider role in Mexico than in the United

States.

All

these factors, nationalism, dependency, social and

political forces at work towards greater participation, ideology,

must be taken into account in order to better understand Mexico as
a nation,

the import of its petroleum resources, and the shape of its

foreign and domestic policy.
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Most important, it is
crucial to recognize that
solutions to
these problems must originate
starting from Mexico's own reality,
from its historical and
societal processes.
In this context,

dependency represents

a

source of stress and tension for
the system,

since it undermines the very basis
of the nationalism which glues

together Mexican society.

Mexico's stability and orderly develop-

ment are directly related to whether
its political system can overcome
the gnawings of domestic and
international flux, and whether it can
be flexible enough to accomodate
new groups and sectors of the

population into an "inclusionary" scheme.

One of the keys to the

viability of the system will be the degree of
success in achieving
a

more just distribution of income during the
1980'

s.

The possibility of greater equilibrium for the
Mexican system
is

directly bound to the facts of dependency.

To the degree that

dependency increases, tensions are likely to mount, too, out of

a

basic discord between external influences and Mexico's unique

characteristics.

The project of the Mexican State is geared to

achieving the stability of the polity under conditions of rapid
development, and

a

peaceful adjustment among its component groups.

An abatement of dependency would give the Mexican government more

maneuvering room in the charting of an appropriate and more equitable
course of development.

In this context, the resources from hydro-

carbon exploitation may propitiate

economic and political autonomy.

a

more acceptable level of

However, this objective emerges
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wUhin

a

narrowing historical margin of action,
the result of

a

confluence of domestic and global trends,
and the scenario for a
reappraisal of U.S. -Mexican relations.

Prospects for U.S. -Mexico relations

There appears to be an overriding tendency in
the United States
to equate increased Mexican oil

production with closer U.S. -Mexican

relations, and a healthier process of development in
Mexico.

This

view, widely spread among officials as well as academic
circles,
is highly simplistic, and misses the general,

complex dimension

of the problem.

Representative of this position is Richard

B.

Mancke.

Mancke

argues that rising oil production and exports by Mexico would imply

benefits for the United States in strategic, economic and

environmental terms.

Additionally,

a

deeper reliance on expanding

Mexican oil and gas production would mean that the United States
could postpone the costly search for alternative domestic fuels,

which require high-risk, long-tertn capital investments.

On the

other hand, an increase in petroleum output would foster economic
growth and general prosperity in Mexico, which in turn would help

reduce the flow of illegal Mexican workers to the United States.
Mexico, says Mancke, unlike other oil -exporting countries such as
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has a sizable population and a relatively

developed infrastructure, which would allow it to spend its oil
earnings in acquiring foreign goods and services.^ Explains Mancke,
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sLt!c

'

^2^^ ^^^'*^°

the United

to expand
production nfPj;°^-^ r"'"
c^ude oil and natural
^^^1^°^
al?
.J Ih
gas at
the Jhighest technically feasible
'

rate,

,^,^,^Jj^^,^^ftion becomes: what policies
Irl available to each country
are
for promoting
achievement of this goal?...:The
princ?pir

constraints slowing down the rate
of longterm expansion are current
shortages of
technical expertise -resources of
wh-^J^lu^^n
which
the United States has an
abundance,
bince both countries would reap
large gains
from accelerating the rate of
expansion,
policies should be aimed at alleviating
these constraints. "2

Like so many arguments caught up in
the fallacy of the "growth
paradigm." Mancke's views suffer from
serious shortcomings, and can
not stand the weight of evidence.

At first sight, the United States

would indeed seem to gain 1n economic and
strategic terms, from
rapidly expanding Mexican oil production.

a

But, on a middle and long

range basis, possible advantages are likely to amply
offset by

a

series of potential dangers to the stability of U.S.
-Mexico

relations.
The view that intensified oil exploitation will redound in clear

benefits for both the United States and Mexico can be effectively

challenged in regard to two criteria.

First, the present domestic

situation in Mexico would seem to lead to the conclusion that the
more petroleum-bound its economy and society become, the more likely
th?t dcrmant social and economic tensions will reach

with the obvious negative political implications.

a

critical

level,

Of course, it could

be argued that this would be the situation even more so without rapid
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oil

exploitation.

But the point is that petroleum might easily
tend

to aggravate disequilibriums present
in Mexican society, and to

become, indeed,

a

mirage of apparently "easy" solutions to deep-

seated structural problems.
Looking at the strategic questions more carefully from
the
previous perspective, it is clear that

a

restless Mexico would

be a thorn for U.S. security and strategic interests.

In other

words, the benefits accruing to the United States from

a

Mexico

somewhat less formidable as an oil producer and exporter, but

politically stable, would seem to outweigh by far the ephemeral
benefits of

a

larger flow of petroleum, at the expense of

a

politically

volatile situation.
In this respect, a word of caution has already been expressed

by several

respected critics of U.S. -Mexican relations.

In a 1977

article, Richard R. Fagen acknowledged that oil represents, indeed,
a

way out for Mexico from its immediate social and economic problems,

but also warned that
"Oil may allow Mexico to slip away from the IMF
but not from history. Oil exports, the related
relaxation of debt limits, and the easing of some
aspects of the austerity program give breathing
space, another chance for hard-pressed Mexican
politicians. But oil by itself cannot respond
to peasants' demands for land; nor can it
create hundreds of thousands of new jobs each
year; nor can it keep millions of Mexicans from
crossing the border; nor make rapid inroads on
redressing a distribution of income that is
one of the most unequal in the world; nor
reduce public and private corruption; nor
deal with the human and social problems
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generated by

a

population that doubles in

^^-^toil can Jo
In", this is
-and
not to be scoffed at- is
soften
and perhaps postpone for
some years the
sharpening of the contradictions
that are
inherent in the Mexican development
model.
It cannot solve them. "3

Reinforcing the previous views,
in another 1977 article,
George
Grayson pointed out that, unless
decisive political leadership was
effective, by the middle of the
twenty-first century Mexico might
find itself with exhausted oil
reserves and the same distorted
economy.

4

More recently, David
Gandara, in

a

F.

Ronfeldt, Richard Nehring and Arturo

study prepared for the Rand Corporation,
have warned

that, under high production levels, Mexican
oil reserves might wane

within 15 to 20 years.
to see Mexican oil

On a long range basis, for the United States

primarily as

a

cheap and convenient solution for

its energy-related security problems, might
prove to be very costly.

The danger lies, say the authors, in the political and
economic

instability that might result from an excessively rapid development
of the oil industry, and which might turn Mexico from

a

secure to an

insecure source of petroleum.^
In this respect. 01 ga Pellicer has emphasized the need for the

United States to be aware of these ominous possibilities and to

contribute to prevent them.

It is a question, says Pellicer, for

American political leadership to place the goal of balanced Mexican

development before certain U.S. particular interests that favor
short-range capital expansion and fully irrestricted trade.

In the
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long range, U.S. security will
be better protected by paying
due

attention to the requisites for

peaceful, stable development of its

a

southern neighbor.^
Secondly, it would seem that the
more important Mexico becomes
as an oil

producer and exporter, the more likely
that its government

will continue to pursue an assertive
and dynamic presence in inter-

national affairs.

Mexico's foreign policy, partly because of

a

defensive reaction due to wariness of the
overwhelming U.S. proximity,
and also because of an impulse born of its
nationalistic propelling

elan, will probably be antagonistic, or at least
not acquiescent to
U.S. overtures in Central America and the Caribbean.

And it is here

that the greatest danger to the relations betv/een the two
countries
resides.

Paradoxically, but only seemingly so, the more economically

dependent Mexico becomes on the United States, the greater its

compensating efforts will be to implement an independent foreign
pel icy.

There would seem to be

a

cause-and-effect relationship between

Mexico's foreign policy and its domestic situation.
the two are negatively related.

That is,

a

At present,

tenser and more unstable

internal situation is bound to result in a more forceful and

nationalistic foreign policy.

Already, from the American perspective,

Mexico's foreign policy towards Central America and the Caribbean,
in spite of following traditional

principles, would appear to be going

beyond the limits of propriety established in the past in the
relations between the two nations.

But, it must be remembered that

this is a region very close to Mexico's national

interest, too.
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In other words, Mexican foreign policy is, at
least partly, the

counterbalance to Mexico's uneasy domestic cauldron.

The Mexican

government, with growing oil revenues, is bound to try to patch up some
of its shortcomings in the domestic milieu, through a more aggressive

presence in the international scenario.

On the other hand, because

of that same nationalistic behavior, and because it follows the price
policies of that association without the political hindrances of
formal membership, Mexico will not join OPEC.

Such a move would

be feasible only under conditions of an extreme deterioration of
its relations with the United States.

A Recapitulation

By the early 1980 's, the Mexican government would seem to be

caught in the vicious circle of high levels of oil production-

recrudescence of shortcomings in old and new economic sectors as
well as in regard to the social situation-and still higher levels

of oil production.

This impasse will prove to be hard to overcome.

In spite of the Energy Program, and the protestations of Mexico's

political leadership in regard to

a

firm oil production and exports

platform, self-imposed levels of output are likely to be surpassed.
Increases in oil production and exports are bound to take place
and
because of the distortions in Mexico's process of development,

programs.
the need to earn foreign currency to pay for domestic
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The fact is that Mexico's model of
development remains deeply

unbalanced and distorted.

Easy oil money is bound to underline

the negative aspects of the Mexican
system.

political leadership, still, is to create

a

The challenge to Mexico's

proper model of develop-

ment, congruent with Mexico's traditions,
available means, and
national goals.

The Mexican State has been evolving since the Reform
period in
the 1850's.

Petroleum wealth represents

a big,

and probably the last,

opportunity for the Mexican State to give new sustenance, and
justice,
to the national process of development, under its auspices.

If it

fails, then the initiative will pass to private enterprise, or to
the military.

The potential implications of either course are grave:

deep instability originating in Mexico's nationalistic and leftist
groups as they see the private sector take over increasingly the
control levers of the economy, or repression a la South America, with
its

impact on Mexican migration to the United States, and other

various border problems.

These ominous possibilities should motivate the U.S. government
to devise and implement comprehensive policies that take into account

the entire scope of its relations with its southern neighbor, and

promote the maintenance of
forces within Mexico.

a

moderately fluid interplay of political

At present, U.S. policies that encourage

increasingly higher levels of oil production in Mexico, and at the
same time thwart Mexican foreign policy initiatives, are myopic and

counterproductive.
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U.S. -Mexican rapprochement must tread,
by necessity, a path

geared towards conciliation and compromise.

This path is located

somewhere between Mexico's hypersensitive
historical memory, and
the U.S. historical amnesia, between American
attempts to achieve
total

control of its sphere of influence, and Mexico's
need to

uphold its sovereignty.

A true partnership is required.

As the

stronger partner, the United States must have, at the
center of its

Mexican foreign policy,

ment in Mexico.

a

special concern for the process of develop-

As Fagen asserts,

"At one level this means a frank recognition of
the 'specialness' of the U.S. relationship
with Mexico by virtue of the 2,000-mile frontier,
the weight of the U.S. presence in the Mexican
economy, and the scale and importance of Mexico
to the United States
an even greater challenge
in the long run will be to find ways of supporting
those aspects of Mexican development and political
practice that promise to increase social justice
....to fail to understand that a Mexico in which
the fruits of development are not more equitably
shared is also a Mexico which cannot indefinitely
continue to be a 'good neighbor' is to misread
history and to ignore geography."?
In any case, confrontation over foreign policy matters will

continue to be a fact of life in U.S. -Mexico relations, at least in
the short run.

The challenge for both countries is to keep

confrontation within manageable limits, and to set the basis for
more amicable and mutually satisfying relations in the long run.
In this context, U.S. energy needs must not blind Washington to the

increasingly complex scenario in Mexican domestic politics, and
its external

reverberations.
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Ultimately. Mexican nationalism
does not need to be incompatible

with the national interest of
the United States, as long as the
latter
understands the nature of ongoing
changes in Mexico, and the need to
go beyond dependence towards a new
form of interest association.

Mexico is trying to consolidate its
political and economic autonomy,
and to widen the radius ot its external
actions.

reliant Mexico, and not

a

But

a

strong, self-

dependent Mexico, is the best insurance

for good, stable bilateral relations.
On the other hand, Mexican initiatives in foreign
policy matters

may pave the way for greater cooperation.

Under a more imaginative

policy framework, the U.S. government would encourage Mexico
to play
a greater role in bringing peace and reconciliation between
the

warring factions in

El

Salvador.

Likewise, it could be argued that,

perhaps, American interests would be best served by improving

relations with Cuba, and thus reducing its reliance on the Soviet
Union, or by increasing economic and political contacts with the

Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
play an extremely useful role as

a

In both scenarios, Mexico would

mediator.

In any case, petroleum constitutes a watershed in U.S. -Mexican

relations.

For the United States, it means a change it its conduct

and patterns of action towards Mexico and, for the latter,

definition of its project as

a

nation.

a

This will require the

demise of ethnocentric approaches on the part of the United States.
In the words of Michael

and Nanneke Redclift:
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...If Mexican policy is characterized by a
search for greater economic independence,
more attention to resource conservation,
redistributive policies at home, and an
active foreign policy in Central America
and the Caribbean, Washington should
recognize that these policies are consistent
with long-term U.S. interests. "8
If an association based on mutual

interests and benefits is to

evolve, the U.S. government must understand and accept the changes that
are taking place in Mexico, and the emergence of the Mexican State
as a middle power with autonomous goals of its own.

Under other

circumstances, the temptation of economic and political interventionism

may effectively obstruct this unique opportunity.^ The setting

is

thus

ready for closer friendship or escalating confrontation in the relations

between Mexico and the United States.

In this context, petroleum

constitutes both a source of confidence, and
out to be a propelling force, or

a

quagmire.

a

quandary.

It may turn

It corresponds to

decision-makers in both nations to seize this historical challenge
and turn it into a stepping stone for cooperation.
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